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Abstract 
International greenhouse gas emissions are typically monitored and regulated from a 
production perspective. This accounts for emissions produced directly by industries within a 
country’s territory. International climate regulation centres around decarbonisation, negative 
emissions technologies and energy efficiency, none of which are aligned in practice with a two 
degree future. Given the remaining emissions gap between limiting temperature rise to two 
degrees (or lower) and existing climate mitigation pledges, mitigation policies must be 
constantly reviewed.  
Materials act as a carrier of industrial energy that allows, through trade, the transfer of 
emissions between producers and consumers. Despite continual increases in aggregate 
consumption, industrialised countries have managed to stabilise their production emissions, 
partially from increasing imports from developing countries. For example, 20% of emissions 
growth in countries without climate targets under the Kyoto Protocol can be attributed to 
products exported for final consumption in countries with climate targets, who are not assigned 
any responsibility for reducing them. However international policies continue to prioritise 
production-related measures that reduce the carbon intensity of energy supply or reduce direct 
energy consumption. Reducing absolute demand for materials and products, which embody 
emissions, is absent from national climate policy packages in high-consuming developed 
countries. In this context, ‘sufficiency’ is seen as politically unpopular and often framed by 
companies and governments as denying consumers’ basic rights or by describing consumers 
unwilling to change their behaviours. Yet evidence suggests consumption patterns are instead 
heavily influenced by ingrained social practices, locked in by powerful marketing corporations.  
I investigate how the implementation of embodied emissions would redefine existing climate 
targets and policies, and explore further opportunities for resource consumption policies in 
climate mitigation. This is within the context of existing UK climate targets, however I also argue 
that the targets need to be reframed as they, in themselves,  are not aligned with the 
international climate objective of preventing two degrees or lower temperature rise. I examine 
how the integration of embodied emissions would alter the UK’s 2050 climate target and 
mitigation policies, how the UK’s energy supply system might adapt when mitigating for 
emissions embodied in fuels and energy technologies, and the additional emissions scope of 
extending energy efficiency policies to include emissions embodied in resource use in the EU.  
I conclude that resource consumption policies increase the policy portfolio of energy dominant 
mitigation strategies and can contribute to bridging the remaining emissions gap. However, the 
tools and targets used to devise this evidence base are limited, and need further validation. I 
propose complementing mandatory production emissions accounting with mandatory 
consumption-based accounts. Their use in policy would ensure actions in one country do not 
result in a shift in production impacts to another and increases the policies available to meeting 
climate targets, particularly in combination with resource efficiency policies. In the discussion I 
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make the case that the foundation of such a framework already exists and outline possible steps 
for implementation.   
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1 Introduction 
Despite international agreement by 195 countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
consistent with limiting global temperature rise to two degrees Celsius (UNFCCC, 2010), global 
greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise. National territorial emissions inventories are 
submitted annually to the UNFCCC to monitor progress. These report the volume of emissions 
released directly from production sectors within a country, incentivising countries to reduce 
end-of-pipe emissions generated within their territories. However, this accounting procedure 
underplays the role consumption has on rising emissions. This thesis investigates an alternative 
but complementary approach for national emissions accounting, target setting and policy 
making: a consumption-based accounting approach. Consumption emissions are the sum of 
emissions generated globally to produce products (goods and services) consumed in a country, 
also termed embodied emissions (Munksgaard and Pedersen, 2001, Peters and Hertwich, 2008a, 
Peters, 2008). Conceptually they are equal to territorial emissions plus emissions generated 
abroad to produce imports minus emissions generated domestically to produce exports. 
Changes to consumption therefore have the ability to reduce emissions generated outside a 
nation’s territory from import production, creating potential policy applications that would not 
arise from a territorial accounting approach.    
The problem of climate change is mounting, having arguably transgressed the boundaries for 
operating within two degrees of temperature rise (Rockstrom et al., 2009, Steffen et al., 2015). 
There is a well-established scientific foundation to inform climate policy so as to prevent 
warming of greater than two degrees, however climate change is proving difficult to mitigate, 
due largely to the complexity and multiplicity of actors involved. I have chosen to focus on the 
integration of embodied emissions into climate mitigation policy because it offers policy 
additionality, has been suggested as a compromise to break the climate impasse (Grasso and 
Roberts, 2014), and prevents countries shifting their emissions burden abroad. Whilst there has 
been a considerable amount of research reporting the consumption impacts of a region or 
organisation, developing and refining the models and methods , and to a lesser extent on 
quantifying the emissions saving potential of altering consumption patterns; there has been 
little empirical work on how its implementation would affect existing national climate policies 
and targets. This thesis attempts to move away from tracing the consumption-driven climate 
impacts of regions, to focusing on the solutions. 
1.1 A consumption perspective of climate mitigation 
A global deal on climate change is seen as an essential tool in reducing emissions, and this is 
being negotiated at the national level, with countries or regional groupings pledging individual 
action plans. It was the aim of the 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21) of the UNFCCC in 
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December 2015 to reach a global agreement on how to meet the internationally agreed two 
degree climate objective. The analysis in this thesis was completed before countries began 
submitting their most recent climate pledges, known as Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs), that were negotiated at the COP 21. Therefore, most of the text refers to 
the pre-existing pledges and policies. However, early indications suggest there still remains a 
considerable gap between targets and actions pledged and carbon budgets for a two degree 
future (Gütschow et al., 2015) and pledges are yet to mention embodied emissions. Therefore 
the analysis remains relevant to the ongoing debate.      
In this section I review the literature on climate mitigation from a consumption perspective. The 
structure of the review is summarised in Figure 1. I identify the scientific evidence on emissions 
budgets and trajectories to prevent dangerous climate change; explore the drivers of rising 
global emissions which provide the leverage for reducing their impact; outline the strengths and 
limitations of consumption-based accounting from a governance perspective; describe the 
availability of data and methods from a practical standpoint; and present evidence of the 
effectiveness of potential consumption-based climate policies. 
Figure 1: Overview of literature review 
 
 
1.1.1 Target setting and climate governance 
Based on climate science, this section identifies the speed of the low carbon transition required 
and the adequacy of current mitigation policies to achieve this goal, finding that there remains 
a considerable disconnect between science and policy.  
1.1.1.1 Carbon budgets and mitigation pathways  
Climate science gives us a good indication of atmospheric limits to avoid more than two degrees 
of warming. Global temperature rises are approximately proportional to an increase in 
cumulative carbon emissions, but not end-point targets where emission pathways to reach a 
2050 reduction target can differ (Gillett et al., 2013). The linear response of climate as a function 
of cumulative emissions is termed transient climate response to emissions (TCRE), and is defined 
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as the global mean surface temperature change per 1000GtC emitted to the atmosphere. The 
TCRE is likely to be in the range of 0.8 degrees to 2.5 degrees per 1000 GtC, factoring in 
uncertainty and holding true only until temperatures peak and for smoothly varying cumulative 
emissions (i.e. not disruptive change) (Collins et al., 2013). By directly relating warming to 
emissions it can be used to calculate the cumulative emissions consistent with two degrees of 
warming (Allen et al., 2009, Meinshausen et al., 2009), providing a scientific basis to inform 21st 
century emission pathways (Collins et al., 2013). 
The uncertainty associated with the TCRE means that probabilities are attached to budgets for 
limiting the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions to less than 2oC. To have a 66% 
probability (the highest probability considered) of not exceeding two degrees of temperature 
rise, the IPCC calculated that 790 GtC of greenhouse gases (GHG) can be emitted between 1880 
and 2100. In 2011 approximately 515 ± 85 GtC had already been emitted since the 1860-1880 
baseline, limiting future emissions (from 2011) of between 275 and 385 GtC to 2100 depending 
on the probability accepted. Including a 10% contribution from land-use change, we are 
currently emitting between 10-11 GtC annually. If an equivalent amount continues to be emitted 
annually the budget could be exhausted as early as 2038, however Meinshausen et al. (2009) 
shows that this could be as early as 2024 if less risk is accepted (they measure an 80% probability 
of not exceeding 2 degrees). Anderson and Bows (2011) suggest that 2 degrees should form a 
threshold level where probabilities of exceeding 2 degrees are replaced with prevention of 2 
degrees of warming, but warn that the viability of this is rapidly diminishing.  
In recognition of the relationship between cumulative emissions and temperature rise, emission 
trajectories need to be derived from concentrations of accumulated GHGs in the atmosphere, 
as was done in the latest round of IPCC scenarios (Peters et al., 2013). They are referred to as 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) and are particularly relevant to informing 
climate mitigation budgets as they have for the first time included a strong mitigation pathway 
consistent with the long term climate policy objective of not exceeding 2 degrees (RCP 2.6).  
To be aligned with RCP 2.6, the IPCC suggest global emissions need to peak by 2020 whilst 
sustaining 2015 emissions levels until then, sustain around 3% annual reductions thereafter, and 
if delayed, achieve negative carbon emissions by withdrawing carbon from the atmosphere by 
2070 (Peters et al., 2013). However, the uncertainty and expense of these technologies are 
widely cited and to be successful have a politically and economically contentious road ahead 
(Watson et al., 2014). If we assume that negative carbon technologies will not be available then 
emissions would need to peak earlier or the annual reduction would need to be steeper. 
Trajectories (i.e. emissions peaks and reduction rates) have been differentiated between regions 
to reflect stages of economic growth and allow room for less developed economies to grow 
(Bows and Barrett, 2010, Anderson and Bows, 2011, Raupach et al., 2014). Delaying peak 
emissions however will only lead to higher mitigation rates in the future at higher costs. Without 
the technologies available to withdraw atmospheric carbon, Raupach et al. (2014) demonstrate 
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the need for stronger global annual reduction rates of 7% to have a 66% chance of not exceeding 
two degrees. When differentiating across countries based on per emissions per capita, 
mitigation rates exceed 15% in some developed countries, whilst being nearly zero in some of 
the world’s low-income countries.  Anderson and Bows (2011) reach similar conclusions, 
suggesting reduction rates of between 6 and 8% in less developed countries, and up to 11% in 
developed countries.  
1.1.1.2 Climate governance 
Early environmental regulation in the Global North in the 1960s addressed visible environmental 
problems (McManus, 2009), concentrated on regulating the quality of localised impacts to 
environmental media such as air, soil and water, independent of market objectives (Hey, 2005). 
Concern about the ability of regulated industries to compete in markets with unregulated ones 
saw a weakening of government intervention and a reduction in the legislative and regulatory 
burdens for businesses in the 1980s. Regulation was replaced with market incentives with the 
aim of motivating business to cost-effectively innovate. As trade has been liberalised patterns 
of trade specialisation have resulted, to some degree, in less developed countries producing 
carbon intensive goods for export to developed countries (Gasim, 2015). There has been a shift 
from legislating localised impacts to international agreements protecting global commons and 
regulating internationally important resources whilst recognising the development needs of 
millions living in poverty. Governance has moved from a first-come first-served basis, to 
principles of burden-sharing, questioning whether countries that have contributed least to the 
cumulative problem should be treated the same as those who have contributed the most. 
Since 1992, 195 nations have signed an international treaty under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreeing to limit climate change and its 
impacts, but with differentiated responsibilities to reflect development needs, termed Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). Within this parties 
endorsed a target requiring climate policy to limit warming to two degrees above pre-industrial 
levels in the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2010). This overall objective has not yet been 
matched with a global agreement on emission reduction targets and cross-country 
responsibilities.  
International negotiations were initiated in the early 1990’s where parties were split into three 
main groups Table 1. Annex I parties have the strongest quantitative commitments and 
reporting obligations compared to non-Annex I parties which have qualitative obligations, more 
lenient reporting requirements and eligibility for financial and technological assistance 
(Depledge, 2009). Underpinning the UNFCCC are the Kyoto Protocol and Cancun Agreements. 
Countries known as Annex B are those Annex I countries that have ratified an emission reduction 
target under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. In addition to achieving Kyoto reductions (18% 
below 1990 levels by 2020) through domestic measures, the Protocol created a carbon market 
allowing countries to sell credits if they exceeded their targets, but also to receive credits for 
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reducing emissions overseas. The carbon market is implemented through three market-based 
measures: International Emissions Trading allows countries to sell spare carbon units to those 
that are over their targets; the Clean Development Mechanism credits Annex B countries for 
emission reduction projects they implement in non-Annex B countries; and Joint 
Implementation credits Annex B countries for emission reduction projects they implement in 
other Annex B countries. Whilst the intention was that as emissions in non-Annex I parties grew 
they would take on the obligations of Annex I countries, the voluntary nature has failed to 
motivate such transitions (Depledge, 2009).  
Table 1: UNFCCC party classification according to differing commitments 
Classification Definition Example countries/ 
regions 
Current commitment 
Annex I Industrialised OECD member 
countries and countries 
deemed to be economies in 
transition in 1992 
EU, the Baltic 
States, Russia, 
North America, 
Australia, Japan etc. 
Pledged quantified 
economy-wide emission 
reduction targets to 2020 
(Cancun Agreements)  
Annex B Annex I countries with emission 
reduction commitments in 
Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol 
Annex I excluding 
USA, Japan, Russia 




Annex II OECD members in Annex I 
excluding economies in 
transition 
EU, North America, 
Australia 
Provide financial resources 
for abatement in transition 
and developing economies  
Non-Annex I Countries deemed as 
developing in 1992 and 
recognised as being vulnerable 
to the adverse impacts of 
climate change 
Asia, Central and 
South America, 
Middle East, Africa 
Nationally appropriate 




Whilst the majority of countries in Annex I signed up to the initial Kyoto Protocol, the US, the 
second largest emitter worldwide, refused to ratify it on the basis that some high emitting 
nations were excluded (e.g. China) and that it would harm the US economy. Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand and Russia have since withdrawn from the second commitment from 2013 to 2020, 
deeming that the Protocol is ineffective without the inclusion of the highest emitters.  
Alongside legally-binding Kyoto targets, Annex I countries have pledged quantified economy-
wide reduction targets to 2020 documented in the Cancun Agreement (UNFCCC, 2011). Some 
participants, for example the EU, have said they will strengthen their reduction (from 20% to 
30%), but only if a global agreement is reached where developed countries reduce by a 
comparable amount and developing countries contribute adequately according to their 
respective capabilities. Parties are not legally held to these, but it is anticipated they will 
underpin a legal emission reduction framework that was negotiated COP21 at the end of 2015. 
Whilst the Cancun Agreements are not restricted to Annex I countries, the divide between 
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quantified targets and qualitative mitigation actions remain, with Annex I countries submitting 
quantified reduction targets for 2020 and non-Annex I countries implementing mitigation 
actions based not on absolute emission reductions but largely to gain technology and financial 
transfers from Annex I countries.  
So far, climate policy has prioritised the deployment of low carbon energy technologies. From 
this perspective, emissions will depend on how effectively policy can enable the deployment of 
low carbon technologies (Chicco and Stephenson, 2012). Whilst deemed to be technically 
feasible and within the political scope of national governments, the risks and barriers to 
widespread technology deployment are frequently documented ((Bruckner et al., 2014) (Iyer et 
al., 2015, Luthra et al., 2014) (Kennedy and Basu, 2013) (Balcombe et al., 2013) (Eleftheriadis 
and Anagnostopoulou, 2015)). Commonly identified is their high upfront investment costs 
compared to the relatively long payback period. The current market-driven policy approach has 
been shown to be incapable of delivering the type of low carbon technology investment required 
over the necessary timescales (Bolton and Foxon, 2015), and industrialising countries do not 
seem to be avoiding fossil fuel lock-in, as was hoped (Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006). 
While low carbon technologies could technically provide all the energy needed for the 
continuing growth in consumption, this is proving to be a very expensive pathway with many 
barriers. 
The IEA (2013) analysed the CO2 impact of pre-COP 21 climate commitments and pledges, 
finding that even if fulfilled they fall far short of levels needed for a two degree future. 38 
countries representing only 13% of global emissions have taken on binding emission targets to 
2020 under the extended Kyoto protocol. Additionally, 43 countries representing a 36% share 
of 2010 global emissions have set themselves a mitigation target, and 48 countries making up a 
42% share of global emissions have pledged actions to mitigate their emissions. Even if all these 
are achieved, the two degree target remains out of reach.  
Despite the scientific evidence of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, international mitigation 
policy within the UNFCCC remains descriptive when referring to a two degree target and 
fragmented in terms of implementation. A key challenge facing climate policy is therefore how 
to distribute the remaining global carbon budget between countries to form national mitigation 
strategies. Contraction and convergence frameworks have been proposed to distribute the 
global budget equitably across nations in accordance with every person having an equal right to 
carbon space, offering environmental benefits and addressing poverty alleviation 
simultaneously (Corfee-Morlot and Höhne, 2003). Several allocation schemes have been 
proposed, often discussed in the context of equity and political acceptability (for summaries 
refer to Winkler et al. (2002), Mattoo and Subramanian (2012) Kawase and Matsuoka (2013) 
and Pan et al. (2014)). Proposed allocations are governed by issues of historical responsibility 
for emissions generation, the ability to pay for abatement, responsibility for current emissions 
releases and equal entitlements for every citizen to atmospheric emissions space (Bows and 
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Barrett, 2010). Different fairness-based criteria favour and bias different countries, not only 
between developed and developing countries but also within developing countries (Winkler et 
al., 2002), making it difficult to come to a consensus. 
1.1.1.3 Global cooperation 
The atmosphere is characterised as a common-pool resource which has a limited carbon space, 
at least to minimise rising temperatures; is difficult to exclude or limit greenhouse gas emitters; 
and emissions from one actor limits the carbon space of others (Ostrom, 1999). Climate change 
has been described as a tragedy of the commons (Paavola, 2011, Stavins et al., 2014), first 
depicted by Hardin in 1968. Hardin depicts his hypothesis as a pasture open to all herdsmen. 
Each herdsman is expected to keep as many cattle as possible. As populations grow, for example 
by health improvements, the carrying capacity of the land is exceeded and cannot maintain 
increasing numbers of cattle. Each herdsman acts ‘rationally’ to maximise his own gain. As all 
the proceeds from the sale of an animal go to the individual farmer, yet the effects of 
overgrazing are shared amongst all herdsmen, the farmer is incentivised to keep adding to his 
own herd.  
There are two implicit assumptions within Hardin’s analogy: there can be no technological 
solution to growing population demands on a planet with finite resources and ecological limits, 
and people act out of self-interest and not concern for the global good. In the case of the former, 
it is mathematically impossible to maximise for two variables: resource limits and a growing 
population. In the latter case it is assumed that the individual benefits received from the use of 
a resource outweigh the shared collective loss from over use or pollution. In this circumstance, 
Hardin concludes that regulations on access and use of the pasture in the form of private 
property rights (i.e. getting rid of the commons) would be needed to stop herdsman degrading 
the pasture, as without this they would continue profit seeking for themselves.   
The assumption of self-interested actors seeking to maximise their immediate individual gains 
has been challenged by Elinor Ostrom in direct response to Hardin’s analogy (Ostrom, 1999). 
Moreover, the basic economic theory of utility-maximising individuals has been criticised in 
many fields of research (Levine et al., 2015). Actors do not necessarily act in self-interest, nor 
for purely economic gains (Cárdenas and Ostrom, 2004, Jackson, 2005). Rather trust and 
reciprocity can go some way to explaining the cooperation of individuals within a system, along 
with psychological, sociological and institutional influences, describing an individual with 
habitual behaviours and preferences, interacting with others around them, and operating within 
an institutional construct.  
Whilst Ostrom argues communities can cooperate for the greater good without the need for 
external regulation (Ostrom, 2012, Ostrom, 1999), she and other scholars also recognise that 
the multiplicity of global actors contributing to climate change lends itself somewhat to the need 
for some form of external regulation (Ostrom, 2010). Ostrom depicts a theory of collective action 
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where behaviours are characterised by human action, influenced by internal psychological and 
external sociological and institutional factors, and not purely individual reasoning. She promotes 
a polycentric system of governance where various actors across different spatial, temporal and 
institutional scales play some role in the process, as they understand the local context and need 
to be able to adapt within it, but recognising that with no clear atmospheric boundary, and a 
large, highly mobile and diverse population of emitters, there may be no alternative but to rely 
on centrally imposed rules to incentivise changes in behaviour (Ostrom et al., 2012). Relying 
exclusively on the latter however, she argues, is unlikely to create sufficient trust among actors 
that is essential to compliance (Ostrom, 2012), and those actors remaining unconvinced about 
the need to reduce emissions could continue to be or become free-riders (Ostrom, 2010). 
1.1.2 Analysis of emissions drivers  
Understanding the drivers of emissions puts the mitigation challenge into perspective. In 
quantifying the contribution of individual drivers it is possible to determine the rates of change 
required to reverse rising trends in emissions. For example, it gives analysts and policy makers 
the ability to quantify the required rates of efficiency improvements to offset growth in 
population and the economy to meet a given carbon budget. 
1.1.2.1 Energy and the economy 
GHG emissions, dominated by fossil fuel combustion, are often explained by patterns of 
economic growth. The literature is inconclusive as to whether energy is a prerequisite for 
economic growth, or economic growth drives energy demand, which will have implications for 
future policy development (Stern and Enflo, 2013). If GDP stimulates energy use, then energy 
supply wouldn't constrain economic growth, however if the reverse is true, limited energy could 
have negative impacts on economic growth (Kalimeris et al., 2014).  
The conventional approach to understanding the energy-economy relationship is measured as 
the proportion of GDP spent on direct energy compared to capital and labour costs (Warr and 
Ayres, 2010, Ayres and Warr, 2005). Studies consistently show a relative decoupling of energy 
consumption from economic growth since the 1970s (Bithas and Kalimeris, 2013), explained by 
global processes of industrialisation and economic restructuring (Sorrell, 2015). As countries 
industrialise, in aggregate they shift to less energy-intensive production and restructure to 
produce higher value service-based products (Warr and Ayres, 2010). In comparison to the high 
costs of capital and labour, energy is deemed of little importance in driving economic growth, 
and is often depicted as being substitutable with capital (Daly, 2013).  
However, Ayres and Warr (2005) demonstrate that the role of energy is greater than the 
payment made for it, describing it as the ‘engine for growth’. The conventional measure 
captures primary energy as a direct input to the production process, but not the efficiency with 
which primary energy is converted, or the dependence of other production processes for the 
physical output in the form of goods and services, coined as ‘useful work’. In other words, 
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production outputs require not only direct energy inputs, but indirect inputs (goods and 
services) within which energy is embodied (Gasim, 2015, Wagner, 2010). For example, whilst 
capital in the form of fertiliser and irrigated water has to some extent replaced sunlight, soil 
nutrients and rain, they themselves embody energy and therefore are not a replacement for it 
(Daly, 2013). Given energy is the only source of useful work, it is indispensable for economic 
progress (Kalimeris et al., 2014, Warr and Ayres, 2010). Energy is therefore certainly a limiting 
factor to growth (Brown et al., 2011) and to sustain long-term growth it is necessary to increase 
energy supplies or increase the efficiency of energy into useful work (Warr and Ayres, 2010). 
Energy consumption is not only correlated to economic growth but to other quality of life 
indicators such as health and education, as it takes energy to train doctors and teachers and 
build hospitals and schools (Brown et al., 2011), yet beyond a certain level of energy 
consumption the returns start to become diminished (Steinberger and Roberts, 2010). Feeding, 
clothing and maintaining a population necessitates energy, the amount of which is determined 
by the efficiency in which it is converted to useful work and the demand for goods and services. 
Bithas and Kalimeris (2013) show that improvements in the conversion of energy have been 
offset by increasing population and demand for goods. Steinberger and Roberts (2010) find that 
if global resources were equally distributed, current energy consumption would be sufficient to 
meet global human needs at high levels of human development. Despite uncertainty as to the 
direction of the causal effect between energy and economic growth, there is general agreement 
that energy is essential to growing economies and to stay within climatic limits, current trends 
in population and consumption growth cannot be sustained.  
1.1.2.2 Consumption as a driver of emissions 
Simplifying emissions growth into a linear function of economic output has been shown to give 
a poor understanding of emissions (Roberts et al., 2003). Candidate drivers of greenhouse gases 
include population, affluence, technology, institutions, culture, attitudes and beliefs (Rosa and 
Dietz, 2012, Dietz and Rosa, 1997, Lamb et al., 2014). There is a longstanding consensus in the 
literature that increasing consumption is the dominant factor when measured using the 
common Kaya identity, based on the earlier I-PAT equation, which looks at environmental 
impacts more broadly (credited to Ehrlich and Holdren in the 1970s). The Kaya identity 
decomposes overall changes in emissions into macro-level variables of population, affluence and 
technology as follows:   
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Affluence is expressed as GDP per capita and is indicative of income, and technology is expressed 
as the product of energy to produce GDP and the CO2 intensity per unit of energy used. However, 
from a per capita perspective, only a minority of the population are responsible for the majority 
of impact (Chakravarty et al., 2009), and there is an uneven distribution in time (reflected by 
cumulative emissions),across regions (Raupach et al., 2007) and increasingly within regions 
(Chancel and Piketty, 2015). 
Different regions and sectors contribute differently to global emissions. Asia for example is the 
only region to have nearly doubled the carbon intensity of its energy, compared to an 
improvement in the range of 5 to 25% for all other regions since 1970. In addition, Asia 
experienced the strongest economic growth averaging 5% per annum, compared to a global 
average of 1.8%. Transport and buildings are the dominant source of emissions in high-income 
countries; land-use change dominates in low income countries; and energy and industry in 
middle income countries (Blanco et al., 2014). Liddle and Lung (2010) found that affluence has 
twice the impact on CO2 emissions from transport compared to population, yet for residential 
energy consumption population has a considerably greater impact. This seems consistent with 
transport dominating wealthy country emissions, and energy in middle-income countries. 
However, at the city level, urbanisation reduces the need for travel (Weisz and Steinberger, 
2010), and hence different relationships exist at different spatial scales and for different 
activities. Furthermore, other localised incentives such as the quality of public transport and 
deterrents of car use play a role at this level (Weisz and Steinberger, 2010).  
Overall improvements in energy intensities have not been enough to offset growing consumer 
demands of an increasing population (Figure 2). The contribution of economic growth rose 
sharply in the last decade (IPCC, 2014). The global financial crisis in 2009 had only short-lived 
effects, with emissions rebounding back to record highs the following year (Peters et al., 2012b). 
Population is expected to continue to grow in most regions alongside the promotion of 
economic growth (Rosa and Dietz, 2012), resulting in higher purchasing powers which will need 
to be met with greater rates of efficiency improvements if lifestyles and consumption levels 
remain unaddressed. However, contradictory to the widely held view that increased affluence 
leads to reduced environmental impacts beyond a certain level of wealth, defined by the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), this has not been shown to be the case for greenhouse gas 
emissions (Rosa and Dietz, 2012, Dietz et al., 2007), particularly in countries rich in fossil fuel 
resources (Burke, 2010, Burke, 2012).  
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Figure 2: Decadal decomposition of global CO2 emissions by four drivers (IPCC, 2014) 
 
When considering emissions per capita, inequalities in regional contributions become even 
more striking. Per capita emissions of the highest income countries are almost ten times that of 
the lowest income countries (Blanco et al., 2014, Chancel and Piketty, 2015). Emissions per 
capita are growing in emerging economies in Asia, yet remain at two thirds of OECD countries. 
Evidence has shown however that there is a general trend towards Western consumption 
patterns in less developed economies (Rosa and Dietz, 2012, Dietz and Rosa, 1997). As wealth 
accumulates, the number of households increases, and hence the heating, cooling, lighting and 
energy service requirements increase, complicated by a range of additional demographic factors 
such as age structure and urbanisation (Dietz et al., 2007, Liddle and Lung, 2010).  
International diversity and temporal dynamics makes driver-based analyses challenging (Lamb 
et al., 2014). To enable the quantification of drivers to increasing emissions, variables have had 
to be simplified and therefore are often investigated at the macro level. However, underlying 
trends in population, affluence and technology are a complex set of influential variables. It is 
this complex set of drivers that explains in much more detail the sectoral and regional 
divergences, which are much harder to quantify and therefore lack systematic assessment (Rosa 
and Dietz, 2012, Roberts et al., 2003). Different behavioural models have developed to 
understand why people consume and what internal and external factors shape and constrain 
choices and actions of individuals and organisations (Røpke, 1999, Jackson, 2005). These better 
describe the internal psychological and external societal influences on people’s behaviours and 
why pro-environmental attitudes are not necessarily reflected in sustainable behaviours. 
1.1.2.3 International trade and carbon leakage 
Many low income countries have been subject to the ‘resource curse’ where they have not been 
able to diversify their export economies beyond natural resources with little processing, which 
dampens economic growth and does not incentivise investment in human capital and innovation 
(Murshed and Serino, 2011) . The liberalisation of trade, starting in the late 1970s, has enabled 
high-income countries to take advantage of cost competitive pricing, and shift low skill, labour 
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intensive industries, e.g. clothing, textiles and manufactured hardware, to less developed 
countries (Mair et al.). High income countries tend to get more favourable terms of trade 
(Jorgenson, 2012), and falling costs in communication and coordination activities means that 
various stages of production do not need to be in close proximity, opening them up to global 
competition (Timmer et al., 2013). Western Europe is shifting towards more high-skilled service-
based workers as manufacturing becomes more global (Timmer et al., 2013). Less developed 
countries have turned to export production as a means to stimulate economic growth and 
attract direct foreign investment (Jorgenson, 2012). Whilst overall the global economy has 
expanded, most notably in China, trade between developed and less developed countries has 
become increasingly ecologically unequal (Jorgenson and Clark, 2012). As a result of 
globalisation, high income countries are able to partially externalise their environmental impacts 
through the ‘vertical flow of exports’ (Jorgenson, 2012).  
An increase in the volume and structure of international trade has enabled production activities, 
and their emissions, to be transferred outside the country of consumption (Peters et al., 2011), 
referred to as carbon leakage (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a). Between 1990, the benchmark year 
for emission reduction targets, and 2008, global CO2 emissions from export production grew at 
an average 4.3% a year, faster than economic and population growth (Peters et al., 2011). Net 
emissions transfers from non-Annex B countries (without climate targets) to Annex B countries 
(with legally-binding targets) via trade grew by 1.2 Gt CO2 (17% a year), whilst reductions within 
Annex B territories reduced by only 0.3 Gt CO2 (2%) (Peters et al., 2011). Kanemoto et al. (2014) 
found that up to 30% of global emissions are linked to export production. They confirm that 
trade is undermining Kyoto targets, calculating that the amount of burden-shifting abroad from 
Annex B countries is greater than their Kyoto-sized targets.  
A consumption-based emissions accounting perspective, which is adjusted for trade, often 
changes the rank of a country in terms of their contribution to global emissions. Territorial 
emissions from non-OECD Asian countries (includes China and India) more than tripled in two 
decades between 1990 and 2010, overtaking OECD countries in 2009 (left chart in Figure 3). 
Consumption emissions (territorial + imports – exports) remain overall higher in OECD countries. 
20% percent of emissions growth in non-Annex B countries can be attributed to increased 
demand for products in Annex B countries, 25% of which are emitted in China (Blanco et al., 
2014). Per capita territorial emissions (right chart in Figure 3) in OECD countries are three times 
those for non-OECD Asia, and OECD per capita consumption emissions are a factor five higher. 
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Figure 3: Territorial-based versus consumption-based emissions in five world regions, from 
1990 to 2010 (Blanco et al., 2014) 
 
The left panel presents total emissions, the right panel per capita emissions. The blue areas indicate that 
a region is a net importer of embodied CO2 emissions. The yellow area indicates a region is a net exporter 
of embodied CO2. OECD-1990 = OECD countries in 1990; EIT = economies in transition; LAM = Latin 
America and the Caribbean; MAF = Middle East and Africa; Asia = non-OECD Asia 
  
1.1.3 Consumption-based emissions accounting  
A growing body of research is concerned with emissions embodied in consumption (Munksgaard 
and Pedersen, 2001, Peters and Hertwich, 2008a, Wiedmann, 2009, Davis and Caldeira, 2010, 
Barrett et al., 2013), which is gaining policy relevance as nations consider their roles in global 
emissions reductions. In this section I consider the motivations for consumption accounting in 
international negotiations, and the robustness of accounting methods.  
1.1.3.1 The motivation 
There is an ethical argument that consumers should take responsibility for what they consume 
(Kokoni and Skea, 2013, Vetőné Mózner, 2013). Some propose that much of the pressure on 
climate change is a direct consequence of affluence and unsustainable consumption practices in 
industrialised countries (Steininger et al., 2014, Grasso and Roberts, 2014), which drive 
production. There have also been suggestions that both consumers and producers should share 
responsibilities, because whilst producers bear the environmental costs, they generate jobs and 
income from production (Ferng, 2003, Lenzen et al., 2007, Vetőné Mózner, 2013). Annex I 
countries can be seen as having taken out an ecological debt as they have generated nearly 60% 
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of the global cumulative emissions to develop their economies, whilst diminishing the carbon 
space for other countries to follow a similar development pathway (Ward and Mahowald, 2014). 
A number of authors suggest that attributing emissions reductions based on cumulative 
consumption accounting could address issues of inequality and fairness (Peters and Hertwich, 
2008a, Raupach et al., 2014) and hence be more politically acceptable to developing countries. 
Also, big emitters like the U.S. could be more accepting of mitigation requirements if their 
polluting counterparts (i.e. China) were also subject to mitigation targets.  
Practically, Peters et al. (2011) and Kanemoto et al. (2014) have shown that despite reporting 
success in bringing down their territorial emissions, when adjusted for net trade, most 
developed countries have resulted in increased global emissions driven by their consumption. 
These countries have more capacity, most often determined by their ability to pay, to mitigate 
emissions (Baer et al., 2007). It is therefore more economically and emissions effective for high-
income countries to be attributed greater mitigation responsibility. This also adheres to the 
principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and Respective Capacities (CBDR-RC) 
written into the UNFCCC (Wiedmann, 2009), which acknowledges the different capabilities and 
responsibilities of individual countries in addressing climate change. 
Consumption accounting increases information available to policy makers to design policy tools 
and analyse the probable effects of different consumer changes/ policies (Wiedmann, 2009, 
Steen-Olsen et al., 2014). In considering supply chains, the domination of energy production and 
energy intensive producers is replaced by resource intensive procurers, such as public services 
and manufactured goods. A consumption approach brings to the forefront different points of 
leverage that include the emissions of traded products that are not captured under territorial 
accounting (Barrett et al., 2013). This does not advocate only consumer-oriented measures, but 
it both increases the policy mechanisms available and would ensure policies cannot report 
reducing emissions by shifting them elsewhere. By putting pressure on greening up supply 
chains, developing countries would be encouraged to implement energy efficiency 
improvement strategies to reduce the carbon embodied in their exports in order to safeguard 
their access to foreign markets. However, this would require support in the form of technology 
and or finance to give developing countries the capacity to compete on the world market, which 
could be in the form of targeted technology transfers between trading partners for example 
(Wiedmann, 2009).  
1.1.3.2 Arguments against implementation 
Consumption accounting would require the greenhouse gas content of traded products to be 
recorded which is more methodologically and empirically challenging than compiling production 
accounts. Product supply chains have become increasingly complex since the liberalisation of 
trade, and can span several countries. The compilation of consumption accounts requires a 
standard monitoring, reporting and verification process to ensure transparency and enable 
cooperation between countries to comply with consumption accounting procedures.  
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The data requirements are larger, requiring global trade data between countries to be recorded 
in a common classification, currency and in basic prices (i.e. with the effect of inflation and 
distorting taxes and subsidies on prices removed, so the transactions represent physical 
quantities and not price effects). Additional administrative duties will put further pressure on 
developing countries that already require support to compile their production inventories. 
Currently global trade data sets are prone to assumptions where data is limited (Wiedmann, 
2009), or where recorded exports of one country do not tally with recorded imports from that 
country. The results have added uncertainty to production based measures, yet the additional 
uncertainty has been shown to be less significant than that inherent in production accounts 
(Peters et al., 2012a).  
Implementing regulation on the carbon content of products could impact on the comparative 
advantage of developing countries, whose export revenues would be reduced unless they met 
the specification at a cost. Carbon and energy intensive exports have been shown to be an 
important factor in economic growth and industrialisation (Chang et al., 2013, Xia et al., 2015, 
Sheridan, 2014, Helm et al., 2012), and the welfare effects could be unevenly felt by developing 
economies specialising in export production (Sakai, 2013). Discriminating against carbon 
intensive imports could be in breach of World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements (Helm et 
al., 2012) which do not allow discrimination between similar domestic and foreign products. If 
environmental concerns allowed the differentiation of products based on their embodied 
carbon, export-intensive economies might instead meet their consumer demands increasingly 
by domestic means, and with more carbon intensive economies such measures could actually 
indirectly increase global emissions (Jakob and Marschinski, 2013). However, the outcome on 
global trade is uncertain and will depend on the ability of countries to diversify their production.  
1.1.3.3 Methods and uncertainty  
At the macro level multi-region input-output (MRIO) analysis is a well-established method to re-
allocate emissions associated with production activities to the final demand of products 
(Wiedmann, 2009, Steen-Olsen et al., 2014). In the 1930s Wassily Leontief developed a series of 
linear equations that describe how producing a single unit of final demand requires inputs from 
all sectors of the economy. The economic framework was later extended to include a vector of 
‘externalities’ which measured tonnes of pollution per unit of final consumption (e.g. CO2/ £) 
(Miller and Blair, 2009), and to incorporate imports and exports (Wiedmann, 2009). The 
different sectors of an economy not only require natural resources in order to produce different 
goods and services, but they also generate several by-products (e.g. pollution and waste) during 
their production processes. Calculations could then determine how pollution originating from 
producing sectors in one country could be reallocated to final consumers in another country.  
In essence, inverting a global trade matrix showing monetary transactions between 
intermediate sectors and final consumers, termed the Leontief inverse after its inventor, can 
identify the direct effects that occur in a specific sector within a region and the indirect effects 
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that take place throughout the global supply chain in other regions derived by an additional unit 
spent either on finished domestic or imported goods. Pre-multiplying the Leontief inverse by a 
vector of carbon intensities (i.e. CO2/total output) produces a matrix indicating how the sum of 
emissions created directly and indirectly by an additional unit of final demand. Post multiplying 
this by a vector of final demand identifies the amount of emissions that is emitted upstream 
throughout the supply chain for a country or regions composition and level of spend. The results 
from MRIO databases can be used at a variety of scales from national level consumption 
accounting, to sector level footprints down to identifying the contribution of a particular sector, 
from a particular country in a good’s production chain (Peters, 2010b).  
In the last five years, several MRIO databases with an emissions extension have been developed, 
described in Table 2. Limitations in the availability, consistency and quality of global trade data 
has meant tables are constructed using various approaches (Inomata and Owen, 2014). The 
MRIO databases differ in their geographical, sectoral and temporal coverage. Eora has the 
longest annual time series from 1990 to 2012 and the largest geographical scope covering 186 
world regions. EXIOBASE uses the most detailed sector classification, displaying each region’s 
economy in 163 production sectors.  
Table 2: EE-MRIO models 







Eora Varies by 
country from 26 
to 515 sectors1 
187 1990 – 
2012 
Annual updates 
with 2 year 
time lag 
(Lenzen et al., 2012, 
Lenzen et al., 2013) 
GTAP 57 129 (yr ‘07); 
113 (yr ‘04); 




3 year intervals 
with a 4 year 
time lag 
(Narayanan et al., 
2012, Peters et al., 
2011) 







(Tukker et al., 2013, 
Wood et al., 2015) 
WIOD 35 industries, 
59 products 










Understanding uncertainties in the data gives an indication of the robustness of outcomes 
(Inomata and Owen, 2014) for use in designing and evaluating policies. Environmentally 
extended-MRIO analysis relies on the compilation of secondary economic, environmental and 
trade data into a MRIO framework. As shown by Peters et al. (2012a) different results across 
                                                          
1 The original database has heterogeneous country sector classification systems, however a 
harmonised 26 sector model is available 
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different models and studies can be attributed to the use of different production emissions data 
sources, different definitions of consumption and different economic and trade structures 
(supported by (Lenzen et al., 2010, Wiedmann et al., 2008, Wilting, 2012)).There are many ways 
in which the data can be assembled and adjusted (Inomata and Owen, 2014) and each alteration 
to the original source data introduces a layer of uncertainty. National economic data needs to 
be converted into a common currency and monetary transactions converted into basic prices. 
This requires price conversion statistics and taxes and subsidies to be re-distributed from a 
product to a value added sector. Where national data are missing, estimations are required such 
as the use of a representative average. MRIO tables must also adhere to a number of properties 
such as inputs must equal outputs and the sum of value added must equal the sum of the final 
demand. If these conditions are not met in the raw data, then the table is subjected to a number 
of balancing iterations until a table is produced that satisfies these constraints. Balancing 
methods vary and there are numerous techniques for table construction which leads to 
uncertainty in the final result.  
In addition, the aggregation of economic sectors introduces uncertainty. Firms are grouped into 
broader economic sectors, each representing a weighted average of the characteristics of the 
firms within them (Steen-Olsen et al., 2014). Steen-Olsen et al. (2014) show that this is more 
problematic for environmental analyses, as industries within a sector can exhibit different 
emissions profiles with an order of magnitude difference. For example, a carbon intensity is 
often applied to the agricultural sector when calculating consumption emissions. This 
aggregated sector includes a wide range of crops, animals, practices and so forth. However, 
cattle farming is considerably more carbon intensive than other types of agriculture. The choice 
of aggregation can therefore lead to different impact results. Grouping data together that 
exhibit very different emission intensities will lead to calculations containing more uncertainty.  
Whilst national-level trends in consumption emissions reported across different MRIO models 
are consistent within 10%, results by country and sector are more varied (Moran and Wood, 
2014). In a comparison of the main databases, Owen et al. (2014) find that differences in national 
consumption emissions accounts across the models are largely explained by differences in total 
global emissions from different data sources, differences in the trade structures, and differences 
in total final demand. Peters et al. (2012a) found that consumption-based emissions are broadly 
consistent across studies and MRIO databases, despite some differences in the model 
compilation, and that the difference didn’t necessarily translate into uncertainty but were a 
result of several data sources and definitions of consumption (see Table 3). Variation in the 
territorial emissions accounts, and the attribution of these emissions to countries and sectors, 
before entering the IO calculations, was found to be much larger than the variation in economic 
and trade input data. Transport and energy intensive sectors exhibited the most variation in 
results along with small trade dependant countries and countries with poor data quality.  
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Table 3: Average percentage variation between consumption-based emission accounts 
(adapted from Peters et al. (2012a)) 
Input data/ assumptions Average percentage variation  
Territorial emission accounting source 30% (between countries) 
Definition of consumption 21% 
Economic and trade input data 5% 
 
1.1.3.4 Quantifying material and product flows 
Using IOA, emissions associated with resource flows are calculated according to the magnitude 
of economic transactions between sectors, which does not distinguish between quantity and 
price components. IO models can separate costs from quantities (Davar, 1993), which is useful 
to investigate the effect of prices on the system, for example simulating the price effects of 
pollution abatement or rising energy costs. However, price homogeneity allows us to investigate 
supply and demand in one system.  
Homogeneity of prices holds true within sectors, but not across sectors. For example, the 
physical quantity of emissions from steel production are attributed to steel procurers based on 
the relative costs intermediate purchasers and consumers pay, and the physical quantity of 
emissions from electricity production are attributed separately to energy users based on the 
value of transactions between the energy sector and intermediate and final consumers. 
Therefore, emissions from steel remain allocated to users of steel and so on. The common price 
assumption means you can’t decompose whether different procurers paid a different amount 
for a unit of production output, meaning that if sectors paid a higher price for steel or energy, 
they would be allocated disproportionately more emissions from the production of that good. 
In reality, larger resource-intensive firms will generally agree a lower price per unit for resources 
than smaller firms. This is not a problem in IOA where firms producing similar outputs, regardless 
of size, are aggregated into an average sector, and hence will average out the price disparity. 
For commodities with relatively fixed prices (found more in oligopolistic markets) this is less of 
a problem compared to commodities with many more competitive global suppliers or those that 
are more volatile due to e.g. supply shortages or geopolitical concerns. Merciai and Heijungs 
(2014) argue that the assumption that purchasers pay the same price for an aggregate 
commodity can violate material flow balances. Material usage would be under estimated for 
those paying a lower than average price, and opposite for those paying a higher than average 
price.   
Economy-wide material flow analysis (MFA) builds on early concepts of material and energy 
balancing. It considers how materials are extracted from the natural system, transformed into 
products and finally put back into the natural system as an output i.e. waste. There are different 
methods for resource accounting based on mass balances and impact assessments that can 
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trace materials through the macro economy or along micro product supply chains (Mancini et 
al., 2015). In the UK, Allwood and Cullen (2012) and Cullen et al. (2012) have calculated the 
emissions impacts of material flows of steel and aluminum in detail, but data is limited to a few 
materials and is not collected as standard practice making it time-consuming to collect. 
Therefore, MFA tends to be subject to similar aggregation limitations to IOA, for example bulk 
materials are often grouped together regardless of the environmental impact of each material 
(e.g. Giljum et al. (2014b) and Schaffartzik et al. (2014)) and more detailed studies focus on 
tracing one material flow or product (e.g. Müller et al. (2011) and Pauliuk et al. (2012)) which 
does not provide an economy-wide perspective relevant for e.g. assessing economy-wide 
climate targets.  
There have been attempts to produce physical input-output tables (Hubacek and Giljum, 2003, 
Konijn et al., 1997), which are directly comparable to monetary IOA except inter-industry trade 
is represented in physical units (e.g. material weights). However these tend to be at a more 
aggregated sector, resource and impact level and are not done annually and therefore are 
available for a handful of years only (Hoekstra and van den Bergh, 2006). Probably due to the 
complexity and lack of data for collating them, these are not readily available for use. 
Sectoral carbon intensities, which are a function of emissions and economic output, are first 
calculated before promulgating through the economy to the final consumer. If prices are high 
and less of a good is purchased as a result, the carbon intensity will be lower, which will equal 
out the effect of the high price on emissions, and vice versa, albeit that some of the change will 
reflect an improvement in the carbon intensity of production and not just a price change. Carbon 
intensities represented in IOA are not solely a measure of efficiency due to a number of other 
economic factors such as price changes and inflation. Improvements in the physical efficiency of 
a process would require the use of physical data such as emissions (gCO2e)/ energy use (kWh). 
Majeau-Bettez et al. (2016) argue that the problem remains the aggregation of sectors with 
different environmental profiles. Two sectors may purchase quite different products within this, 
however, the emissions apportioned to them reflect the average of the sector and not the 
specific product they are purchasing. Majeau-Bettez et al. (2016) suggest the limitations would 
not necessarily reduce using physical flow tables, which remain at a highly aggregated level, 
including the aggregation of products and processes with different physical inputs. Therefore, I 
conclude that despite these limitations, IOA traces producer-consumer linkages with the most 
detail and uses data that is published annually in national economic accounts and environmental 
inventories. 
1.1.4 Consumption policies 
There are different levels of implementation of consumption-based accounting in practice, and 
the degree to which it becomes integrated in policy-making will determine the scope of policy 
instruments required. If consumption accounting were to be used as a mechanism for attributing 
responsibility for greenhouse gas mitigation only, then the focus would be on establishing robust 
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consumption-based measures. However, to target traded emissions, consumption accounting 
would need to be accompanied by a set of policy mechanisms addressing demand, trade and 
business supply chains, which I focus on in this section. There is evidence of embodied or life 
cycle emissions being applied in an informative capacity to guide policy, but applications with a 
direct link to specific policy instruments are rare (Kokoni and Skea, 2013). When demand is 
considered, much of it relates to energy efficiency improvements and not an absolute reduction 
in demand, and it is not integrated with non-technological innovations such as behavioural 
drivers, business models and policies (Hannon and Skea, 2014). 
Chapter 15 of Working Groups III’s contribution to the IPCC fifth assessment report provides an 
assessment of the performance of policies and measures in both developed and developing 
countries (Stavins et al., 2014). However, the assessment is at the sectoral level, e.g. energy, 
transport and industry, failing to identify policy instruments that specifically address emissions 
traded between countries. Table 4 provides a summary of such policy instruments referenced 
in the literature that directly or indirectly address these. References are given in the discussion 
that follows. There will be other options not well established in the literature and this summary 
should not be viewed as a definitive list of policies that can influence consumption. 
Table 4: Summary of policy instruments addressing internationally traded emissions 
Policy instruments Specific measures addressing traded emissions 
Economic instruments or market-based 
approaches 
Emissions credits under the CDM  
Carbon border tax adjustments 
Industrial emissions trading schemes  
Regulatory approaches Product or process standards  
Public  procurement buying standards (considered 
under government procurement) 
Mandatory carbon labelling 
Information Initiatives Carbon labelling  
Carbon calculators 
Government procurement and provision of 
public goods and services 
Removal of institutional barriers 
Public  procurement buying standards 
Voluntary actions Bilateral trade agreements e.g. technological, 
information and economic transfers 
Consideration of embodied emissions 
Non-climate  Resource efficiency (e.g. product longevity) 
Reduce consumption (e.g. work less) 
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1.1.4.1 Economic and regulatory policies 
Under economic instruments or market-based approaches, the Kyoto Protocol Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) has provided a tool with which Annex I countries can claim 
carbon credits from implementing projects abroad. Developed economies are relatively clean, 
and therefore face higher marginal costs for reducing emissions than in less developed 
economies. Two thirds of the lowest-cost abatement opportunities currently lie in developing 
countries (Harris and Symons, 2012). Incentivising investment in cleaner and more efficient 
production systems in developing countries, by being able to claim carbon credits for example, 
has the advantage of presenting the international community with additional mitigation options 
at lower costs (although this excludes them as options for the eventuality that all countries are 
assigned reduction targets). Whilst the CDM has been a cost-effective means to reduce 
emissions for industrialised countries, and in some cases, although not all, generated income or 
led to a positive technology transfer (Stavins et al., 2014), it does not extend the volume of global 
emissions that are capped and limits cheaper options for developing countries in the future. 
Spash (2010) argues that offsets are essentially an excuse to increase emissions, particularly 
when sinks which have individual characteristics and storage capacities are used to offset the 
emissions. Also, the degree to which the addition of renewable energy has managed to displace 
fossil fuels has been shown to be modest, and when controlled for demand York (2012) found 
the introduction of one unit of renewable energy displaced on average only a quarter of a unit 
of fossil-based energy.   
Carbon border taxes have been proposed as a measure that could overcome competitiveness 
concerns, whereby imports are taxed at the emissions price of the regulating region and 
emission payments for exports to non-regulating countries are rebated (Bohringer et al., 2012a, 
Bohringer et al., 2012b, Bohringer et al., 2014, Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012). However, by 
penalising exporting economies, border tax adjustments have been found to intensify regional 
inequalities and may be in breach of world trade agreements (Atkinson et al., 2011, Bohringer, 
2014, Li et al., 2013). China, the world’s largest exporter of emissions, could suffer substantial 
losses, estimated to be as much as 4% of its GDP (Qi et al., 2014). The distributional impacts 
could be reduced if tariff revenues were redirected towards the exporting countries (Bohringer 
et al., 2012a), and low carbon technology transfers from regulated to unregulated regions 
enabled developing countries to compete by producing carbon equivalent products. However, 
the implementation of standards does not necessarily achieve immediate results, as Williams et 
al. (2016) have shown through the introduction of Western European building energy standards. 
Springmann (2012) concluded, however, that an equivalent emission reduction could be 
achieved by linking emissions trading schemes (ETS), whereby emissions are capped and carbon 
allowances within this bought and sold between sectors, across Annex I countries. Such an 
approach would yield greater welfare benefits for non-Annex I countries and would have more 
political traction than implementing carbon tariffs on energy-intensive goods imported from 
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non-Annex I countries. Carbon pricing in the form of an ETS is only in effect in some countries or 
regions, and generous emissions allowances and exemptions for many energy-intensive 
industries have deemed them largely environmentally ineffective (Gawel et al., 2014). Sector 
coverage would need to be extended, or the charge applied to lifecycle emissions (Kokoni and 
Skea, 2013), to capture more emissions and, in the longer term, these could link to emissions 
trading schemes in non-Annex I countries (Springmann, 2012). China, for example, is currently 
preparing for the launch of its nationwide emissions trading scheme in 2016, while South Korea 
has already done so since January 2015 (Liu et al., 2015, Hübler et al., 2014). No Scheme in 
practice is currently premised on a two degree level of ambition.  
Industries in countries with stronger emission reduction commitments claim that 
implementation of a carbon price could put them at a comparative disadvantage to those 
industries in countries where there was no carbon price. If these industries chose to relocate to 
non-Annex B countries to take advantage of cheaper production costs, this would lead to an 
overall increase in global emissions as these emissions become outside the scope of reduction 
targets, and countries with weaker environmental regulations tend to have higher carbon 
intensities of production. However Peters (2010b) shows that implementation of the EU ETS has 
not resulted in the relocation of industry outside the EU2. Chan et al. (2013) support this, 
concluding that that concerns over carbon leakage, job loss and industry competitiveness were 
unsubstantiated.  
Domestic performance standards have already been successful in reducing emissions in the 
operation of vehicles, buildings, and appliances (Somanathan et al., 2014). By ensuring that only 
those products within a specified energy performance bracket are sold on the market, regulated 
standards ensure a certain level of energy efficiency. This is already implemented through 
European policies including the EU Ecolabel and Eco-design directive without imposing a tax on 
imported goods. Performance standards can play a key role, particularly when consumers have 
limited knowledge or influence over product choice, like for example when renting a house, in 
which case tenants have limited influence over the products in it. Whilst existing standards 
relate to operational energy efficiency addressing mainly production emissions (e.g. gas 
combusted to heat a home), methods for carbon footprinting have been developed into 
standards to enable calculation of the embodied emissions of products (Vasan et al., 2014, Suh 
and Huppes, 2005, Finnveden et al., 2009), which are not restricted to operational emissions.  
Taking the example of buildings, a lot of research shows that emissions embodied in building 
fabrics are becoming an increasing proportion of building-related emissions and there are 
options such as material substitution and optimisation to reduce embodied emissions (Miller et 
al., 2015, Ibn-Mohammed et al., 2013, Moncaster and Symons, 2013, Dixit et al., 2012, Iddon 
and Firth, 2013). Similarly, non-energy related products such as financial services produce few 
                                                          
2 However, there were also generous subsidies provided to EU industry 
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direct emissions and are therefore largely neglected in climate policy, yet have a high embodied 
content (Suh, 2006). In the UK, on average 50% of consumption-related emissions are generated 
abroad (Barrett et al., 2013), indicating the potential for resource consumption measures to 
mitigate emissions outside the UK. 
The emissions effectiveness of efficiency measures however can be diminished by what are 
termed rebound effects (Sorrell, 2015). These refer to an economic response to a resource 
efficiency measure. Rebound effects can be direct; for example if a car is more fuel efficient the 
owner can drive further for the same original cost, offsetting any energy savings. They can also 
be indirect; for example the savings from fuel costs of a more efficient car could be spent on 
other goods, which require energy to produce. And finally, a reduction in fuel demand could 
reduce fuel prices and increase fuel consumption in other parts of the economy. As Sorrell (2015) 
points out, these are extremely difficult to calculate but the best available evidence suggests 
that they are higher than previously thought and can offset or eliminate savings from energy 
efficiency by more than 50% (Blanco et al., 2014) in the absence of policies to compensate for 
the rebound. 
1.1.4.2 Information and government-led policies 
As far as informational instruments are concerned, carbon footprints have been used to label 
products and develop carbon calculators in the hope that they will incentivise consumers to 
purchase and adopt greener products and lifestyles (Birnik, 2013, Padgett et al., 2008). They 
have also been suggested to create positive competition between companies to strive for a 
better carbon label, including companies outside the consuming country (Cohen and 
Vandenbergh, 2012). The evidence for information as a standalone mechanism to reduce 
emissions is inconclusive (Cohen and Vandenbergh, 2012), with some suggesting it has limited 
impact (Isenhour and Feng, 2014) unless used in combination with other measures such as 
obligatory standards (Somanathan et al., 2014). However, it is argued in the literature that the 
standardisation of product footprinting needs to be improved to move from the voluntary 
reporting of embodied emissions to enable the regulation of embodied performance standards 
(Wu et al., 2014). Standards would also need to comply with trade regulations that prohibit 
discrimination against the import of similar products, which could be a contentious issue if only 
some countries were subject to greener standards (Cohen and Vandenbergh, 2012). 
The government has a double role to play in addressing consumption policies. Firstly it needs to 
set the policy framework to remove the institutional barriers, such as investment cycles, cultural 
and social norms and habitual consumer practices (Moreno et al., 2014). There also exist some 
internal political-institutional barriers (Langlois-Bertrand et al., 2015). Langlois-Bertrand et al. 
(2015) categorise these, at least for energy efficiency, as a lack of political backing, for example 
related to vested interests; differing interests by government departments having partial 
authority over energy efficiency; and a lack of policy coordination. Secondly, public procurement 
accounts for 17% of the OECD countries GDP, meaning governments can use this high purchasing 
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power to influence production and consumption trends (Testa et al., 2014). By exercising buying 
standards and specifying green criteria systematically in public tenders, governments can 
provide a stimulus for eco-innovation along product supply chains (Testa et al., 2014, Alvarez 
and Rubio, 2015, Michelsen and de Boer, 2009, Uyarra et al., 2014, Bratt et al., 2013). This 
requires organisational resources, and hence the political support for it, clear guidelines and 
training, standardised accounting methods, and increased cooperation with suppliers. 
1.1.4.3 Voluntary and non-climate policies 
Voluntary agreements can at least be a starting point to engage with international suppliers. For 
example, Sweden set up a Centre for Environmental Technology (CENTEC) at their Embassy in 
Beijing, promoting and facilitating exchange of ‘envirotech’ in public and private sectors 
(Isenhour and Feng, 2014). By providing cooperative technology assistance, Sweden is able to 
influence the carbon intensity of its imports and indirectly introduce consideration of embodied 
emissions into bilateral policymaking without placing a domestic restriction on imports. The host 
country is able to benefit from the efficiency improvement, which should also improve economic 
growth (Parrado and De Cian, 2014). However, this in turn could negate the intended emissions 
reduction by increasing consumption in the host country, and therefore does not guarantee an 
absolute reduction in global emissions. 
With non-climate actions, greenhouse gas mitigation from changing consumption has received 
little attention in climate policy literature (Girod et al., 2014), with the exception of residential 
energy efficiency, despite consumption being the main driver of global emissions. Ecological 
limits necessitate a reduction in aggregate consumption (Heindl and Kanschik, 2016), which is 
often referred to as sufficiency in climate discourse. Sufficiency however would need to be 
framed within a social justice context where an acceptable minimum level of consumption to 
fulfil basic needs is defined. However, sufficiency is deemed unpopular on the grounds that it 
violates people’s freedom of choice and therefore efficiency is generally pursued as a policy 
agenda, albeit on the periphery itself. Girod et al. (2014) suggest that reduced consumption 
addresses carbon leakage as it reduces embodied emissions, and as it affects domestic and 
imported products equally it has a lower effect on international competitiveness. There is a 
growing body of literature to show that reduced consumption, through mechanisms such as 
working less, does not necessarily mean reduced quality of life (Knight et al., 2013). Girod et al. 
(2014) show the potential of consumer changes in food, shelter, mobility, goods and services to 
make a significant contribution to the international two degree target. Consumption considers 
not only energy demand, but demand for material goods and services which can have a high 
embodied impact. For example, Barrett and Scott (2012) show the potential for resource 
efficiency measures to contribute to reducing consumption emissions. Strategies include 
material substitution (Giesekam et al., 2014a), product longevity (Bakker et al., 2014), product-
service systems (Reim et al., 2015) for example and Multi-Utility Service Companies (Roelich et 
al., 2015b). Extending the scope of climate policy to other areas such as resource efficiency 
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increases the coverage of emissions beyond those from a country’s production, but will also 
need to address sufficiency to be aligned with two degree or lower climate targets. Research 
framing and contribution 
This thesis applies consumption-based emissions accounting to national climate mitigation 
policy and target setting. It addresses consumption and growth, the main drivers of emissions; 
analyses progress towards meeting carbon budgets from a consumption perspective; shows 
how low carbon energy pathways would need to adapt when including embodied energy system 
emissions in climate targets; and presents additional policy opportunities as well as supplying 
efficient low carbon energy. 
1.1.5 Contribution to the literature 
The scientific evidence is clear on the need to devise climate targets based on cumulative carbon 
budgets, yet international negotiations continue to discuss end-point targets. Those targets in 
place are also not sufficient to achieve a two degree, or lower, future. There is agreement in the 
literature that consumption is the main driver of greenhouse gas emissions, and that 
international trade distorts territorial emissions inventories. I reviewed studies that looked at 
different principles, mainly around justice and equity, to apportion the remaining carbon 
budgets to nations. However, if there were the political motivation for consumption accounting, 
this would require increased data collection and monitoring procedures, presenting additional 
administrative burdens, particularly for developing countries. Publications on consumption-
based accounting methods have considerably increased in the last eight or so years, focusing on 
advancing the methods and presenting consumption emissions results, but with less 
applications to refining climate policies. While low carbon technologies have been cited as 
feasibly providing all the energy needed for the continuing growth in consumption, this is 
proving to be an expensive pathway with many barriers, and is yet aligned in practice with 
anywhere near a two degree future. Therefore, further attention is required to reduce energy 
demand through a range of additional policies. I found examples of policy instruments that when 
supported with technology and financial transfers could address traded emissions without 
disproportionately impacting the welfare of less developed countries. However, there has been 
little empirical work on how the implementation of consumption-based accounting would affect 
existing national climate policies and targets. 
I build on the growing body of literature on consumption accounting by linking climate science 
directly to policy. I analyse how the integration of emissions embodied in trade would redefine 
climate targets and policies for three applications: 2050 climate change targets, energy supply 
pathways, and energy efficiency product standards. I focus on policies decided at the national 
and supra-national level (UK and EU), and not how these translate into local level decision-
making and planning. The first two applications are analysed for the UK, however the latter is 
conducted at the European level as it relates to product and resource efficiency policy which is 
designed more at this level. I align the analyses with a carbon budgetary approach by measuring 
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cumulative emissions alongside progress towards meeting end-point targets. The contribution 
of UK mitigation compared to global efforts is measured, placing the UK within the global 
context. This thesis both quantifies the additional reach of specific policies in terms of emissions 
coverage and demonstrates its applicability to devising policies where countries cannot transfer 
their emissions burden abroad. In doing so, it advances the application of consumption-based 
accounting beyond a diagnosis of the problem of carbon leakage.  
In addition to its policy-oriented contribution to the literature, the thesis makes two 
methodological contributions. Firstly, high level IPCC scenarios have been extended to include 
emissions embodied in trade, calculating the most detailed projections to date of consumption-
based emissions (Chapter 2). Secondly, in collaboration with energy system modellers at 
University College London (UCL)3, we have developed a novel methodology by extending an 
energy system optimisation model to include traded emissions as a criterion in energy 
technology selection to meet a specified emissions budget (Chapter 3). 
1.1.6 UK and EU case studies 
The UK has committed to reducing its production emissions to 20% of 1990 levels by 2050, on a 
downward trajectory defined by five-year cumulative carbon budgets. As noted by Anderson 
and Bows (2011), the wording around UK climate targets in policy documents, such as the UK’s 
Carbon Plan, is qualitatively clear on the need to prevent dangerous climate change and not 
exceed two degrees, however such efforts do not extend in practice. Going back to 2007, when 
the UK target was set at a 60%, not 80% reduction, Anderson and Bows (2007) suggested to have 
even a 30% chance of not exceeding two degrees would translate into a 70% and 90% reduction 
in 1990 emissions by 2030 and 2050 respectively. It was first thought that 2 degrees represented 
an acceptable level of damage limitation, however, the impacts associated with 2 degrees have 
been revised upwards representing a threshold between ‘dangerous’ and ‘extremely dangerous’ 
climate change and according to Anderson and Bows (2011) should represent a threshold level. 
However, despite the scientific evidence base, UK targets are based on a 50% probability of 
exceeding 2 degrees on the premise that “the global danger zone starts above about 20C, and 
that global policy should aim to keep central estimates of temperature increases below this 
danger zone” (CCC, 2008).  
The global emissions budget based on IPCC evidence (Stocker et al., 2013) from 1870 to 2100 is 
2900 GtCO2, assuming a 66% probability of limiting temperature rise4. 1,891 Mt was emitted 
before 2011, leaving 1,009 Mt of remaining carbon space. If the global budget was apportioned 
on an equal per capita basis determined by today’s population the UK’s cumulative carbon 
budget from 2011 would be in the region of 9Gt, and even less if 2 degrees was taken as a 
                                                          
3 Hannah Daly (Research fellow) and Neil Strachan (Professor) 
4 The highest probability measured 
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threshold limit or assuming 2050 population estimates in which the UK is anticipated to have a 
diminishing share of the global population. Based on different fairness based criteria of 
increasing equity, Raupach et al. (2014) estimate a remaining carbon space of between 7 and 12 
Gt for the UK5. However, based on UK climate policy, assuming cumulative emissions aligned 
with existing carbon budgets and then cumulative emissions associated with a downward 
trajectory to meeting the UK’s 80% emissions reduction target, the UK would produce 14.7 
GtCO2e from 2011. This is 60% higher than the IPCC’s scientific base. Given the evidence for 2 
degrees, and moreover the latest negotiations in Paris which indicate limiting temperature rise 
to 1.5 degrees, the UK’s target arguably needs considerable reframing. Whilst recongising the 
shortfalls in the targets set by the UK government, I aim to investigate a deviation from the 
existing climate policy landscape and therefore from here on in refer to existing targets, and not 
arguably required more ambitious targets.  
As a Member State of the EU it is accountable to EU legislation and its regional targets and 
pledges under the UNFCCC. The three headline targets of EU energy and climate policy are to 
increase the share of renewable energy sources to 20%, to increase energy efficiency by 20% 
and to decrease CO2 emissions by 20% by 2020. Furthermore, the EU has the objective of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990. UK climate policy, 
documented in its Carbon Plan (2011), is based on reducing production emissions by sectors, 
focusing on a low carbon energy transition away from fossil fuels. EU climate policy is centred 
on the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and Directives addressing the energy efficiency of 
buildings and products. The EU ETS sets a limit on absolute industry emissions (representing 40% 
of EU production emissions), which reduces over time, and allocates industries a certain number 
of carbon allowances, each equivalent to one tonne of carbon. These are then traded between 
industries depending on individual mitigation efforts, putting a price on carbon. Industries which 
introduce fewer mitigation measures need to buy additional allowances from those who have 
carbon to spare. The intention is that a carbon price will encourage industries to innovate 
emissions abatement measures.  
1.1.7 Research questions, methods and academic outputs 
The overall objective of this thesis is to determine how climate policy would change when 
embodied emissions are integrated into climate mitigation targets using the UK and EU as 
representative case studies of Annex I nations. Three overarching research questions are 
proposed, each corresponding to a chapter of analysis and standalone peer-reviewed 
publication, outlined in  
                                                          
5 Raupach et al. derive budgets for Europe which I assign to the UK based on the UKs share of 
current population 
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Table 5. Research aims for each question are presented in each paper. The discussion brings 
together these analyses to consider how the focus of climate mitigation policy would shift with 
the integration of embodied emissions, to what extent consumption-based emission accounting 
could be implemented, at what scale, and under which policy mechanisms. 
This thesis includes papers in which I am the primary author, and I have also referenced relevant 
co-authored papers in Table 6. In Afionis et al. (submitted) we provide a political perspective on 
what has helped consumption-based emissions accounting gain stature in international 
discussions on climate mitigation on the one hand, but has hindered its widespread adoption on 
the other. In Daly et al. (2015) we developed the methodology that enables us to explore the 
policy implications of accounting for embodied emissions in devising energy pathways. In Barrett 
and Scott (2012) we explored the mitigation potential of resource efficiency strategies for 
meeting UK climate targets. Finally, in Holland et al. (2015) we explored the implications of 
energy demand on freshwater consumption, recognising that energy policy does not only affect 
greenhouse gas emissions, but a range of other environmental and social impacts.  
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Table 5: Research questions, corresponding methods and academic outputs 
Research 
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Table 6: Relevant co-authored papers 
AFIONIS, S., SAKAI, M., SCOTT, K., BARRETT, J. AND GOULDSON, A. (2015) Consumption-based carbon 
accounting: Does it have a future? Submitted to WIREs Climate Change (undergoing revisions) 
DALY, H. E., SCOTT, K., STRACHAN, N. & BARRETT, J. R. 2015. The indirect CO2 emission implications of 
energy system pathways: Linking IO and TIMES models for the UK. Environmental Science & 
Technology, 49, 10701-10709. 
BARRETT, J. & SCOTT, K. 2012. Link between climate change and resource efficiency. Global 
Environmental Change, 22, 299-307. 
HOLLAND, R. A., SCOTT, K. A., FLÖRKE, M., BROWN, G., EWERS, R. M., FARMER, E., KAPOS, V., 
MUGGERIDGE, A., SCHARLEMANN, J. P. W., TAYLOR, G., BARRETT, J. & EIGENBROD, F. 2015. Global 
impacts of energy demand on the freshwater resources of nations. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 112, E6707-E6716. 
 
1.1.8 Summary of papers 
The first paper (Chapter 2) extends well established territorial decarbonisation scenarios from 
the IPCC’s RCPs (Stocker et al., 2013) and the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives 
(International Energy Agency, 2012) to include trade. While the IPCC provided a detailed analysis 
of the embodied emissions of trade as part of the assessment of past drivers, the literature was 
not available to consider future projections within the scenario analysis. I calculate current and 
projected trajectories of UK consumption-based emissions in which international emissions are 
based on committed climate policies, and compare these to the UK’s production emissions 
trajectory as defined by its carbon budgets.  
Given the priority of energy policy, the second paper (Chapter 3) uses an established energy 
system optimisation model featured in the UK Carbon Plan, which has been extended to include 
emissions embodied in energy infrastructure, some of which occur outside the UK. In its original 
form, it generates cost optimal energy technology pathways based on combustion emissions 
from energy supply to meet UK energy service demands within a given emissions constraint. The 
analysis looks at the implications of mitigating embodied emissions within energy policy, in 
terms of both potential changes to the energy system pathways and first versus second best 
policy options. 
The third paper (Chapter 4) analyses the emissions associated with resource consumption in the 
EU. The premise is that a greater integration of resource efficiency within climate mitigation 
policy can deliver additional emissions reductions, currently reliant on the deployment of 
renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency measures. Instead of considering a broad 
range of resource efficiency strategies, the paper measures how a simple extension of EU energy 
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efficiency Directives to include emissions embodied in a product, and not just its operational 
performance, can increase the scope of emissions captured by existing EU policies. 
1.1.9 Thesis structure and overview of chapters 
The academic outputs presented in  
Table 5 provide three chapters of analysis (Chapters 2 – 4). Chapter 5 summarises the main 
conclusions and policy implications of each analysis, presents the limitations of the study, 
discusses why and how to integrate embodied emissions into climate mitigation policy and 
suggests a pragmatic proposal for its implementation, including future research needs. 
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2 An integration of net imported emissions into climate change targets 
This chapter is the author accepted manuscript of: SCOTT, K. & BARRETT, J. 2015. An integration 
of net imported emissions into climate change targets. Environmental Science & Policy, 52, 150-
157. 
Abstract 
There is an international divide between net emissions importers and net emissions exporters, 
with industrialised nations mainly falling into the former and emerging economies the latter. 
Integrating emissions transfers into climate policy, so as not to disadvantage export-intensive 
countries, has been suggested to increase participation in international emissions reduction 
commitments. Consumption-based scenarios are presented for the UK identifying the 
geographic and sectorial source of emissions to meet future consumer demands given the 
current international climate policy landscape. The analysis is applied to the UK yet the 
discussion is applicable to international climate policy; assigning national responsibility for 
global emissions reductions; and extending the mitigation potential for net importing countries. 
Two trajectories for UK consumption emissions are calculated in which (1) international 
reduction targets are consistent with those pledged today equating to four degrees of 
temperature rise and (2) international reduction targets achieve a two degree future. By 2050 it 
is estimated that UK consumption emissions are 40% to 260% greater than UK territorial 
emissions depending on the strength of global reduction measures, and assuming the UK meets 
its 80% reduction in 1990 emissions by 2050 target. Cumulative emissions are presented 
alongside emissions trajectories, recognising that temperature rise is directly related to every 
tonne of carbon emitted. Whilst this paper argues that the current UK emissions targets 
underestimate the UK’s contribution to global mitigation for two degrees, it shows how 
expanding the focus of policy towards consumption introduces new opportunities for reduction 
strategies at scale. The paper advocates the implementation of consumption-based emissions 
accounting which reveals underexploited policy interventions and increases the potential to 
break down barriers that exist between industrialised and emerging economies in international 
climate policy.   
Key words: consumption emissions; emissions transfers; emissions targets; climate policy; 
scenario analysis  
2.1 Introduction  
Drastic cuts in emissions are needed to achieve the global climate objective of limiting 
temperature rise to two degrees. The IPCC 5th Assessment report presents the latest scientific 
evidence on the relationship between emissions and temperature rise (Stocker et al., 2013). The 
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report shows that global temperature rises are approximately proportional to an increase in 
cumulative carbon emissions, and not simply end-point targets for 2050, given that emission 
pathways can differ (Gillett et al., 2013). This has major implications for the way climate change 
targets are implemented. Contributions to climate policy literature have illustrated the need to 
replace end-point targets with cumulative carbon budgets (Anderson et al., 2008, Anderson and 
Bows, 2011, Anderson and Bows, 2012, Meinshausen et al., 2009, Peters et al., 2013, Gillett et 
al., 2013, Chicco and Stephenson, 2012). Cumulative emissions will depend on the interplay of 
technology and policy development, and how effective policy can enable the deployment of low 
carbon technologies (Chicco and Stephenson, 2012). 
Reaching global agreement on how much responsibility should be assigned across regions is 
being contested in international climate negotiations, creating somewhat of a climate ‘impasse’ 
(Grasso and Roberts, 2014).  Currently greenhouse gas emissions reductions are by-and-large 
governed by a pledged-based system of end-point targets benchmarked against territorial 
emissions in a handful of regions implemented under the Kyoto Protocol and Cancun 
Agreements; however these commitments alone equate to in the region of four degrees of 
warming (International Energy Agency, 2012). Industrialised countries, termed Annex I parties1, 
have the strongest quantitative commitments and reporting obligations compared to emerging 
and developing economies, non-Annex I parties2, which have qualitative obligations, more 
lenient reporting requirements and eligibility for financial and technological assistance 
(Depledge, 2009). Countries are often referred to as Annex B and these are the Annex I countries 
that have ratified an emissions reduction target under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, which in 
its second phase accounts for less than 15% of global emissions (Grubb, 2013).  
In contrast to territorial emissions accounting, research papers in the last five-to-ten years have 
calculated countries’ consumption-based emissions accounts: the emissions embodied in a 
country’s final consumption regardless of where they are produced (for example Davis and 
Caldeira (2010) and Hertwich and Peters (2009)). Studies show that industrialised countries tend 
to be net importers of emissions whereas emerging and less developed countries tend to be net 
emissions exporters. In the first round of Kyoto targets the emissions saved were completely 
offset by net emissions transfers from non-Annex B to Annex B countries (Peters et al., 2011, 
Kanemoto et al., 2014), referred to as carbon leakage. However, there  has been little debate on 
the use of different system boundaries for international emissions reporting (Peters and 
Hertwich, 2008a), and efforts to incorporate consumption impacts into international 
negotiations have been marginalised (Isenhour and Feng, 2014). Some now advocate that net 
                                                          
1 industrialised OECD member countries and countries deemed to be economies in transition in 
1992 
2 Those deemed as developing in 1992 and recognised as being vulnerable to the adverse 
impacts of climate change. 
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emissions importers should take on responsibility for the ‘additional’ imported emissions 
generated outside their territories (Singer et al., 2014).  
Studies have shown on the grounds of equity that industrialised countries should take on more 
responsibility than is currently assigned to mitigate global carbon emissions (Steininger et al., 
2014, Grasso and Roberts, 2014, Raupach et al., 2014, Athanasiou et al., 2014, Pan et al., 2014). 
Athanasiou et al. (2014) even suggest that emissions reductions in Annex I countries should be 
greater than the emissions generated within these countries, meaning they need to take 
responsibility for reducing emissions in non-Annex I countries. What has not been explicitly 
analysed in the literature is distributional trends in consumption emissions and whether trends 
in net traded emissions are likely to continue within existing climate change frameworks.   
The UK for example has an 80% emissions reduction target on 1990 territorial emissions by 2050, 
to be achieved through implementation of its Carbon Plan (HM Government, 2011), and has 
interim five year carbon budgets (set four terms in advance) to try to ensure a reduction in 
cumulative emissions towards meeting the end-point target. It is unclear however how much of 
the UK’s cumulative consumption-based emissions would continue to sit outside the UK in the 
country of origin, complicating their inclusion in reduction targets. A few studies have shown for 
highly aggregated global regions what consumption-based emissions trajectories are needed to 
meet carbon budgets for two degrees, without considering what they are likely to be given 
existing climate polices (Bows and Barrett, 2010, Springmann, 2014). Both references provide 
high-level regional analysis without disaggregated trade and sectorial details. To help inform the 
evidence gap this paper analyses the corresponding cumulative emissions of implementation of 
international climate policies from a national consumption perspective. The paper poses four 
research questions: 
1. Within the existing international climate policy framework, will the UK continue to be 
a net importer of emissions to 2050? 
2. In which regions and sectors will UK consumption-driven emissions be emitted in 2050? 
3. What is the cumulative impact of UK consumption emissions to 2050? 
4. How can climate policy respond to achieve a reduction in the cumulative global 
emissions caused by UK consumption? 
The paper is the most comprehensive analysis to date of consumption-based pathways at the 
country and sector level. It extends well established territorial decarbonisation scenarios from 
the IPCC’s representative concentration pathways (Stocker et al., 2013) and the IEA’s Energy 
Technology Perspectives (International Energy Agency, 2012) to include trade. While the IPCC 
provided a detailed analysis of the embodied emissions of trade as part of the assessment of 
past drivers, the literature was not available to consider future projections within the scenario 
analysis. This paper is one of the first to provide a detailed analysis of the future emissions 
embodied in trade within the context of the IPCC’s detailed analysis of territorial emissions. 
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Whilst providing this detailed consumption-based emissions pathways for the UK, the results 
are also discussed in the context of domestic and international climate policy and the feasibility 
of achieving a two degree future. 
2.2 Method for determining consumption-based emissions trajectories 
for the UK (2010-2050) 
Territorial emissions are published annually in the UK by DECC (Department for Energy and 
Climate Change), and the UK is one of a handful of countries to publish consumption-based 
emissions from 1990 to 2013 (Defra, 2015, Barrett et al., 2013). National consumption-based 
emissions are equal to territorial emissions minus emissions generated to produce exports 
(consumed elsewhere) plus emissions generated elsewhere to produce imports, and are 
calculated using multi-region input-output models. UK consumer demand will not just induce 
production in the UK economy but will induce global production activities, resulting in emissions 
being released outside of its territory. Consumption-based accounts lag a few years behind the 
release of territorial emissions therefore at the time of this research 2010 was the latest year 
available.  
In this paper consumption-based emissions are projected at five year intervals from 2010 to 
2050. The modelling framework is built on collaboration between the authors and the UK 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC) who were investigating emissions associated with future 
UK consumption patterns, documented in the CCC’s report Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint 
and managing competitiveness risks (CCC, 2013). In addition this paper presents territorial 
emissions alongside consumption-based emissions for comparison and the cumulative impacts 
of the scenarios are calculated based on the direct relationship between temperature rise and 
carbon emissions (Gillett et al., 2013). 
2.2.1 Input-output analysis 
Environmentally-extended multi-region input-output analysis (EE-MRIOA) can evaluate the 
emission impacts embodied in goods and services traded between nations and is recognised as 
the most appropriate tool to estimate consumption-based emissions accounts at the national 
and supra-national level (Peters, 2010a, Wiedmann, 2009, Peters et al., 2012a). EE-MRIOA 
reallocates production emissions, which are point source emissions from sectors within a 
country’s territory, to the destination country of the final consumer through complex 
international trade flows (Peters, 2008). Direct household emissions for heating and transport 
are added onto the account as they are not allocated to an industry sector.  
Using input-output analysis, consumption emissions (F) are given by 𝐹 = 𝑓𝑥𝐿𝑦, where fx is the 
direct carbon intensity of production sectors, L is the effect of trade transactions (known as the 
Leontief Inverse), and y is the volume and composition of final consumption. Carbon intensities 
for production sectors (fx) are calculated by dividing direct sector emissions (f) by the sector’s 
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economic output (X). The Leontief inverse (L) calculates the ratio of upstream requirements (i.e. 
goods and services) to produce each sectors finished products. When multiplied by the vector 
of carbon intensities it provides carbon intensities for final products which includes the direct 
and indirect emissions produced along product supply chains to the point of purchase, referred 
to as total carbon intensities. Multiplying the total carbon intensities for domestic and imported 
products by a country’s final demand for domestic and imported products (y) determines the 
emissions released globally in the production of goods and services consumed in a nation – its 
consumption-based emissions account.  
2.2.2 Scenarios and projections 
Two main scenarios are presented, providing different representative trajectories for UK 
consumption-based emissions to 2050 in which (1) international efforts don’t go beyond those 
currently implemented equating to four degrees of warming, and (2) global production 
emissions reduce in line with carbon budgets for a two degree future. These scenarios will differ 
in their emissions embodied in UK imports. 
The input-output framework is used to link international and UK emissions reductions with 
growth in UK final demand via global trade transactions to calculate the UK’s consumption-
based emissions from 2010 to 2050. 110 productive sectors are modelled within the UK and 
their trade with 26 sectors in seven global regions outside the UK to meet UK demand are 
modelled: OECD Europe (excluding UK), non-European OECD, Russia, China, India, Rest of Asia 
and Rest of World. Each variable in the input-output model described in section 2.2.1 is 
projected at five year intervals from 2010 to 2050 to generate two consumption based emissions 
trajectories. Emissions at five year intervals are then interpolated to estimate cumulative 
emissions from 2010 to 2050. Projections for UK territorial emissions are produced separately 
to projections for international emissions (fUK and foverseas). The assumptions for each variable are 
summarised in Table 7 and described in more detail in Appendices 6.1 to 6.6. The resulting 
consumption-based emissions trajectories are compared to the UK territorial target to 
determine the distance from the territorial target to achieve a two degree future. The results 
section presents two representative trajectories for UK consumption-based emissions to 2050, 
broken down by sector and import share, and from a cumulative perspective.  
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Table 7: Summary of UK consumption emissions projections (more detail is provided in 
Appendices 6.1 - 6.6) 
Consumption 
emissions variable 




UK production emissions are reduced 80% from 1990 levels by 2050 
following the “Barriers in industry” scenario defined by the CCC (pg. 





This is where the two and four degree scenarios are distinguished. 
(1) Only currently pledged emissions reductions are achieved 
consistent with four degrees of temperature rise, and (2) global 
emissions are reduced from 2010 to 2050 to have a 66% probability 





Production emissions are divided by projected economic output to 
describe the carbon intensity of production sectors. The Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR) projections were used to project UK 
annual economic growth rates and IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) and other sources were used to project economic output in 
the seven trading regions. Both scenarios achieve improvements in 
carbon production intensities. 
Global trade 
transactions (L) 
Global trade transactions between sectors and countries destined for 
UK consumers are taken from the Eora database developed at the 
University of Sydney (Lenzen et al., 2012, Lenzen et al., 2013). The 
share of product inputs along product supply chains are assumed to 
remain constant, however sales to final consumers change which 
reflects changes in the structure of the global economy.  
UK final demand (y) The level of UK final demand grows in line with trends over the past 
20 years, with demand for domestic and imported products 




Traded emissions results are limited to CO2 only due to data availability of global emissions; 
however the UK production emissions are expressed in CO2e to benchmark against national 
targets. UK consumption-based emissions have grown 16% from 1993 to 2010, with imported 
emissions from outside European OECD countries rising nearly 60%. Looking forward to 2050, 
implementation of domestic and international mitigation policies drives absolute emissions 
associated with the UK down. Figure 4 shows results for UK production and consumption 
emissions. The two trajectories for consumption emissions represent the two scenarios which 
consider (1) only the current Cancun Agreements consistent with four degrees of temperature 
rise (line with diamonds) are implemented, and (2) imports are produced in a world where global 
mitigation is compatible with limiting warming to two degrees (line with triangles). The UK has 
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already complied with the first round of Kyoto targets set under the UNFCCC and is well 
underway to comply with the second phase target. 
The success of the UK in achieving its reduction targets is offset by emissions generated in other 
regions to meet UK demand. Even with strong global mitigation the UK could continue to be a 
net importer of emissions in 2050 with consumption emissions estimated to be 43% higher than 
the 80% reduction target, increasing to two and a half times the target (257%) if only current 
internationally-pledged reductions were implemented (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Emissions trajectory for the UK to 2050 (UK production emissions are in Mt CO2e 
and import emissions are in Mt CO2) 
 
 
If strong international abatement efforts towards a two degree future are achieved, emissions 
generated in the energy sector become a tenth of what they are in 2010, changing the sector 
profiles considerably by 2050. Emissions generated in the global energy sector are anticipated 
to contribute an 11% share to UK consumption-based emissions in 2050 compared to 41% today. 
The share of emissions is shifted to manufacturing and transport services, where there are more 
barriers to technology deployment, each estimated to represent nearly a 40% share by 2050. If 
countries fail to achieve the required reductions, current international emission reduction 
commitments would mean the share of UK imported emissions climbs to nearly 80% (the 
transparent colours in Figure 5), with a higher share of the increase in imported emissions being 
produced in non-Annex I countries.   
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Figure 5: Share of UK consumption emissions by sector of origin in 2010 and 2050 under a 
two and four degree scenario. Sectors are disaggregated by their domestic and overseas 
location with the second transparent colour segment representing the overseas proportion. 
 
 
The sum of the bars in Figure 6 show the cumulative emissions between 2010 and 2050 (blue 
bars) compared to a baseline situation whereby it is assumed 2010 emission remained constant 
at 2010 levels to 2050 to give a measure of avoided cumulative emissions (red bars). From a 
production perspective over 25 GtCO2e would have been generated by UK industries and just 
over 11 Gt (44%) would be avoided by meeting the 80% reduction target. From a consumption 
perspective 33.5 GtCO2(e) would have been generated, 42% from industries overseas. Only 
about 10 Gt (30%) would be avoided in a four degree future, compared to 14 Gt (41%) in a two 
degree future. Imported emissions add more than 9 Gt CO2 to the cumulative account, and a 
further 4 Gt CO2 without a global deal to strengthen current emission reduction commitments. 
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Figure 6: Accumulated and avoided emissions for scenarios from a production and 
consumption perspective from 2010 to 2050. Avoided emissions are equal to the cumulative 
emissions from 2011 to 2050 if emissions stabilised at 2010 level minus the cumulative 
emissions in the two and four degree futures. 
 
2.4 Discussion and policy recommendations  
The results of this analysis emphasise that unilateral climate policies can be hampered by carbon 
leakage. Half of the UK’s cumulative consumption-based emissions sit outside the UK in the 
country of origin, and increasingly within non-Annex I countries, which is of mounting concern 
without their inclusion in international reduction targets. We illustrate how net imported 
emissions could increase UK production emissions in the region of 40% to nearly 260% 
depending on the strength of international mitigation efforts in 2050. This assumes compliance 
of UK carbon budgets and currently pledged emission targets; however recent analysis raises 
concerns for whether UK policy is even enough to achieve its fourth carbon budget (CCC, 2014).  
Without a global cap on emissions, different policy measures have been proposed to prevent 
carbon leakage from making unilateral policies ineffective. One of the most widely discussed 
options is carbon border adjustments where the carbon content of imported products from non-
regulated (or weaker regulated) regions is taxed at the emissions price of the regulating region 
and emission payments for exports to non-regulating countries are rebated (Bohringer et al., 
2012a, Bohringer et al., 2012b, Bohringer et al., 2014, Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012). Whilst 
generally but not exclusively thought of as being the most effective means of cutting leakage, 
they have been found to intensify regional inequalities by penalising the high exporting 
countries and may be in breach world trade agreements (Atkinson et al., 2011, Bohringer, 2014, 
Li et al., 2013). The distributional impacts could be reduced if tariff revenues were redirected 
towards the exporting countries (Bohringer et al., 2012a), and low carbon technology transfers 
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from regulated to unregulated regions enabled developing countries to compete by producing 
carbon equivalent products. The discussion below identifies options for the UK, and other 
industrialised nations, for mitigating emissions embodied in their imports, without unfairly 
taxing export economies.    
2.4.1 Revising the UK’s emissions reduction target 
From a consumption perspective the UK generates more emissions abroad than it statutes for. 
This is not an argument to cease trade to the UK as this in itself would not necessarily reduce 
global emissions (Jakob and Marschinski, 2013), but to extend the scope of emission reductions 
to reflect the UK’s position as an industrialised global consumer. With industrialised nations 
secured into a legally-binding mitigation framework, strengthening their commitments by 
extending their carbon budget framework to include net emissions embodied in trade could 
make reduction targets for high-exporting (less industrialised) economies more palatable. To 
demonstrate the scale of such an initiative, it is estimated that in 2050 the UK drives an 
additional volume of emissions of between 68 to 251 CO2 outside its territory depending on 
global mitigation efforts. Subtracting these figures from the existing 2050 target of 160 Mt CO2e 
would result in the UK target being reduced to at least 91 Mt CO2e (equating to an 89% reduction 
on 1990 territorial emissions, 805 Mt CO2e), to having negative emissions of 92 Mt CO2e by 2050.  
2.4.2 Expanding the focus of climate policy 
To achieve the same intended “climate outcome” of the existing territorial target, which is 
dependent on cumulative emissions, countries with high consumption-based emissions could 
be given tighter carbon budgets. There are three broad options in which to achieve greater 
reductions without taxing exporters: (1) strengthen reduction efforts within the national 
territory, (2) reduce emissions in countries outside one’s territory, and (3) reduce and/or alter 
resource consumption; of which there are benefits and disadvantages of each. 
2.4.2.1 Increasing domestic emissions reductions 
The UK could strengthen its domestic reduction efforts, however the assumptions employed in 
the scenarios for global and UK production emissions trajectories are heavily reliant on 
decarbonisation and technology innovation and deployment. It is assumed the technologies are 
available and cost effective to mitigate for two degrees. Whilst deemed to be technically feasible 
and within the political scope of national governments, there are risks and barriers to 
widespread technology deployment (Bruckner et al., 2014) and the transition into practice has 
not had a promising start. Although the UK met the first round of Kyoto targets and its first 
carbon budget, the evidence suggests this is mainly due to the exclusion of international aviation 
and shipping3, the economic recession, and generous carbon allowances under the EU ETS. For 
                                                          
3 Whilst not in the UK’s officially reported territorial emissions, these are included in the 80% 
reduction trajectory modelled in Figure 4. This is termed production emissions, not 
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example less than 1% of the 7% reduction in UK territorial emission reductions in 2011 is 
attributable to climate policy (CCC, 2014). The under ambitious allocation of allowances in the 
EU ETS coupled with reduced shares of GDP being spent on energy-related research (Bowen and 
Rydge, 2011) has meant there is less incentive to innovate and the share of energy consumption 
from renewable sources remains marginal compared to fossil fuels at 4% of UK energy 
consumption (DECC, 2013). With annual emissions reduction rates of more than four times the 
global average (1.2%) needed to 2050, and a diminishing global carbon budget, there is a need 
to look at alternative reduction options.  
Edenhofer et al. (2015b) argue that unilateral policies can be effective with the implementation 
of a national carbon price. This would allow countries to select the policies that work most 
efficiently for them, and could pave the way to a global dynamic hybrid climate regime. Even 
though they acknowledge that a national carbon price will not in itself meet the required global 
emissions gap, evidence has shown that other countries are likely to reciprocate the more 
ambitious efforts of the lead country (enabled through for example shared experiences and 
technology spill over). These more flexible bottom-up unilateral policies could be coordinated 
into an international framework that is gradually scaled up over time by countries pledging to 
increase their effort conditional on policy support or more ambitious targets in other countries. 
Edenhofer et al. (2015b) provide examples of linking regional trading schemes, investing in joint 
research and development initiatives and technology cooperation aiming to harmonise high 
standards.  
2.4.2.2 Strengthening effort-sharing agreements 
National efforts could be strengthened by effort-sharing agreements linked to climate targets. 
As alluded to in the previous paragraph, this includes the transfer of finance, knowledge, 
abatement technologies and so forth and therefore allows the UK to take on more responsibility 
than what is defined by its territorial emissions. This was partly the intention of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) which was set up under the UNFCCC to allow countries with 
reduction targets to gain carbon credits for implementing or financing carbon reduction projects 
outside their territory; recognising however in theory that the process needs to also ensure it 
benefits the host population (Mathur et al., 2014). According to Edenhofer et al. (2015b), strong 
leadership and technology spillover can promote actions in other regions, and it can enable 
emissions intensive consumer countries to negate additional emissions outside of their political 
jurisdiction. Whilst this can be argued on the grounds of improved equity, whereby net 
emissions importing countries with higher economic capacity take on responsibility for the 
impact of their consumption-intensive lifestyles, CDM projects have not necessarily had the 
                                                          
territorial, to identify that emissions from aviation and shipping are included. If these 
additional emissions were included in the territorial account the first carbon budget would 
have been exceeded by 2.5%.  
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intended transferal benefits for the host nation (Costa et al., 2013); they have been unevenly 
distributed across countries (Rahman and Kirkman, 2015); and it has been hard to prove that 
the emissions reductions wouldn’t have occurred without the CDM (Erickson et al., 2014). 
Therefore this needs to be corrected for such policies to be effective. 
2.4.2.3 Reducing consumption 
Greenhouse gas mitigation from changing consumption has received little attention in climate 
policy literature (Girod et al., 2014), with the exception of residential energy efficiency. 
Consumption changes can increase mitigation options beyond decarbonisation. Bruckner et al. 
(2014) suggest more aggressive energy demand reductions are needed to meet international 
climate objectives. Girod et al. (2014) show the potential of consumer changes in food, shelter, 
mobility, goods and services to make a significant contribution to the international two degree 
target. Currently UK policy influencing consumption deals primarily with the energy 
consumption of products, stemming from three EU Directives: EU Eco-Design Directive, EU 
Energy Labelling Directive and the EU Ecolabel Scheme (a voluntary measure). Yet there is also 
untapped potential for resource efficiency strategies that deal with material and product 
demand to drive emission reductions upstream, including those generated in its trading partners 
(Barrett et al., 2013).   
Barrett and Scott (2012) show the potential for demand-side strategies applied to non-energy 
related goods and services4 to contribute to reducing UK consumer emissions. Strategies can be 
adopted by both producers such as lean production and green procurement, and households 
such as changing household’s behaviours towards using products for longer and shifting to 
service-based consumption instead of ownership, for example joining a car club. They estimated 
savings of up to 28% in the non-energy sectors. These would influence emissions from sectors 
that under strong decarbonisation and electrification become the most significant source of 
emissions: transport services and manufacturing.  
However, developing countries are dependent on export markets to generate economic growth 
to develop their infrastructure and increase their living standards. Whilst there is a considerable 
body of work on degrowth and its implications for developed economies, it has been hard to 
find how reduced consumption in developed economies or border taxes on developing 
countries’ exports would impact welfare (Li and Zhang, 2012) and further exacerbate global 
inequalities.  
                                                          
4 The study excluded emissions reductions from energy and transport  
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2.5 Conclusions  
This paper presents evidence on the regional and sectorial distributional trends in UK 
consumption-driven emissions given existing international climate change frameworks from 
2010 to 2050. It argues through an analysis of imported emissions, that current UK emissions 
targets underestimate the UK’s contribution to global mitigation for two degrees. In this 
research paper two scenarios were investigated that project UK consumption-based emissions 
to 2050. These consider emissions embodied in UK imports and discount emissions embodied 
in exports which are assigned to the purchasing country. A few studies have shown for highly 
aggregated global regions the consumption-based emissions trajectories that would be required 
to meet carbon budgets for two degrees. These are not based on current reduction targets and 
or pledges, nor do they indicate how emissions will shift between sectors. This paper 
investigates national representative pathways for UK consumption-based emissions given (1) 
current international emissions reductions pledges and (2) strong global mitigation efforts 
aligned with two degrees, implemented mainly through country-wide energy measures and 
carbon capture and storage. Further analysis testing the sensitivity of the scenario assumptions 
would increase confidence in the results. 
The UK is likely to remain a net importer of emissions. The origin of emissions shifts from energy 
production to transport and manufacturing, which are harder to mitigate. Under the scenarios 
for two and four degrees, UK consumption is anticipated to generate 20 to 24 Gt cumulative CO2 
between 2010 and 2050, compared to 14 Gt CO2e from a production perspective.  It is estimated 
that in the region of 46% to 55% would be emitted outside UK political jurisdiction. These 
percentages are higher when looking at the 2050 end-point only (46% to 76%). Whilst 
researchers have argued for industrialised countries to take stronger steps to mitigate global 
emissions on the basis of historic cumulative emissions, present consumption emissions and 
financial capacity, this paper shows that these distributional issues could prevail even with global 
mitigation for two degrees, at least this has been found to be the case in the UK.    
Global mitigation requires immediate and unprecedented reductions in carbon intensities and 
strong international collaboration, particularly towards countries with less financial and 
technical capabilities. Current territorial policies in developed countries such as the UK are most 
probably inadequate to deal with the emissions released globally in the production of goods for 
their consumption. To meet cumulative budgets, the literature suggests that industrialised 
countries are likely to need to increase their annual rate of carbon reactions; more effectively 
transfer technology, finance and knowledge to non-Annex I countries; and reduce their demand 
for products (see Figure 7). In doing so (and somewhat relying on other Annex I countries take 
similar actions), evidence suggests this will enable non Annex-I countries to reciprocate 
emissions reductions without risking their economic development by retaining a certain degree 
of competitive edge. Such unilateral policies and agreements can harness a more flexible 
international climate change framework that is scaled up in time.  
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Figure 7: A climate policy framework for reducing net imported emissions 
  
Whilst the analysis supports the finding that a mitigation framework based on consumption 
emissions would benefit net exporters in terms of emissions reduction, because a share of its 
export emissions will be the responsibility of the final consuming country, the policy responses 
from net importers could have economic implications for the exporting countries. Further 
research however is needed on the regional economic and social consequences of reducing 
consumption, particularly in developing economies, so as not to impede their development.   
The conclusions of this paper need not be alarming for the policy community. International 
effort-sharing agreements in the form of the Clean Development Mechanism for example have 
shown to be environmentally effective (despite not achieving the desired level of technology 
transfers). Decarbonisation policy in the UK is well defined; yet changing the focus of policy 
towards consumption introduces new opportunities for reduction strategies at scale. Using 
consumption-based emissions accounting as a complementary tool to production accounting 
increases the levers available to policy makers with the potential to provide shorter-term 
measures whilst waiting for the wide deployment of low carbon technologies. With more 
systematic research on consumption-based policies on the rise, demand-side measures are a 
real contender to relieve pressure on large-scale reductions. Given the increasing share of 
imported emissions in the UK’s account, and the political and technological uncertainty of 
decarbonisation, making consumption-based accounting mandatory gives us the greatest 
chance to be armed with responses faced with the increasing danger of climate change and 
could be the catalyst to unlock barriers in international negotiations. 
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3 National climate policy implications of mitigating embodied energy 
system emissions 
This chapter is the author accepted manuscript of: Scott K., Daly H., Barrett J., Strachan N. (2015) 
National climate policy implications of mitigating embodied energy system emissions, in press in 
Climatic Change 
Abstract 
Rapid cuts in greenhouse gas emissions require an almost complete transformation of the 
energy system to low carbon energy sources. Little consideration has been given to the potential 
adverse carbon consequences associated with the technology transition. This paper considers 
the embodied emissions that will occur to replace the UK’s fossil fuel-reliant energy supply with 
low carbon sources. The analysis generates a number of representative scenarios where 
emissions embodied in energy systems are integrated within current national climate and 
energy policy objectives. The embodied emissions associated with a new low carbon energy 
system are lower than the emissions reduction associated with the low carbon energy sources, 
confirming that there is a carbon return on investment. However, even if the UK reaches its 2050 
territorial climate target, it is estimated that by 2050 an additional 200 Mt CO2 emissions are 
generated overseas (compared to 128 Mt generated within the UK) in the production of 
imported fuels and infrastructure components. The cost-optimal model results suggest that 
more electrification would need to occur, supported by nuclear energy, mainly in replacement 
of natural gas to mitigate these emissions. However, due to a number of deployment barriers, 
other policy interventions along the energy supply chain are likely needed, which are discussed 
alongside the model results. There could be more emphasis on an absolute reduction in energy 
demand to reduce the scale of change needed in supplying energy; new business models 
oriented towards performance and not sales; and existing trade schemes and international 
effort-sharing frameworks could be extended.   
Key words: energy pathways, embodied emissions, energy systems, energy policy, climate 
mitigation 
3.1 Introduction  
The fifth assessment report of the IPCC (Bruckner et al., 2014) outlines the requirements for a 
fundamental transformation to a low carbon energy system, without delay (Luderer et al., 2013). 
Despite reducing operational combustion emissions, the building of a new and capital intensive 
low carbon energy infrastructure will release GHG emissions associated with its material 
requirements (and the mining of), construction, distribution, maintenance and 
decommissioning (Giesekam et al., 2014b, Müller et al., 2013), hereinafter referred to as 
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embodied or indirect emissions1. Increasingly material requirements are being imported from 
emerging and less developed countries (Kanemoto et al., 2014, Peters et al., 2011, Peters and 
Hertwich, 2008b). For example, China’s surge in manufacturing since the 1990s has seen its 
exports dominate global trade flows, becoming the world’s largest exporter of emissions 
(Kanemoto et al., 2014). Within an energy context, trends in exported emissions from China to 
the developed world are likely to continue as China now dominates the global low carbon 
technologies market (Liu and Goldstein, 2013). 
Little research has been conducted on the additional emissions generated by the infrastructure 
requirements of a global low carbon transition.. Beyond theoretical (Suh, 2004, Suh and Huppes, 
2005, Suh et al., 2004) and applied (Wiedmann et al., 2011, Acquaye et al., 2011, Crawford, 
2009) developments in life cycle impact assessments of energy technologies in the 2000s, there 
have been methodological contributions to improve our understanding of the environmental 
impacts of in-use and fixed capital stocks (e.g. buildings, infrastructure and products in which 
people derive a service) (Pauliuk and Müller, 2014, Pauliuk et al., 2015), and more specifically in 
terms of energy pathways (Hertwich et al., 2014, Hammond et al., 2013, Igos et al., 2015). These 
have not however been applied to understanding implications for revising and setting national 
and international climate policies when emissions transfers are accounted for in the energy 
system. These studies have assessed the life cycle environmental consequences of low carbon 
energy policies, but have not internalised embodied emissions in the calculation of low carbon 
energy pathways. Such results can be compared with reduction targets but do not suggest how 
the energy pathways would change when including the embodied energy system emissions in 
mitigation targets.  
The uncertainties, risks and barriers to a low carbon technology transition are quite widely 
documented, with the diffusion of technologies limited by institutional, behavioural and social 
constraints (Iyer et al., 2015, Bruckner et al., 2014). Industrialising countries look like they are 
emerging along the same fossil fuel path as those before them (Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 
2006), and governments that protect vested interests of powerful energy suppliers are likely to 
remain locked into carbon-intensive energy forms (Moe, 2010). The current economics-driven 
policy approach has been shown to be incapable of delivering the type of low carbon investment 
required over the necessary timescales (Bolton and Foxon, 2015).  
The authors were the first to examine the emissions embodied in supplying energy by 
developing indirect emission factors for energy technologies and fuels with an input-output 
                                                          
1 We define embodied emissions as the emissions generated along the energy supply chain up 
to the point of operation. This includes mining activities, fuel processing, electricity 
generation, emissions capture and fuel imports such as emissions from manufacturing 
mining drills, farming biomass, constructing power stations and manufacturing wind 
turbines 
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model and including them in an energy system model for the UK (Daly et al., 2015). In the 
analysis,  indirect emissions in the generation of energy infrastructure and fuel processing are 
reallocated from the source industry to the component of the UK energy system in which they 
are embodied, to be considered in a model of cost-optimal technology and fuel selection, and 
included in an emissions constraint aligned with the UK’s 2050 emission target.  The UK has a 
legally-binding target to reduce 1990 emissions by 80% by 2050, and a series of interim carbon 
budgets aligned with this end-point. The study found that modelling only territorial emissions in 
the cost-optimal energy pathway lead to substantial international emissions transfers, and when 
required to mitigate embodied emissions generated abroad, the marginal cost of abatement 
more than doubled. Such outcomes are not just relevant for the UK, but contribute to the 
ongoing debate of accounting for traded emissions in international climate change negotiations. 
This paper builds upon that analysis and looks at the broader implications of accounting for 
emissions transfers in the UK energy system, both in terms of potential changes to the energy 
supply pathways and the UK’s national energy and climate policy. This paper covers the 
following research questions: 
1. How sizeable are the embodied emissions associated with the energy system in the UK 
required to deliver the 2050 emissions target? 
2. What changes to energy sources and demand technologies are observed in a least-cost 
scenario, when emissions embodied in energy systems are considered in 2050 
decarbonisation targets, and at what additional cost? 
3. Is there evidence of alternative policy opportunities to reduce emissions embodied in an 
energy system beyond the technology solutions modelled, given the barriers and risks 
associated with low carbon energy technology solutions?  
3.2 Method 
Energy system optimisation models (ESOMs) are widely-used planning tools for regional, 
national and global energy systems, and are very highly detailed at the fuel and technology level. 
Well known examples include TIMES (Loulou et al., 2009), MESSAGE (Klaassen and Riahi, 2007) 
and OSEMOSYS (Howells et al., 2011). This paper uses the UK TIMES model (UKTM) (built in the 
TIMES framework (Loulou et al., 2004)), which has had a strong underpinning role in UK energy 
and climate policy development (Ekins et al., 2011). It portrays the UK energy system from fuel 
extraction and trading, through energy conversion, such as the production of electricity, 
hydrogen and biofuels, to final energy demand (Daly et al., 2015). Emissions from industry, 
transport and services are added to the energy sector emissions to add up to UK territorial 
emissions. UKTM generates cost optimal scenarios of the future composition of the UK energy 
system, which meets energy service demands, taking into account assumptions regarding the 
evolution of final demands, technology costs and attributes and resource availability. 
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Infrastructure requirements are defined as a cost to the system, representative of the physical 
flow of materials.  
ESOMs have historically had a critical shortcoming: by counting emissions only at the point of 
combustion, they do not take into account the embodied impacts of energy pathways. By adding 
a value for indirect emissions, calculated using input-output analysis (Miller and Blair, 2009), to 
each component of the energy system, supply chain emissions become a criterion for technology 
selection. We use our novel methodology described in Daly et al. (2015) to integrate embodied 
emissions to all activities upstream of energy supply. Embodied emissions are generated using 
a top-down global trade model (the input-output model employed in Wiedmann et al. (2011)), 
which traces the interactions between the UK energy sector and all other sectors within and 
outside UK territory. Indirect emissions are added to the supply-side energy sources and 
technologies, and not to demand-side technologies such as household boilers and cars. This is 
aligned with current climate policy which largely influences supply-side technologies, the focus 
of this paper.  
This paragraph summarises the novel methodology we developed in Daly et al. (2015) (also see 
Appendix 6.7), and the sections referenced here refer to sections in that article. Energy system 
technologies and fuel inputs in UKTM were aligned with an equivalent economic sector in the 
multi-region input-output model - MRIO (section 2.3.). For each relevant MRIO sector, an 
indirect or embodied emissions factor expressed in tCO2 per £M was calculated for both the UK 
and a global average rest of world region (section 2.4). The embodied emissions were attributed 
to energy system technologies and traded fuels on the basis of installed capacity or fuel flow 
(section 2.4). The range of indirect emissions values for energy vectors are presented in Section 
5 of Daly et al.’s supporting information. The volume of emissions reallocated from UK industry 
to the UK energy system as embodied emissions were subtracted from the UK industry emissions 
account (section 2.5.). Scenarios for future domestic and international emissions intensities and 
the import dependency of the UK economy were developed and run through UKTM (section 
2.6.). Domestic embodied intensities were assumed to follow the same trajectory as the industry 
sector in UKTM. International embodied emissions intensities were assumed to decarbonise at 
the global average rate of 1% per year. Trade patterns are projected based on recent short-term 
trends. The paper also discussed some of the limitations and uncertainties of the approach 
which need further sensitivity analysis (section 4.2.), including country and sector aggregation, 
projection of global efficiency improvements and trade patterns, and the inclusion of emissions 
embodied in end-use technologies such as private vehicles household appliances.  
3.2.1 Emissions boundary allocation 
Our study focuses on energy supply as this dominates climate policy. Emissions in UKTM are 
constrained by UK cumulative carbon budgets which have been set to 2027 (HM Government, 
2011) and then a cumulative carbon budget which is equivalent to the same total amount of 
emissions as a linear emission reduction meeting the 80% target by 2050, defined by the UK 
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Committee on Climate Change as the most ‘cost effective path’ (CCC, 2015a). To remain aligned 
with our previous scenarios in Daly et al. (2015) we describe the same 4 scenarios, however in 
the results comparisons are mainly drawn between S2 and S4. This is to understand how energy 
pathways would change when embodied emissions were included compared to the current 
approach where only combustion emissions are considered. The 4 scenarios are: 
 S1. No target: the UK energy system is optimised on the basis of cost, with no emissions 
constraint. This represents a baseline scenario with no mitigation activities (however results 
focus on changes between S2-S4). 
 S2. Target – direct only: combustion emissions in the UK energy system are optimised on 
the basis of cost, with total territorial CO2 emissions between 2010 and 2050 constrained to 
meet an 80% reduction target on 1990 levels by 2050, representative of current UK policy. 
 S3. Target – Direct & UK emissions: embodied energy system emissions from domestic 
industry are re-allocated to the energy system from the industry sector and included in the 
optimisation. As above, total territorial CO2 emissions between 2010 and 2050 are 
constrained to meet an 80% reduction target.  
 S4. Target – All emissions: international  emissions are allocated to the UK energy system 
component in which they are embodied and included in the optimisation process. Territorial 
and imported CO2 emissions minus emissions embodied in exports, between 2010 and 2050, 
are constrained to meet the carbon budget imposed by the 80% territorial target. 
Each scenario generates the cost optimal technology mix to meet a specified demand for around 
50 energy services (e.g. car kilometres, lighting and industrial heating) in the UK with increasing 
emissions to be mitigated. Energy service demands over the period will grow at different rates 
according to official government projections, with most increasing (e.g. international aviation 
doubles in the period) and some decreasing (some industrial demands, bus and domestic 
navigation). The scenarios are indicative of the changes to conventional energy pathways that 
consider territorial emissions only. We do not consider a comprehensive set of possible future 
pathways, and instead isolate the impact of including traded emissions. Hence, all other 
variables are held constant in the model. UKTM includes all greenhouse gases in the reduction 
targets; however the model only considers CO2 in terms of energy sources and technology 
selection therefore the focus of the paper is CO2 only. This analysis focuses on emissions 
pathways from 2010 (the latest year modelled which is used to represent current levels) to 2050.  
3.3 Results 
UKTM produces cost-optimal adjustments to energy supply vectors and technologies when 
embodied emissions are included in the UK’s carbon budgets. Whilst we analyse one modelling 
exercise, a model run in isolation does not provide a complete policy assessment. Cost-
optimisation alone cannot guarantee the desired emissions target due to governance, societal 
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and technology barriers and future uncertainties. Therefore, in the discussion we consider the 
evidence for alternative policy options to those modelled here. 
3.3.1 Embodied energy system emissions 2010 - 2050 
Figure 8 shows the change in UK territorial combustion emissions and the additional indirect 
emissions embodied in the UK energy system under the three scenarios from 2010 to 2050. In 
2010 UK territorial emissions were 527 Mt CO2 and an additional 115 Mt CO2 was embodied in 
the energy system. 85% of the embodied emissions were emitted outside the UK.  
Constraining territorial combustion emissions only in the 2050 emissions reduction target of 
80% (S2 in Figure 8), the current policy, reduces combustion emissions by 77% from 2010 to 
2050. However overseas emissions more than double over the same time period, meaning that 
total emissions (including embodied emissions) are only reduced by around 50%. Energy service 
demand over this time period has increased across most categories, trade is on an upward trend 
and production efficiencies in the rest of the world progress at the global average of 1% per 
year. As embodied energy system emissions originating in other UK industries (e.g. from the 
manufacture of renewable energy technologies) represent less than a 3% share of energy system 
emissions in 2010, declining even further by 2050, their inclusion in targets makes little 
difference to the results (S3).  
 
Figure 8: Combustion and embodied emissions when increasing mitigation from UK energy 
system emissions to include embodied emissions in the UK 2050 climate target (black solid 
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Only when embodied emissions generated in industry overseas (to produce technology 
components imported to the UK) are considered in the cost-optimal energy pathway, and hence 
mitigated in the UK’s carbon budgets, are we able to influence the 98 Mt CO2 (18% share) 
currently generated outside the UK. Results in the following sub-section therefore concentrate 
on the differences between S2 and S4. When mitigating for embodied emissions in the 80% 
reduction target (S4) by avoiding burden shifting abroad, UK combustion emissions need to 
reduce by almost 90% from 2010 to 2050 (in S2 they reduce 77%).   
Cumulatively2, in meeting the domestic 80% emissions reduction (S2), 14Gt and 6Gt cumulative 
CO2 emissions are released in the UK and abroad respectively. 5 Gt are prevented from entering 
the atmosphere if imported emissions are mitigated in the UK’s end-point target, emitting nearly 
15Gt CO2. To put this into perspective, the latest figures from the IPCC suggest less than 1,000 
GtCO2 can be emitted globally up to 2100 to have a 66% probability of limiting global warming 
to 2 degrees (Stocker et al., 2013). If national carbon budgets were apportioned based on 
current population the UK would have a 9Gt allowance, 40% under our best case scenario (S4). 
This is within the range suggested by Raupach et al. (2014), calculated to be between 7 and 12Gt 
CO2.3                
3.3.2 Energy system changes 
This sub-section describes changes to the energy sources, demand technologies and cost to the 
energy system when mitigating for embodied emissions. This is done by comparing two 
scenarios: imported emissions are included in the target (S4) compared to the territorial target 
(S2). The underlying dynamics of UKTM, such as technology and cost characteristics, remain a 
strong determining factor with the addition of embodied emissions. 
Figure 9 shows the change in composition of UK primary energy consumption (PEC) in 2030 and 
2050 between the two scenarios. Fossil fuel sources contribute 88% (8,565PJ) to PEC in 2010 
reducing to 53% (5,137PJ) and 36% (3,315PJ) in 2050 in S2 and S4 respectively. To meet the 
territorial target (S2) natural gas retains over a third of the share (3,543PJ), yet when embodied 
emissions are included (S4) the share drops to a quarter (2,201PJ). The share of renewables 
increases to 6% in both scenarios (475-478PJ) in the medium term (2030) and then reduces to 
1% in the longer-term (2050) (122-133PJ). The share of biofuels steadily rises in both scenarios 
to make up over a fifth of energy consumption. The most notable difference is the increase of 
                                                          
2 The model is run at five year intervals and the results are interpolated between years and 
summed to calculate cumulative emissions. 
3 Raupach et al. estimate Europe has a carbon budget of 90 to 159GT CO2 under three burden 
sharing principles. We estimate this to be in the region of 7 and 12 Gt for the UK given the 
UK’s 2015 share of Europe’s population to be 7.6%. 
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nuclear energy from 6% (562PJ) in 2010 to 24% (2,377PJ) and 39% (3,610PJ) by 2050 in S2 and 
S4 respectively.  
Figure 9: Composition of UK primary energy consumption in 2030 and 2050 compared to 
2010 for S2 and S4 
 
 
In order to compensate for the stricter carbon budgets, the trends in technologies selected tend 
to remain similar between S2 and S4, yet the deployment of lower carbon technologies is greater 
in S4 when mitigating embodied emissions alongside operational ones. Under the technology 
assumptions for this scenario set, UKTM generally projects the long-term (levelised) costs of 
nuclear lower than (intermittent) renewables plus back up, with and without embodied 
emissions. Sunk infrastructure costs are a relatively low share of the overall costs of electricity 
technology options and allows interim (in this case renewable) technologies to be invested in 
and then not replaced when first generation units reach the end of their working life. 
Primary energy consumed (the composition of which is shown in Figure 9) is sourced from 
domestic energy production and imported fuels. The UK also exports fuels for consumption 
overseas. Figure 10 shows the decadal change from 2010 to 2050 in territorial primary energy 
production (PEP), the trade balance of fuels (i.e. imports minus exports), primary energy 
consumption (PEC) and final energy consumption (FEC) between S4 and S2 by energy source. 
This illustrates the change in energy production and trading in fuels that would cost effectively 
meet the emissions reduction required should the UK decide to mitigate the indirect energy 
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Figure 10: Time series change in PEP, Net-trade, PEC and FEC from 2010 to 2050 when 
mitigating for embodied emissions in the UK’s 2050 climate target (i.e. Scen 4 – Scen 2) 
 
 
Pre-2025, the reduction in UK oil production outweighs the increase in gas produced. Despite 
achieving a cumulative reduction in PEP between 2010 and 2050, post-2025, PEP starts on an 
upward trajectory as natural gas production becomes greater than the reduction in oil being 
produced. By 2050, shale gas is responsible for the majority of increases in PEP. UK fuel trading 
shows the opposite trend. Cumulatively, the UK imports more fuels than it exports over the time 
period, but net imports are on a downward trend from 2025. Until 2030, the UK continues to 
import more oil than it exports, followed by an increase in net imports of uranium in the 2030s. 
However, post-2030 net exports of UK natural gas grow, and grow at a rate greater than the 
imports of uranium. Whilst production of gas in the UK increases (almost an additional 18,000 
PJ is produced between 2010 and 2050), it proves cost-effective to export, and therefore 
primary consumption reduces. The reduction in natural gas is compensated mainly by an 
increase in imports of uranium (nearly 23,000 PJ) and biomass (nearly 5,000 PJ), which have 
lower life cycle emissions. Embodied emissions results in the overall emission budget under S4 
being tighter, and hence, the intertemporal UKTM reduces domestic oil in the near term and 
overall oil use in the aggregate. The reduced demand for gas in the UK and the equivalent 
embodied emissions for domestic and international gas combine to allow the UK to export more. 
UK oil and gas resource is generally not co-productive whilst imports of these fuels occur via 
separate international markets.   
Figure 10 also compares the impact of mitigating indirect emissions on final energy consumption 
(FEC). FEC by intermediate (electricity and hydrogen) and end-use (residential, transport, 
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industry and services) sectors are presented in Figure 11. The reduction in FEC is marginal from 
2010 to 2050, except between 2030 and 2040 where annual final energy consumption reduces 
to around 600 PJ. This reduction is achieved in the residential and transport sectors, with energy 
consumption of industry and services changing very little. With the exception of transport, 
electrification happens across all sectors, and hydrogen displaces fossil fuel consumption in 
transport. Electrification is supported by the increase in imported nuclear fuels, which displaces 
final demand for natural gas, yet hydrogen production in turn consumes natural gas.   
As is clear from the results, UKTM favours particular technologies and fuel pathways. Nuclear 
becomes a dominant fuel source by 2050 in both scenarios, mainly displacing natural gas. The 
same climate outcome could be met by renewables or biofuels, but under the assumptions of 
UKTM in this study surrounding the cost and technical features of different technologies and 
fuel sources, nuclear is the lowest cost low-carbon option, with and without accounting for 
embodied emissions. Similarly, less importing of natural gas is favoured over less consumption 
and more domestic production (Figure 10). A feature of technology selection in least-cost 
ESOMs, like all linear optimisation models, is “penny switching behaviour”, where a small change 
in costs can lead to sudden changes in results. Given the uncertain nature of future costs and 
policy and social constraints, and given that investment behaviours do not conform to this 
penny-switching, these results should not be interpreted as a forecast of the future but rather a 
set of informed scenarios, sensitive to input assumptions. 
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Figure 11: Changes to FEC by end-use sector and intermediate energy consumption by 
electricity and hydrogen when mitigating for embodied emissions (i.e. Scen 4 – Scen 2) 
     
 
 
Increasing the UK’s reduction effort to mitigate its indirect energy system emissions comes at 
an additional cost. Table 8 describes the annual cost increase (at five year intervals) and 
cumulative change in energy system cost from 2010 to 2050 (undiscounted4) when mitigating 
                                                          
4 We are comparing the costs between two scenarios therefore the difference would be the 
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for indirect emissions (S4), compared to S2 (achieving the territorial target). Overall this 
increases the cost of S2 by 3.7% - £682.5 billion from 2010 to 2050. Generally, higher costs will 
be faced in the future and by 2050 it is estimated that mitigating the additional emissions 
increases costs by around 5% of what they are estimated to be if they were not included in the 
target. However, these costs do not consider the reduced costs of adapting to climate change 
and therefore offer a comparability of mitigation costs between scenarios, but not the overall 
cost to the economy. 
Table 8: Additional annual undiscounted energy system costs and percentage increase at 5 
year intervals and cumulatively when mitigating for embodied emissions (i.e. increased cost 
of S4 compared to S2) 
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2010-2050 
Extra cost 
(£M) 
2,630 10,492 16,953 17,474 17,581 21,980 30,422 30,910 682,547 
%  0.8 2.7 4.0 3.7 3.5 4.1 5.4 5.2 3.7 
 
3.4 Policy discussion  
While low-carbon technologies and fuels can deliver a substantial reduction in emissions, even 
taking embodied emissions into account, there are adverse effects on global emissions. The UK 
increasingly imports goods and services from countries outside the EU (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2013). When comparing the embodied emissions of energy infrastructure from 
equivalent productive sectors in the UK and overseas, we found overseas technologies to have 
been produced on average more carbon intensively than in the UK (see section 5 of the 
supporting information in Daly et al. (2015)). This paper’s analysis shows that emissions 
generated outside the UK to meet its energy infrastructure demands are set to increase through 
to 2050 and could be in the region of 60% higher than UK direct emissions. This poses a policy 
problem as only a few countries, representing 15% of global emissions, are currently being held 
to legally-binding emissions reduction targets (Grubb, 2013).  
In modelling the UK’s mitigation of emissions embodied in its energy supply in the 80% end-
point target, the overall cost of the low carbon transition increases by 3.7%. The most substantial 
change in the model is an increase in nuclear capacity, largely to support electrification of final 
energy consumption. Uranium and biomass in the low carbon energy system pathway is 
increased from 24% and 21% to 39% and 24% respectively. This increase is met by imports, and 
the UK exports more gas to be consumed abroad, falling outside the UK’s emission boundary. 
While under these modelling scenarios renewable energy does not play a major role, ESOMs are 
not forecasting tools and have a limited capability for incorporating uncertainties in long-term 
costs and constraints, and so should not be used as a single tool for planning future policies. 
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If the UK was to take responsibility for the additional emissions generated abroad, adjustments 
to budgets would need to be made to ensure the same intended carbon outcome (i.e. an 80% 
reduction in emissions) if the accounting system was to remain as is. However, recent reductions 
in the UK’s territorial emissions, reaching 8% in 2014 despite strong economic growth, have not 
been the result of planned climate policy. Many of the reductions from building, industry and 
power emissions reflect one off changes and uncertain factors rather than replicable ongoing 
trends, e.g. a mild winter (CCC, 2015b). The CCC also perceives a gap between existing and 
foreseeable climate policies and future UK carbon budgets. Given this and the widespread 
barriers and risks associated with low carbon energy technology solutions (documented in 
Bruckner et al., 2014) there are alternatives that would ease the dependency on unprecedented 
rapid deployment rates; publicly debated technologies (particularly nuclear); and rising costs 
from greater reduction requirements; whilst increasing the scope to reduce imported emissions. 
Taking a supply-chain or embodied perspective of energy brings other policy opportunities into 
view. We identify the evidence for these under four broad categories: demand, business models, 
trading schemes and international effort-sharing: 
 Demand response – Emissions could be avoided by achieving an absolute reduction in 
energy demand. Anderson et al. (2008) suggest that the neglect of energy demand 
reduction is eroding the UK’s ability to play its part in maintaining a two degree future. 
Although demand reduction initiatives have not been modelled in this paper they have 
been shown to be cost effective and complementary to technology led decarbonisation 
(Strachan et al., 2008) and have the scope to reduce both domestic and imported 
emissions through reducing demand for materials, goods and services that embody 
energy (Barrett and Scott, 2012). Emerging evidence shows the potential for material 
and product consumption to contribute sizeable reductions in emissions (Barrett and 
Scott, 2012, Allwood et al., 2010b, Allwood et al., 2011). 
 Business response – Alternative business models whereby product sales are replaced 
with a service or leasing contract can decouple resource needs from energy demand 
(Roelich et al., 2015a, Steinberger et al., 2009, Hannon et al., 2013). Energy Service 
Companies can shift away from selling metered quantities of energy towards selling 
energy services such as thermal comfort and illumination (Sorrell, 2007). Profits are 
incentivised by improvements in energy efficiency instead of selling more units. In 
addition energy using appliances can be leased whereby the provider retains ownership 
and is responsible for its general maintenance and the consumer has possession and use 
of the asset for a prefixed payment period. In this situation energy efficiency is shown 
to play a bigger role in replacement decisions, and remanufacturing is increased (Roelich 
et al., 2015a). 
 Trade response – Currently the EU Emissions Trading Scheme compensates or exempts 
carbon-intensive industries perceived as being at risk of competition from cheaper 
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energy costs elsewhere (Martin et al., 2014). Extending the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) to account for the emissions embodied in trade could increase the scope 
for reductions whilst reducing competitive worries (Carbon Trust, 2006, Carbon Trust, 
2008). For example international agreements could be set up which incorporate the 
major competitors in a particular sector whereby the carbon costs are reflected across 
all producers’ sales products. Alternatively border tax adjustments can be implemented 
on energy-intensive imports to close the cost differentiation (Vivid Economics with 
Ecofys, 2013).  
 International response – Effort-sharing frameworks could help address distributional 
issues between industrialised and developing countries (Edenhofer et al., 2014). 
Interregional instruments such as the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation involve the transfer of technologies, renewable energy implementation 
projects or the financing of abatement projects overseas, for which the UK can receive 
carbon credits. These can currently be used to offset excessive emissions generation in 
the EU ETS, and have been shown to offer cheaper mitigation opportunities as they have 
less installed abatement measures (Harris and Symons, 2012).  
These four policy options would require additional modelling work to assess their overall 
impacts on the role of embodied emissions, but they do address the problem and present an 
alternative from a purely technological driven solution. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This research has focused on novel linked modelling, using the UK as a case study, for integrating 
embodied emissions (both domestic and international) within energy supply, given its 
prominence in energy and climate policy. Even when the embodied emissions of a new low 
carbon energy infrastructure are left unabated, low carbon technologies can deliver a 
substantial reduction in emissions. However, changes in the UK energy system generate 
additional emissions outside the UK and in many cases the EU and their emissions reductions 
targets. This is problematic because globally legally-binding emissions reductions targets only 
capture 15% of emissions. If imported emissions remain excluded from climate targets, this 
figure is less likely to change. The UK could extend the scope of its own carbon budgets to ensure 
it achieves the same intended outcome, a reduction in its emissions by 80%, by increasing the 
speed of low carbon technology roll-out or further exploration of other consumption-side/ 
energy demand factors.  
In this paper, embodied emissions have been considered up to the point of supply and future 
research could consider embodied emissions within the same framework for end-use services 
such as boilers, electrical appliances and vehicles, all of which consume and embody energy. 
These will both increase emissions allocated to the energy system modelled, currently sitting in 
- 75 - 
the industry sector and country in which they are produced, and provide opportunities for 
emissions reductions through behavioural changes. Exploiting more demand reduction, service 
delivery and international opportunities could deliver energy and emissions reductions at a 
reduced cost, and need to be assessed in a holistic framework. 
3.6 References 
ACQUAYE, A. A., WIEDMANN, T., FENG, K., CRAWFORD, R. H., BARRETT, 
J., KUYLENSTIERNA, J., DUFFY, A. P., KOH, S. C. L. & MCQUEEN-
MASON, S. 2011. Identification of ‘Carbon Hot-Spots’ and Quantification 
of GHG Intensities in the Biodiesel Supply Chain Using Hybrid LCA and 
Structural Path Analysis. Environmental Science & Technology, 45, 
2471-2478. 
ALLWOOD, J. M., ASHBY, M. F., GUTOWSKI, T. G. & WORRELL, E. 2011. 
Material efficiency: A white paper. Resources Conservation and 
Recycling, 55, 362-381. 
ALLWOOD, J. M., CULLEN, J. M. & MILFORD, R. L. 2010b. Options for 
Achieving a 50% Cut in Industrial Carbon Emissions by 2050. Environ. 
Sci. Technol., 44, 1888-1894. 
ANDERSON, K., BOWS, A. & MANDER, S. 2008. From long-term targets to 
cumulative emission pathways: Reframing UK climate policy. Energy 
Policy, 36, 3714-3722. 
BARRETT, J. & SCOTT, K. 2012. Link between climate change and resource 
efficiency. Global Environmental Change, 22, 299-307. 
BOLTON, R. & FOXON, T. J. 2015. A socio-technical perspective on low 
carbon investment challenges – Insights for UK energy policy. 
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 14, 165–181. 
BRUCKNER, T., BASHMAKOV, I. A., MULUGETTA, Y., CHUM, H., DE LA 
VEGA NAVARRO, A., EDMONDS, J. & AL., E. 2014. Energy Systems. 
In: EDENHOFER, O., PICHS-MADRUGA,R.,  SOKONA,Y.,  
FARAHANI,E.,  KADNER, S., SEYBOTH, K., ET AL. (ed.) Climate 
Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working 
Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
CARBON TRUST 2006. Allocation and competitiveness in the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme - Options for Phase II and beyond. UK. 
CARBON TRUST 2008. Cutting Carbon in Europe - The 2020 plans and the 
future of the EU ETS. UK. 
CCC 2015a. Meeting Carbon Budgets - Progress in reducing the UK’s 
emissions: 2015 Report to Parliament. London, UK. 
CCC 2015b. Reducing emissions and preparing for climate change: 2015 
Progress Report to Parliament London, UK. 
COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2013. Reducing the UK’s carbon 
footprint. London, UK. 
CRAWFORD, R. H. 2009. Life cycle energy and greenhouse emissions analysis 
of wind turbines and the effect of size on energy yield. Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 13, 2653-2660. 
- 76 - 
DALY, H. E., SCOTT, K., STRACHAN, N. & BARRETT, J. R. 2015. The indirect 
CO2 emission implications of energy system pathways: Linking IO and 
TIMES models for the UK. Environmental Science & Technology. 
EDENHOFER, O., PICHS-MADRUGA, R., SOKONA, Y., FARAHANI, E., 
KADNER, S., SEYBOTH, K., ADLER, A., BAUM, I., BRUNNER, S., 
EICKEMEIER, P., KRIEMANN, B., SAVOLAINEN, J., SCHLÖMER, S., 
VON STECHOW, C., T., Z. & MINX, J. C. 2014. Climate Change 2014: 
Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and 
New York, NY, USA. 
EKINS, P., ANANDARAJAH, G. & STRACHAN, N. 2011. Towards a low-carbon 
economy: scenarios and policies for the UK. Climate Policy, 11, 865-882. 
GIESEKAM, J., BARRETT, J., TAYLOR, P. & OWEN, A. 2014b. The 
greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation options for materials used in 
UK construction. Energy and Buildings, 78, 202-214. 
GRUBB, M. 2013. Doha's dawn? Climate Policy, 13, 281-284. 
HAMMOND, G. P., HOWARD, H. R. & JONES, C. I. 2013. The energy and 
environmental implications of UK more electric transition pathways : A 
whole systems perspective. Energy Policy, 52 103-116. 
HANNON, M. J., FOXON, T. J. & GALE, W. F. 2013. The co-evolutionary 
relationship between Energy Service Companies and the UK energy 
system: Implications for a low-carbon transition. Energy Policy, 61, 1031-
1045. 
HARRIS, P. G. & SYMONS, J. 2012. Norm Conflict in Climate Governance: 
Greenhouse Gas Accounting and the Problem of Consumption. Global 
Environmental Politics, 13, 9-29. 
HERTWICH, E. G., GIBON, T., BOUMAN, E. A., ARVESEN, A., SUH, S., 
HEATH, G. A., BERGESEN, J. D., RAMIREZ, A., VEGA, M. I. & SHI, L. 
2014. Integrated life-cycle assessment of electricity-supply scenarios 
confirms global environmental benefit of low-carbon technologies. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 
HM GOVERNMENT 2011. The Carbon Plan: Delivering our low carbon future. 
London, UK: Department of Energy & Climate Change,. 
HOWELLS, M., ROGNER, H., STRACHAN, N., HEAPS, C., HUNTINGTON, H., 
KYPREOS, S., HUGHES, A., SILVEIRA, S., DECAROLIS, J., 
BAZILLIAN, M. & ROEHRL, A. 2011. OSeMOSYS: The Open Source 
Energy Modeling System An introduction to its ethos, structure and 
development. Energy Policy, 39, 5850-5870. 
IGOS, E., RUGANI, B., REGE, S., BENETTO, E., DROUET, L. & ZACHARY, D. 
S. 2015. Combination of equilibrium models and hybrid life cycle-input–
output analysis to predict the environmental impacts of energy policy 
scenarios. Applied Energy, 145, 234–245. 
IYER, G., HULTMAN, N., EOM, J., MCJEON, H., PATEL, P. & CLARKE, L. 
2015. Diffusion of low-carbon technologies and the feasibility of long-
term climate targets. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 90, 
103-118. 
KANEMOTO, K., MORAN, D., LENZEN, M. & GESCHKE, A. 2014. International 
trade undermines national emission reduction targets: New evidence 
from air pollution. Global Environmental Change, 24, 52-59. 
- 77 - 
KLAASSEN, G. & RIAHI, K. 2007. Internalizing externalities of electricity 
generation: An analysis with MESSAGE-MACRO. Energy Policy, 35, 
815-827. 
LIU, J. & GOLDSTEIN, D. 2013. Understanding China’s renewable energy 
technology exports. Energy Policy, 52, 417-428. 
LOULOU, R., GOLDSTEIN, G. & NOBLE, K. 2004. Documentation for the 
MARKAL Family of Models. Energy Technology Systems Analysis 
Programme  
LOULOU, R., LABRIET, M. & KANUDIA, A. 2009. Deterministic and stochastic 
analysis of alternative climate targets under differentiated cooperation 
regimes. Energy Economics, 31, S131-S143. 
LUDERER, G., BERTRAM, C., CALVIN, K., DE CIAN, E. & KRIEGLER, E. 
2013. Implications of weak near-term climate policies on long-term 
mitigation pathways. Climatic Change, 1-14. 
MARTIN, R., MUULS, M., DE PREUX, L. B. & WAGNER, U. J. 2014. On the 
empirical content of carbon leakage criteria in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme. Ecological Economics, 105, 78-88. 
MILLER, R. E. & BLAIR, P. D. 2009. Input-output analysis : foundations and 
extensions Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press. 
MOE, E. 2010. Energy, industry and politics: Energy, vested interests, and long-
term economic growth and development. Energy, 35, 1730-1740. 
MÜLLER, D. B., LIU, G., LØVIK, A. N., MODARESI, R., PAULIUK, S., 
STEINHOFF, F. S. & BRATTEBØ, H. 2013. Carbon Emissions of 
Infrastructure Development. Environmental Science & Technology, 47, 
11739-11746. 
PAULIUK, S. & MÜLLER, D. B. 2014. The role of in-use stocks in the social 
metabolism and in climate change mitigation. Global Environmental 
Change, 24, 132-142. 
PAULIUK, S., WOOD, R. & HERTWICH, E. G. 2015. Dynamic Models of Fixed 
Capital Stocks and Their Application in Industrial Ecology. Journal of 
Industrial Ecology, 19, 104-116. 
PETERS, G. P. & HERTWICH, E. G. 2008b. CO2 Embodied in International 
Trade with Implications for Global Climate Policy. Environmental Science 
& Technology, 42, 1401-1407. 
PETERS, G. P., MINX, J. C., WEBER, C. L. & EDENHOFFER, O. 2011. Growth 
in emission transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008. PNAS, 
108, 8903 – 8908. 
RAUPACH, M. R., DAVIS, S. J., PETERS, G. P., ANDREW, R. M., CANADELL, 
J. G., CIAIS, P., FRIEDLINGSTEIN, P., JOTZO, F., VAN VUUREN, D. P. 
& LE QUERE, C. 2014. Sharing a quota on cumulative carbon 
emissions. Nature Climate Change, 4, 873-879. 
ROELICH, K., KNOERI, C., STEINBERGER, J. K., VARGA, L., BLYTHE, P. T., 
BUTLER, D., GUPTA, R., HARRISON, G. P., MARTIN, C. & PURNELL, 
P. 2015a. Towards resource-efficient and service-oriented integrated 
infrastructure operation. Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 92, 
40-52. 
SORRELL, S. 2007. The economics of energy service contracts. Energy Policy, 
35, 507-521. 
STEINBERGER, J. K., VAN NIEL, J. & BOURG, D. 2009. Profiting from 
negawatts: Reducing absolute consumption and emissions through a 
performance-based energy economy. Energy Policy, 37, 361-370. 
- 78 - 
STOCKER, T. F., QIN, D., PLATTNER, G.-K., TIGNOR, M., ALLEN, S. K., 
BOSCHUNG, J., NAUELS, A., XIA, Y., BEX, V. & MIDGLEY, P. M. 2013. 
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of 
Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pp. 
STRACHAN, N., FOXON, T. & FUJINO, J. 2008. Policy implications from the 
Low-Carbon Society (LCS) modelling project. Climate Policy, 8, 17-29. 
SUH, S. 2004. Functions, commodities and environmental impacts in an 
ecological–economic model. Ecological Economics, 48, 451 - 467. 
SUH, S. & HUPPES, G. 2005. Methods for Life Cycle Inventory of a product. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 13, 687-697. 
SUH, S., LENZEN, M., TRELOAR, G. J., HONDO, H., HORVATH, A., 
HUPPES, G., JOLLIET, O., KLANN, U., KREWITT, W., MORIGUCHI, Y., 
MUNKSGAARD, J. & NORRIS, G. 2004. System Boundary Selection in 
Life-Cycle Inventories Using Hybrid Approaches. Environmental Science 
& Technology, 38, 657-664. 
UNRUH, G. C. & CARRILLO-HERMOSILLA, J. 2006. Globalizing carbon lock-
in. Energy Policy, 34, 1185-1197. 
VIVID ECONOMICS WITH ECOFYS 2013. Carbon leakage prospects under 
Phase III of the EU ETS, report prepared for DECC. UK. 
WIEDMANN, T., SUH, S., FENG, K., LENZEN, M., ACQUAYE, A., SCOTT, K. 
& BARRETT, J. 2011. Application of Hybrid Life Cycle Approaches to 
Emerging Energy Technologies - The Case of Wind Power in the UK. 
Environmental Science and Technology, , 45, 5900-5907. 
 
- 79 - 
4 Addressing globally traded emissions through domestic consumption 
policies 
This chapter is the author submitted manuscript under review: Scott K., Roelich K., Owen A., 
Barrett J. (2015) Addressing globally traded emissions through domestic consumption policies, 
submitted to Environmental Research Letters 
Abstract 
Existing international emissions reduction policies are not sufficient to meet the internationally 
agreed objective of limiting temperature rise to two degrees. Studies have shown there has been 
an increase in emissions transfers via international trade, which is left largely unaddressed by 
climate mitigation policies. Materials act as a carrier of industrial energy that allows, through 
trade, the transfer of embodied emissions between sectors and countries. Industrialised 
countries have managed to stabilise their production emissions, partially from growing imports 
from developing countries.  However, the use of materials has been completely overshadowed 
by policies focusing on deploying a low carbon energy supply. Policies based on resource 
consumption can support climate change mitigation and presents an opportunity to address 
emissions resulting from trade. We investigate the increase in emissions coverage by extending 
EU Directives that currently target the energy use of products in operation (cars, buildings and 
appliances), to include the emissions required to produce the goods (i.e. embodied emissions). 
We demonstrate how a greater integration of resource efficiency strategies within climate 
change mitigation policy can contribute substantially to abating emissions.    
4.1 Introduction 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) presented a stark warning of 
temperature rises to come if trends in global greenhouse gas emissions cannot be reversed 
(Collins et al., 2013). Around a fifth of global carbon emissions can be attributed to five key 
materials: steel, cement, plastic, paper, and aluminium (Allwood et al., 2010a), which form the 
backbone of modern economies (Müller et al., 2011, Müller et al., 2013, Pauliuk and Müller, 
2014, Steinberger et al., 2010). Reducing the total consumption of these materials could make 
a significant contribution to emissions reductions, yet their production and consumption has 
surged in the last few decades (Pothen and Schymura, 2015, Schaffartzik et al., 2014). This paper 
analyses how a greater integration of resource efficiency within climate change mitigation policy 
can contribute substantially to abating emissions by extending existing energy efficiency 
standards to include embodied emissions. We focus on the EU, and its trade with the rest of the 
world, because it has the most advanced climate policy and a strong resource efficiency agenda; 
however the two issues are rarely considered together. There are additional layers of policy 
- 80 - 
within EU Member States as they translate EU policy objectives into their national policies, but 
we concentrate on the original policies defined at the level of the EU. 
A growing body of literature analyses the material use (Schaffartzik et al., 2014, Pothen and 
Schymura, 2015, Giljum et al., 2014a, Wiedmann et al., 2015) and emissions (Kanemoto et al., 
2014, Davis and Caldeira, 2010, Hertwich and Peters, 2009, Peters et al., 2011, Xu and 
Dietzenbacher, 2014) embodied in international trade. These apply methods which attribute 
material extraction and production emissions to the consumption of goods and services. As 
carriers of industrial energy, the trade of materials and products results in the transfer of 
embodied emissions between countries and consumers. For example, China’s production 
emissions have rapidly risen, with net exports accounting for around a fifth of its emissions (Qi 
et al., 2014), destined mainly for consumption in developed countries (Kanemoto et al., 2014). 
Resource efficiency measures influencing the supply and use of materials and products could 
reduce emissions both within and imported to a country. This becomes increasingly important 
due to the limited opportunities for energy efficiency in material production (Pauliuk and Müller, 
2014, Liu et al., 2013, Milford et al., 2013), which tends to be very energy efficient already due 
to energy being a major cost factor (Müller et al., 2013).  
In 2009 the EU produced 14% of global emissions from institutional units resident in its 
economy, yet 17% of global emissions were associated with the goods and services consumed 
in the EU1 (Boitier, 2012) (see Appendix 6.8  for a description of different emissions accounting 
approaches). Similar trends are observed for most other developed countries. Climate policy 
largely addresses the direct emissions from production and not emissions embodied in the use 
of materials. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the primary vehicle for addressing EU 
industrial emissions. It places a cap on emissions generated by selected energy-intensive 
industries above a certain size, creating a market for carbon allowances that these industries 
can buy or sell when they have a carbon shortage or surplus. However, around 60% of the carbon 
allowances are allocated for free due to competitiveness concerns that have yet to materialise 
(Bassi and Zenghelis, 2014) and many producers in the scheme have enough allowances to 
satisfy their production for several years (Sandbag, 2014). Therefore, the EU ETS is failing to 
incentivise low carbon production, including the reduction of material use (Spash, 2010), to 
levels required for a two degree future. Commercial, residential and the remaining industrial 
emissions outside the EU ETS rely on regulations and standards to improve their energy 
efficiency, yet an efficiency measure does not guarantee a reduction in absolute energy use.  
To deliver resource efficiency the EU is proposing a circular economy agenda (by the end of 
2015) which is intended to address all aspects of product supply chains (i.e. resource 
consumption) and not rely on end of life waste management solutions. As stated in the EU’s 
                                                          
1 Consumption = production emissions + emissions embodied in imports – emissions embodied 
in exports 
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recent Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe, progress is to be measured by resource 
productivity (GDP/ DMC2), despite the measure both reflecting differences in economic growth 
rather than a reduction in absolute material use (Schaffartzik et al., 2014, Steinberger and 
Krausmann, 2011), and not considering up-stream resource requirements of traded goods 
beyond the weight of the imported product (Giljum et al., 2014a). Therefore, the indicator 
cannot guarantee a reduction in absolute material use, which is the main vehicle for emissions, 
nor does it extend to the total material used along increasingly global supply chains. The impact 
per tonne of different materials will be significantly different meaning that resource efficiency 
is not a goal in its own right but a vehicle to reduce environmental pressures, such as GHG 
emissions. 
Resource efficiency remains somewhat detached from EU climate policy. Evidence shows there 
is significant potential in emissions reduction through resource efficiency measures. In analysing 
the ‘reach’ of EU-wide collective corporate action, Skelton (2013) identifies the EU has influence 
over additional (non-traded) emissions in the region of 1 Gt CO2, amounting to nearly a third of 
EU industry production emissions, by addressing company supply chains. Barrett and Scott 
(2012), Girod et al. (2014), Pauliuk and Müller (2014) and Allwood et al. (2011) show the 
potential for resource efficiency and consumption measures to contribute to reducing 
emissions. Strategies include material substitution (Giesekam et al., 2014a), product longevity 
(Bakker et al., 2014), lightweight design (Müller et al., 2013), urban planning (Müller et al., 2013) 
and product-service systems (Reim et al., 2015, Roelich et al., 2015b). 
We suggest that current climate policy fails to identify the mitigation benefits of resource 
efficiency. Rarely addressing the link between resource consumption and embodied emissions 
neglects the leverage resource efficiency strategies have to mitigate climate change, including 
emissions embodied in trade. Recognising the synergies between material consumption and 
emissions, and the importance of international trade, we analyse the potential greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions associated with material consumption in the EU. We aim to answer three 
research questions: what are the emissions associated with resource flows (which include both 
materials and manufactured products made up of materials) in and out of the EU? What 
proportion of EU consumption-driven emissions are excluded from its domestic climate policies? 
How many more emissions could the extension of EU product-specific energy efficiency policies 
to include resource use reach? The discussion centres on the design of such policies. 
                                                          
2 Domestic material consumption (DMC) is domestically extracted plus imported, measured as 
weight of imported product, minus exported materials. It comprises the use of biomass, 
fossil fuels, and minerals including metals.  
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4.2 Method 
At the macro level environmentally-extended multi-region input-output analysis (EE-MRIO) is a 
well-established method which reallocates production emissions through trade flows to 
consumption (Wiedmann, 2009, Steen-Olsen et al., 2014, Kander et al., 2015, Davis and Caldeira, 
2010, Peters et al., 2011, Peters, 2008, Hertwich and Peters, 2009). In the 1930s Wassily Leontief 
developed a series of linear equations that describe how producing a single unit of final demand 
requires inputs from all sectors of the (global) economy. The economic framework was later 
extended to include a vector of ‘externalities’ which measured tonnes of pollution per unit of 
output for each industrial sector (e.g. CO2/ £). The different sectors of an economy not only 
require materials and resources to produce different goods and services, but they also generate 
several by-products (e.g. pollution and waste) during their production processes. Calculations 
could then determine how pollution originating from producing sectors could be reallocated to 
the final users of goods and services (Appendix 6.9).  
In our analysis greenhouse gas emissions flows associated with global trade in materials and 
products are calculated using an emissions-extended multi-region input-output model (EE-
MRIO). EE-MRIO traces the source of emissions for products consumed by EU final consumers, 
through intermediate trade transactions. We use a spatially aggregated version of the Exiobase 
MRIO table (Tukker et al., 2013, Wood et al., 2014) which represents 163 production sectors and 
product groups for three regions: the EU, non-EU Annex I countries, and non-Annex I countries 
(see Appendix 6.9.2.). Compared to other MRIO models, Exiobase has the greatest 
disaggregation of material and manufacturing sectors (Appendix 6.9.3.), the focus of our study. 
For the purpose of display, sectors are aggregated into 7 high-level groupings (Table 1 in 
Appendix 6.9.2). Emissions embodied in products aligned with existing EU climate policies are 
calculated (Appendix 6.9.4), and those emissions originating in EU ETS sectors excluded 
(Appendix 6.9.5), to estimate the volume of emissions that could be addressed by an extension 
of the policy that targets embodied emissions. Emissions associated with all material-intensive 
manufactured products are calculated to estimate the total emissions scope of standards on the 
carbon content of goods (Appendix 6.9.4).  
4.3 Results 
Figure 12 shows the supply chain emissions from production to the final consumption of 
products embedded in EU consumption, including imports in and exports out of the EU. 
Production emissions in the EU in 20073 were 5,213 Mt CO2e, with the width of each bar on the 
left-hand side of Figure 12 representing production emissions by sector, the conventional 
                                                          
3 2007 is the latest year available for Exiobase, which has the necessary sector disaggregation 
for materials and products we are analysing.  
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accounting approach. When adding emissions embodied in imports (2,847 Mt CO2e) and 
subtracting emissions embodied in exports (804 Mt CO2e), the EU’s net traded emissions add 
2,043 Mt CO2e to EU production emissions. Around two thirds of imported emissions are from 
non-Annex I countries, whose emissions are not currently covered by binding international 
emissions reduction targets, but on average continue to rise.  
When accounting for the emissions embodied in products, the middle column in Figure 12, the 
emissions profile of sectors change. Services and manufacturing sectors combined directly 
produce 447 Mt (9%) of EU production emissions. However, the emissions embodied in these 
sectors across their respective supply chains account for 1,619 Mt (22%) and 1,869 Mt (26%) of 
EU consumption emissions. Around a third of emissions embodied in both product groups are 
generated outside EU territory. The EU is heavily reliant on materials extracted and processed 
abroad. 38% (622 Mt) of the emissions embodied in services is attributable to the primary 
material sectors and 32% (517 Mt) to electricity. The use and material intensity of resources 
along the supply chain is therefore a key leverage point where emissions can be reduced.   
Figure 12: The supply chain emissions associated with global product flows of the EU  
 
Around 45% of EU production emissions are generated in industries capped in the EU ETS, 
reducing at an annual rate of 1.74%, increasing to 2.2% post 2020. This includes emissions from 
the power sector (72% of ETS emissions), energy-intensive industries such as oil refineries and 
steel works (22% of ETS emissions), and commercial aviation (separated into its own cap). To 
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address the remaining 55% of emissions outside the EU ETS, there a number of EU directives 
focusing on energy efficiency. Many studies have explored the options for reducing operational 
energy use and emissions of products, such as buildings and cars, but most neglect the materials 
necessary to manufacture and construct these (Müller et al., 2013). Embodied emissions 
however are becoming an increasing share of the impact of energy-using products (Ibn-
Mohammed et al., 2013). We have identified three main directives that apply energy efficiency 
performance standards to appliances, buildings and vehicles, and therefore have the framework 
in place to extend these standards to cover embodied carbon: 
 EcoDesign Directive: sets minimum mandatory requirements for the energy efficiency 
of products, such as household appliances and information and communication 
technologies (Directive 2009/125/EC).  
 Energy Performance of Buildings Directive: sets minimum energy performance 
requirements for new buildings, for the major renovation of buildings and for the 
replacement or retrofit of building elements (e.g. heating and cooling systems, roofs, 
walls, etc.) (Directive 2002/91/EC). 
 Vehicle Emissions Performance Standards: sets emissions standards for fuel combustion 
in passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (Directive 98/69/EC). 
Figure 13 compares the operational (the conventional accounting approach) and embodied 
emissions related to the products addressed by the EU directives that we have identified as 
having the potential to be extended (Appendix 6.9.4). The values include emissions embodied 
in products sold to both intermediate (industries) and final (households, government and large 
capital investments) consumers. Some of the embodied emissions will originate in sectors 
already capped under the EU ETS (536 Mt CO2e) (Appendix 6.9.5).  
For modelling purposes, the Building Directive has been applied to the construction sector in the 
input-output model; vehicle standards have been applied to the manufacture of motor vehicles; 
and the EcoDesign Directive to the manufacture of office machinery and computers, electrical 
machinery and apparatus and radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus. 
To calculate the emissions potential of extending all three directives you cannot sum the 
emissions embodied across each product group in Figure 13 (Appendix 6.9.4). This would give 
an overestimate as each product can be a supply chain input to the others, and therefore some 
emissions related to vehicles will be included in construction activities. All three product groups 
need to be included in one calculation to exclude any overlap.  
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Figure 13: Operational and embodied emissions of selected products in 2007, Mt CO2e 4 
 
230 Mt was emitted in the manufacture of electronics and electrical appliances in 2007, a sector 
which has been growing in physical terms. Operational emissions are allocated to the power 
sector and not directly to electrical appliances, as they are emitted where the fuel sources are 
combusted. From 1996 to 2012, EU consumption of telephone equipment rose tenfold; demand 
for other electronics such as computers, tablets and televisions rose fivefold; and purchases of 
household appliances such as fridges and freezers remained stable (European Environment 
Agency, 2014c). 60 Mt of the 230 Mt CO2e (26%) embodied in appliances used in the EU sit within 
EU ETS sectors, leaving 170 Mt unaddressed potential (2.4% of EU consumption emissions).  
The building performance directive tackles the energy use of buildings, which continues to 
increase at approximately 1% a year, despite implementation of the directive in 2002. In addition 
to the 594 Mt CO2e released directly from commercial, institutional and residential buildings 
(European Environment Agency, 2014b), 773 Mt were embodied in construction materials 
themselves. An equivalent of 5.7% (406 Mt) of EU consumption emissions were outside the 
reach of the building directive and ETS.  
934 Mt CO2e were emitted by road transport in 2007 (European Environment Agency, 2014b), 
representing 18% of EU production emissions. An additional 346 Mt were embodied in the 
manufacturing of the vehicles purchased in the EU. A third of these are captured in industries 
capped by the EU ETS, leaving two thirds of the embodied emissions outside the scope of EU 
climate policy (3.3% of EU consumption emissions). Using the same logic, regulations on 
embodied emissions can be applied to all non-energy using products, currently not addressed 
specifically by EU climate policies. 
                                                          
4 Operational emissions of electrical appliances are allocated to the power sector where the fuel 
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We calculated the total emissions reach across all manufactured goods, not just energy using 
ones. We estimate that 2,061 Mt CO2e, equivalent to 40% of EU production emissions, are 
related to material-intensive manufactured products’ supply chains, both for use by 
intermediate and final consumers. 789 Mt (38%) of these greenhouse gases are emitted within 
EU ETS sectors, however the suggested policy extension would increase the coverage of 
emissions beyond the EU ETS to include both domestic non-traded and imported emissions. 
These figures represent the potential reach of policies, but not the emissions reduction potential 
as we don’t know how politically feasible they are, or the reaction of consumers to such policy 
changes.   
4.4 Discussion 
We have analysed the potential reach of extending product standards and regulations to address 
the emissions embodied in manufactured goods to fully exploit the mitigation potential of 
resource efficiency. Extending energy-efficiency regulations to include the carbon or material 
content of all manufactured goods would set minimum carbon or resource efficiency standards. 
However, evidence on emissions drivers suggests there needs to be a greater focus on final 
demand reduction (Rosa and Dietz, 2012, De Koning et al., 2015), questioning whether resource 
efficiency can bring about a reduction in emissions without affecting the final demand for 
products (Barrett and Scott, 2012). This could be achieved using an enhancement mechanism 
which measures the carbon content of a product over its lifetime (e.g. emissions / year) thereby 
addressing product longevity, leading to a number of changes in business models (e.g. a shift 
from goods to services or longer product guarantees) and product design.  
Thought needs to be given to how the policies are designed, and to ensure they do not 
undermine the effectiveness of others. For example, energy efficiency lowers production costs 
and creates financial savings which are freed up to spend on additional consumption and its 
associated impacts, known as rebound effects (Sorrell, 2009). Reduced demand for energy and 
materials within EU ETS sectors can also free up allowances enabling trading participants to emit 
at a lower cost if the equivalent volume of allowances are not retired from the scheme (de 
Perthuis and Trotignon, 2014, Koch et al., 2014). Therefore there needs to be some way of 
dynamically managing caps either through auction release or changing cap (de Perthuis and 
Trotignon, 2014). This would avoid rebound effects as it maintains the carbon price and carbon 
is actually removed from the system. 
The nature of instruments has implications for how easy they are to extend and how they 
interact to deliver emissions reductions. The EU ETS could be extended to include additional 
sectors but, in its current form, would still only capture a proportion of production emissions. 
Regulations and standards can more readily be extended to include embodied emissions, either 
within their current scope or with the addition of new requirements (Table 9).  
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Table 9: Potential to extend selected policies to include embodied emissions 
Current regulation Possible addition Additional requirements  /next 
steps 
EcoDesign Directive Within current scope to set 
requirements to address some 
aspects of embodied emissions, 
including minimum guaranteed 
product lifetimes and promoting 
modularity, upgrading and repair 
(European Union, 2009a). 
More appropriate methods to be 
used for preparatory studies in the 
EcoDesign Directive, which used 
more recent data, accounted for 
technology development and took 




Extend current requirements to 
include embodied energy in the 
integrated energy performance of 
buildings (Szalay, 2007). 
Standardisation of the calculation of 
embodied energy for building 




Extend standards to include whole-
lifetime emissions (Correia et al., 
2014). 
Standardisation for the calculation of 
embodied emissions for vehicle 
elements and processes.  
 
The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive and the emissions performance standards for 
light-duty vehicles do not include embodied emissions (European Union, 2009b, Szalay, 2007); 
however the EcoDesign Directive was designed to take a more holistic approach. The EcoDesign 
Directive requires that a preparatory study is carried out to determine whether a product group 
necessitates requirements to be set, and for which stages of the product lifecycle these should 
be implemented (European Union, 2009a). However, many product groups were assessed 
before recent advances in energy efficiency and when embodied emissions data was sparse and 
of poor quality (Huulgaard et al., 2013). Furthermore, the approach to lifecycle analysis 
underpinning preparatory studies uses boundaries that exclude considerations such as product 
durability (Cullen and Allwood, 2009). We suggest using a measure that counts for embodied 
emissions measured over the lifetime of a product. Therefore, all EcoDesign Directive 
requirements have been related to operational energy and no products have had requirements 
set for embodied emissions to date (Maxwell et al., 2011). Our research indicates that these 
measures can however enhance the policy package for climate mitigation.  
4.5 Conclusions 
Through its consumption of material goods and services, EU consumption embodies nearly 40% 
more emissions that it produces, a trend found across nearly all industrialised countries. We 
calculate that just under a quarter of EU consumption emissions are capped under the EU ETS 
and that emissions from material intensive sectors are not easy to reduce from energy efficiency 
policy alone. The emissions flow chart in Figure 12 presents a framework which identifies 
different leverage points in the economy at which policy can intervene to reduce resource use 
and greenhouse gas emissions. Through resource reduction measures, industrialised countries 
can target emissions sitting outside their current climate policies, including imported emissions.  
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Opportunities to increase the scope of climate policy are not restricted to those in this paper, 
but we have attempted to show the additionality of integrating resource efficiency into existing 
climate mitigation policy. Resource efficiency policy which considers product supply chains has 
the potential to influence additional emissions than those from production. When analysing 
material-intensive manufactured products, we calculated their embodied emissions to be the 
equivalent of over 40% of EU production emissions, offering significant scope for emissions 
reductions. 
There is work to be done with intermediate and final consumers on designing the right policies 
to exploit these opportunities. Further consideration needs to be given to the practical 
implementation of polices addressing embodied emissions, including the accounting procedures 
and administrative requirements for measuring and monitoring supply chain emissions crossing 
international borders. The exact mechanisms to ensure any overlap between policies are 
complementary in bringing about an absolute reduction in emissions, and do not undermine 
existing policies, need to be identified. This forms the basis of our next analysis. 
A limiting factor of this study is that we calculated emissions associated with resource flows by 
the magnitude of economic transactions between sectors, and not the physical quantity of 
traded materials and products, which is not available in such detail at a global scale. For example, 
emissions from steel production are attributed to procurers of steel based on the price each 
consumer pays for it. Therefore, it doesn’t reflect that different consumers pay different prices 
for the same commodities. Global commodities are aggregated into 163 product groups, and 
reflect an average emissions flow for the combined group, when the emission intensity within 
groups can vary considerably. Publications on the integration of physical data with global 
economic trade flows are increasing, with such developments hopefully able to contribute to 
similar policy assessments in the very near future. 
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
This thesis has the overall objective of determining how the implementation of embodied 
emissions, achieved using consumption-based accounting measures, would redefine existing 
climate policies and targets, and to explore further opportunities for consumption orientated 
policies in climate mitigation. It analyses this through an investigation of the UK’s 2050 territorial 
emissions reduction target, the UK’s energy pathway, and EU energy efficiency policies. In the 
first two analyses policy decisions on these topics are largely decided at the UK-level, however 
the third analysis investigated extending energy efficiency policies to include resource use of 
which the main policy driver is EU resource efficiency strategies. Accounting for embodied 
emissions makes a valuable link between industrial energy use to material production and then 
consumption. One of the main conclusions to emerge is the additionality that material efficiency 
strategies offer to the portfolio of energy-dominant mitigation policies in place.  
To limit global temperature rises to less than two degrees there is increasing recognition that 
there needs to be a reduction in aggregate energy demand, at least in the near term (Edenhofer 
et al., 2014, Anderson et al., 2014). Edenhofer et al. (2014) however only refer to direct energy 
demand reduction. Energy demand goes beyond purely direct energy use and includes the 
energy embodied in all goods and services (i.e. indirect energy demand). Therefore I define 
demand reduction as a reduction in the consumption of all goods and services. Mainstream 
policy relies on reducing direct industry and household energy use through decarbonisation and 
efficiency improvements such as more efficient or low carbon technology installations and 
insulation measures, despite current policies continuing to maintain an emissions gap between 
cumulative emissions levels and the carbon budget for a two degree future. 
This thesis applies methods for consumption-based accounting to demonstrate practical policy 
solutions. It advances existing research which has refined consumption accounting methods 
(Wood et al., 2014), reported results (Kanemoto et al., 2014), focused on revising national 
targets (Springmann, 2014) and investigated border tax adjustments that directly target traded 
emissions (Steininger et al., 2014). Only a limited number of papers measure the emissions 
impacts of broader consumption policies (Barrett and Scott, 2012, Girod et al., 2014, Müller et 
al., 2013, Allwood et al., 2011, Roelich et al., 2015b) and this thesis starts to bring together these 
opportunities into a comprehensive analysis of consumption in UK climate policy within a 
European context. Each chapter builds on the implementation of consumption accounting from 
measuring and monitoring consumption-based emissions (Chapter 2), to its integration into 
climate models (Chapter 3) and finally its integration into policies (Chapter 4). Such research is 
vital for advancing the application of consumption-based emissions accounting and extending 
the emissions reduction potential of prevalent energy supply policies to include resource use. 
This is increasingly important given that we are heading for temperature rises that will have a 
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severe impact on people and the planet, unless we can rapidly reverse trends in rising global 
emissions.  
The findings of each research question are summarised next, covering their contribution to the 
current literature, the empirical evidence base and policy recommendations. This is followed by 
the research limitations. The environmental potential and policy implications of integrating 
embodied emissions into climate mitigation policy are then discussed more broadly. Based on 
the evidence base and thesis results, a pragmatic proposal for the implementation of 
consumption-based accounting and policies is finally presented. This includes steps for future 
research.    
5.1 Revisiting the research objectives 
Research question 1: How would the integration of embodied greenhouse gas emissions alter 
UK climate change mitigation policies? 
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to indicate the scale and source of a country’s 
consumption emissions pathway, given pledged and agreed international climate mitigation 
policies to 2050. Its value lies in being able to explore plausible speeds, scales and sources of 
changing emissions, and how different consumption emissions would be from existing national 
carbon budgets and targets. The UK’s consumption-driven impact is likely to exceed its 
production-based target, even if ambitious global mitigation efforts for a two degree future are 
implemented. By 2050, I estimate UK consumption emissions to be in the region of 50% to more 
than double (257%) UK production emissions, dependent on the implementation of existing, 
expected and desirable climate policies and trends in UK consumption and trade. The emissions 
profile of production sectors will shift given planned abatement measures, from energy 
currently being the dominant source of emissions to manufactured goods and transport services 
dominating in the future.  
From a cumulative perspective, I estimate that to satisfy UK consumer demands, net imports 
will result in an additional 5.5 to 11.5 Mt CO2e being emitted outside the UK, based on 
assumptions of the UK meeting its carbon targets and on the ambition of global mitigation 
efforts. These emissions would need to be mitigated in addition to the existing production target 
for the UK to have the same intended climate outcome. There is no evidence to suggest that it 
was the intention of the UK’s Carbon Plan to meet its targets by outsourcing manufacturing. The 
intention was to deliver a specific carbon outcome and therefore this would suggest that 
responsibility for these additional emissions should be taken by the UK.  
However, evidence suggests that only a small proportion of recent reductions in UK production 
emissions are directly the result of its climate policies, implying the need to consider alternative 
and additional policy options. For example, the recession in 2009 and warm winters has had a 
greater effect on reducing emissions than climate policy. This leaves the UK vulnerable to 
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external factors and does not create the underlying conditions for a low carbon pathway. The 
paper provides a framework for reducing net imported emissions, involving stronger domestic 
efforts, more effort-sharing agreements and the transfer of finance and/or technology to less 
developed economies, which also addresses differences in the mitigation capacity of countries. 
This is already happening under the Clean Development Mechanism, of which the UK is Europe’s 
key trader in Certified Emission Reductions (Gorecki et al., 2010). Evidence around governance 
suggests this will encourage non Annex-I countries to reciprocate emissions reductions without 
risking their economic development as they would have the technologies to retain a certain 
degree of competitive edge. As referenced in Chapter 2, published studies show that policies 
aimed at reducing consumer demand can be greater than the net imported emissions gap, 
enabling the UK to fully mitigate its consumption-driven impacts.   
Research question 2: How would the UK’s low carbon energy transition adapt when mitigating 
embodied emissions, not just operational emissions, from energy supply? 
I collaborated with University College London to integrate embodied emissions into a cost 
optimisation model of UK energy supply and demand (UKTM), constrained to territorial 
greenhouse gas emissions targets. We developed a novel modelling approach (Daly et al., 2015) 
to analyse the policy implications of including energy technology supply chain emissions in 
developing UK energy pathways to 2050. I calculated embodied emissions using MRIO analysis 
and assigned these to the fuels and technologies represented in UKTM. I used the results from 
UKTM model runs to analyse the implications of accounting for embodied emissions in the UK 
energy system, both in terms of potential changes to the energy supply pathways and the UK’s 
national energy and climate policy. By using UKTM, which provided evidence on energy 
pathways for the UK’s Carbon Plan, I can see how evidence that directly guides UK policy would 
change. I show how energy supply pathways based on combustion alone would need to adapt 
so as not to shift the production burden abroad.  
I found that the emissions generated outside the UK to meet its energy demands and associated 
technology infrastructure are set to increase through to 2050 and could be in the region of 60% 
higher than UK combustion emissions. When measuring embodied and combusted emissions 
associated with UK energy supply, the deployment of low carbon energy technologies achieves 
a 50% reduction from 2010 to 2050, compared to 77% when measuring combustion 
(operational) emissions only. UK combustion emissions need to reduce by almost 90% from 2010 
to 2050 if the full supply chain emissions are to be reduced to 80%. Given the cost-optimal and 
technology features characterised in UKTM, energy pathways, both with and without embodied 
emissions, favour nuclear as a low carbon electricity source replacing fossil-based energy 
sources to mitigate the additional emissions. The underlying model characteristics remain a 
strong determining factor of the model outcomes even when embodied emissions are 
considered. Electrification and an increase in hydrogen production lead to further emissions 
reductions in the residential and transport end-use services. The mitigation costs of meeting the 
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80% target are estimated to increase 5%; however this does not consider cost savings from 
reducing adaptation requirements. Further analysis is needed to validate the model results, 
which I discuss shortly in section 5.2.1.2. 
Given the widespread public opposition and perceived safety risks associated with particularly 
nuclear, there is evidence of alternative policy opportunities that would ease the dependency 
on unprecedented rapid deployment rates, publicly debated technologies and rising costs from 
greater reduction requirements; whilst reducing imported emissions. These address reducing 
the consumption of energy-intensive materials, incentivising end-use energy performance and 
not profit driven sales, regulating traded emissions, and the transfer of finance and technologies 
to less developed countries in return for carbon credits.  
Research question 3: What is the additional emissions scope of energy efficiency policy when 
embodied emissions are included? 
To my knowledge, this is the most comprehensive study quantifying and appraising the potential 
for extending EU energy efficiency product policies to include emissions embodied in all 
resource use, which includes internationally traded emissions outside the scope of existing EU 
climate policy. As resource efficiency is essentially a vehicle to reducing impacts (e.g. emissions, 
water consumption, deforestation etc.) from resource consumption it offers policy additionality 
when integrated within other policy domains, in this case climate mitigation. Climate and 
resource policies are currently developed almost entirely separately from each other.  
Emissions embodied in EU consumption are almost 40% greater than those emitted from its 
production. Through international trade the EU imported the equivalent of 2,847 Mt CO2e in 
2007, which minus its exports resulted in net imports of 2,043 Mt CO2e. I estimate the emissions 
embodied in material-intensive manufactured goods (includes energy and non-energy using 
products e.g. furniture and packaging) to be in the order of 40% of EU production emissions, 
indicating the potential for resource efficiency measures to contribute to mitigating these 
emissions.  
A mitigation plan comprises many actions, for example decarbonisation, industry efficiency, 
carbon capture and storage, a shift in business practices, and changes in consumption levels, 
whose combined effect can only be estimated within a consistent framework. An advantage of 
using input-output analysis is that overlap across policies can be captured as it measures the 
supply chain interactions between sectors. For example 38% of the emissions embodied in 
manufactured goods originate in EU ETS sectors, and can act to undermine the carbon price, 
unless mechanisms are in place to prevent this. In this case, simply stacking these policies could 
deem them less effective.   
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5.2 Research limitations 
In this section I first outline the modelling limitations and then the limitations in terms of the 
research context.  
5.2.1 Modelling 
5.2.1.1 Input-output analysis 
From a modelling perspective input-output analysis has its limitations, which are quite widely 
documented (e.g. see Peters et al. (2012a) and Owen et al. (2014)), but difficult to overcome. 
Environmentally-extended multi-region input-output (MRIO) analysis relies on the compilation 
of secondary economic, environmental and trade data into a MRIO framework, which is subject 
to a number of adjustments and balancing procedures. Different consumption-based emissions 
results across different models and studies can be attributed to the use of different production 
emissions data sources, different definitions of consumption and different economic and trade 
structures. Here, I elaborate on some of the limitations that have specific relevance to the thesis. 
Sectors are aggregated into between 26 and 163 representative economic profiles across 
available MRIO databases. When analysing emissions, it is better to have sectors with similar 
emissions profiles grouped together, however the raw data are collected primarily for economic 
analysis. De Koning et al. (2015) suggest a higher sector resolution is the preferred approach 
when calculating emissions embodied in trade at the level of technical detail required to 
investigate meeting tight carbon targets. As the papers that make up this thesis have been 
written, I have tried to apply the model most fit for purpose. For example, when integrating 
input-output analysis with the UKTM energy model, I selected a UK centric model with the 
highest disaggregation of the energy sector at the time. When investigating the potential reach 
of resource efficiency policies I selected the input-output model with the highest disaggregation 
of energy-intensive, material, and manufacturing sectors. The disaggregation of input-output 
models is subject to ongoing research. 
Another limitation of input-output analysis is that emissions associated with resource flows are 
calculated according to the magnitude of economic transactions between sectors and not the 
physical quantity of traded materials and products, which is not available in such detail at a 
global scale. For example emissions from steel production are attributed to procurers of steel 
based on the price each consumer pays for it (refer to section 1.1.3.4. for more detail). 
Therefore, the analysis doesn’t reflect that different consumers pay different prices for the same 
commodities. As materials are the vehicles for transferring emissions via trade, physical flows 
are a more accurate representation of embodied emissions. However, input-output analysis can 
trace the sales and purchases of materials through complex global supply chains, for example to 
service sectors that use thousands of products to deliver their services. Material flow models do 
not trace this level of detail in producer-consumer linkages. 
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5.2.1.2 Scenario analysis, sensitivities and data validation 
Our ability to project the future is highly constrained, and scenario analysis has developed as a 
means of exploring aspects of uncertainty and alternative futures (Mander et al., 2008, Mander 
et al., 2007). Every approach has its limitations. Input-output analysis is a static model and 
therefore does not capture the dynamic effects of climate policies e.g. technology deployment 
and changing prices, which in turn impact on emissions. In Chapter 2 I used a static MRIO model 
where the model variables are exogenous to the model and I used past trends, secondary and 
expert information to make changes to the model variables (e.g. economic growth, production 
emissions and trade). However, there were over 85,000 data points in the trade matrix alone, 
and projecting the development of all these interactions to 2050 is impossible. Therefore broad 
assumptions were made and in most cases trade relationships were assumed to remain at 2010 
patterns, yet the level of demand between domestic and imported products changed. In Chapter 
3, the static embodied emissions coefficients were made endogenous within a cost optimisation 
model. In other words, they became a criterion for technology selection. Each approach has its 
own set of limitations. The former doesn’t consider feedback, such as the effect of price changes, 
whereas the latter gives little consideration to political, behavioural and institutional realities 
(Barker, 2004, Scrieciu, 2007, Barker, 2010) and therefore they simulate quite artificial macro-
economic responses.  
Sensitivity analysis offers insights into the influence of variations in IO model input parameters 
on the consumption-based emissions results. When isolating the effect of a change in one 
coefficient, results to the overall footprint are shown to be marginal. However, when making 
changes simultaneously, the change to emissions results can be greater than the initial change 
to the variables. Understanding which variables have a greater influence on the results could 
have helped understand how sensitive the models used were to changes and assumptions in the 
model parameters. Mattila et al. (2013) investigated the use of IOA for building scenarios of 
sustainable development. They first did a perturbation analysis of Finnish input-output tables to 
identify which input data are most decisive for the results in terms of their relative sensitivity. 
Changes were made to direct intensities, technology coefficients and final demand. This 
however does not model rebounds or substitution changes relating to the initial change. Such 
changes in behaviour need to be modelled as a scenario. Individually, most parameters had little 
impact on the model outcomes, and energy-intensive sectors had the highest impact. Emissions 
intensities and final demand had a bigger impact than changing technical coefficients, a result 
shared for the UK between 1992 and 2004 in Baiocchi and Minx (2010a).  
When investigating the effect of isolating a change in one technical coefficient by 10% at any 
one time, Wilting (2012) calculated the results on the Dutch carbon footprint were at most 1% 
of the total footprint. When all technical coefficients were increased/ decreased 10% 
simultaneously, the combined effect on the footprint was a 34% increase/ 20% reduction 
respectively. Hence, the resulting changes on the Leontief matrix (the inverted technology 
- 99 - 
matrix) were much larger than the original change in the technology coefficients. The 
coefficients that had the largest individual impact on the Dutch carbon footprint were from 
foreign production and predominantly covered energy and basic industries. This does not seem 
surprising as these are likely to be present across many supply chains.  Wilting concludes that 
the import linkages have less influence on the footprint results than representation of domestic 
production 
Steen-Olsen et al. (2014) find emissions multipliers are sensitive to the aggregation level of the 
input-output table, although not in any specific sectoral pattern (i.e. energy-intensive sectors 
were no different to financial and public services). The level of aggregation selected can have a 
significant impact on the carbon footprint generated. 
The intention of chapter 3 was to determine how the UKTM’s model outputs would change 
when indirect emissions are included in the energy system modelling. Whilst I indicated that 
there are behavioural, economic and technical barriers and uncertainties to realising the energy 
supply changes, it is important to take a more contextual and critical perspective to the 
outcomes of the model. Taking the example of nuclear, which has the highest shift when 
mitigating indirect emissions in the UK climate target, the model outputs suggested up to 40% 
of primary energy would be sourced from nuclear, primarily to increase final consumption met 
by low carbon electricity. However, I now show such ambition is far from the current situation, 
questioning its feasibility to producing outputs for devising realistic energy pathways and 
policies.  
In 2014, 335 TWh of electricity was generated, with nuclear providing 17% (DECC, 2015), 
equating to around 57 TWh. Currently, there are 15 operating reactors in the UK totalling 9.5 
GW capacity. Around half existing capacity is due to be retired by 2025, but the UK has plans to 
deliver around 16 GW of new nuclear by 2030 from 12 new reactors, which still requires 
significant capital investment (HM Government, 2013). If these plans were successful, installed 
nuclear capacity would be around 20 GW. The newest and largest nuclear power plant with an 
electrical output of 1191 MW, Sizewell B, generated a record-breaking 10.51 TWh in 2015. If 
each GW of installed capacity could generate an equivalent power output, this would equate to 
176 TWh. However, UKTMs estimates final energy consumption of nuclear sourced electricity is 
set to increase year on year to around 1,250 PJ, around 350 TWh, by 2050. Therefore, assuming 
a start date of 2025, this requires in the region of an additional 1.31 Sizewell B each year which 
is far from the UK’s nuclear strategy. Using the example of nuclear alone raises questions on the 
robustness of the model assumptions.  
Understanding uncertainties in consumption-based emissions data provides an indication of the 
robustness of the methods for use in policy making. Data validation is important for determining 
                                                          
1 350 TWh/ 10.51 TWh/ 25 years = 1.33 
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how much influence the methodologies employed, models selected, and scenario assumptions 
chosen (e.g. consumption rates, trade patterns and carbon intensities of production) could have 
on the model outcomes to give confidence in the data. Whilst national-level trends in 
consumption emissions reported across different MRIO models are consistent within 10%, 
results by country and sector are more varied (Moran and Wood, 2014). Scenarios are very 
sensitive to the data and assumptions used and as such should be viewed as an exploratory 
analysis. Whilst we cannot rely on modelling exercises alone, the evidence presented provides 
a robust foundation estimating the additionality consumption accounting offers mitigation 
policies. In reality we do not have the modelling capability to understand what will happen in 
the future, and how the global economy will respond to a low carbon transition. However, we 
need to implement policies now that we think can make a difference, whilst continuing with 
decarbonisation and global cooperation efforts.  
5.2.2 Research context 
Besides the method, there are some contextual limitations related to the scope of the research. 
As critiqued in section 1.2.2., the quantitative climate targets set in the UK are weaker than the 
qualitative description of UK’s responsibility for mitigating climate change. I estimated that UK 
targets are 60% greater than an equal per capita-based distribution of global carbon budgets to 
prevent ‘dangerous’ climate change. From this evidence base, I would argue the need for 
existing UK climate targets to be reframed on this basis. In addition, based on COP21 in 2015, 
there was considerable support for lowering the level of warming from 2 to 1.5 degrees. This 
would require additional movements on the targets, which would have implications for 
timeframes and costs associated with a low carbon transition.  
This PhD was conducted before the latest UNFCCC negotiations at the 21st Conference of Parties 
(COP21) in Paris in December 2015. Since then countries and representative regions have 
submitted new pledges in the form of intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) to 
replace the existing pledges analysed in Chapter 2. More countries now have targets in place 
that will not have been fully captured. Despite greater global ambitions agreed in Paris, many 
experts believe the INDCs still fall short of preventing ‘dangerous’ climate change (UNFCCC, 
2015b), and sought to limit temperature rise to 1.5 degrees. The next IPCC assessment report in 
2018 will look at the feasibility of achieving greenhouse gas emissions reductions aligned with 
this temperature target (UNFCCC, 2015a). This greater ambition further strengthens the need 
for additional demand-side measures to meet tightening carbon budgets.  
Demand-side measures are not considered mainstream and without price adjustments to 
compensate for the reduction in consumption would reduce economic growth2 which is seen as 
                                                          
2 GDP can be calculated as the value of total expenditure of domestic consumers (households 
and government) on final goods and services 
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maintaining current lifestyles and as a vehicle for countries to develop. I have not explicitly 
addressed this tension. However, ecological economists have long been arguing that economic 
growth generates social and environmental costs, and once a certain level of wealth is achieved 
its increase fails to improve quality of life (Howarth and Kennedy, 2016). A number of ongoing 
initiatives, both national and international, are establishing, improving and monitoring 
indicators beyond GDP (Costanza et al., 2014), e.g. the creation in 2008 of the Commission on 
the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress; the EU’s ‘Beyond GDP’ 
initiative; The UN’s Human Development Index; The New Economics Foundations Happy Planet 
Index are a few of the most influential ones. These centre more on social and environmental 
well-being than generating economic growth, and could shed more light on the benefits of 
consumption policies. Working less for example has shown to improve health and happiness 
amongst those working too long or too short hours (Zwickl et al., 2016). In the UK, since 2001 
Defra have been publishing Sustainable Development Indicators which were revised in 2012 in 
partnership with the Office for National Statistics (ONS) new measures of national well-being. 
As consumption is integral to people’s quality of life (and not based on the assumption that 
increasing consumption increases wellbeing) consumption measures can be assessed within 
these types of monitoring frameworks to understand the wider economic, social and 
institutional impacts and co-benefits. 
I have focused on the role of government policies to encourage changes in consumer behaviours 
and not on other influences such as civil society and NGOs. However, change can stem from 
outside government policies. Research on public perceptions suggests public values are critical 
for the success of policies (Demski et al., 2015). There are also different scales in which policies 
are implemented, of which I have concentrated on UK and EU policies, but not how they are 
translated into local governments for example. Changing behaviours is certainly not restricted 
to national government actions, and happens at many scales across many stakeholders. This is 
just one route for encouraging change.   
5.3 Integrating embodied emissions into climate mitigation policy 
In this section I explore the motivations, potential barriers and approaches to integrate 
embodied emissions into climate policy. The structure of the discussion is framed in Figure 14, 
which indicates the steps (included in the box) needed to implement policies. Firstly, the 
evidence in this thesis suggests that consumption accounting can offer additionality in terms of 
increasing opportunities for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. I present an alternative 
framework to designing policies that are complementary to production-based technology 
measures to include consumption. There are different policy mechanisms available to reduce 
consumption, each with its own strengths and limitations. I have measured the environmental 
effectiveness of policies in this thesis, however, they must also be technically and economically 
viable and politically and socially acceptable to be implemented, which I discuss. For example 
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if a policy has a strong environmental potential but no political and public will it is less likely to 
be effective. From a practical perspective, there is a robust empirical basis on which to monitor 
and measure progress and policies using consumption emissions accounting, with ongoing 
developments refining these methods. Given this I conclude that there is a middle ground role 
for the implementation of consumption accounting that will bring consumption strategies into 
designing polices for achieving emissions reductions. This is outlined in my pragmatic proposal 
for integrating embodied emissions into climate mitigation policy.  




The International Energy Agency (2012) demonstrated the gap between international climate 
mitigation policies and emissions reductions required to limit future temperature rise to two 
degrees. I have summarised several reasons given in the literature for the disconnect of climate 
mitigation policy from climate science which determines a carbon budget for probabilities of 
achieving different levels of global warming. These bring to the forefront the need for more 
policy options and the need to think about additional demand-side measures beyond a direct 
reduction in energy demand resulting from energy efficiency and technology improvements: 
1. Policies have focused on the producing industries, leading to a plethora of industry 
technology solutions, which has been competing with increasing population, economic 
growth and consumption. Globally, efficiency improvements have not been enough to 
offset rising consumption and according to the rebound effect could contribute to 
further increases in consumption (Sorrell, 2009). 
2. A territorial boundary definition has been criticised for enabling carbon leakage where 
a reduction in emissions (relative to a benchmark) is offset by an increase outside the 
country’s jurisdiction (Peters, 2010a). These traded emissions are not directly targeted 
by policy, and a large proportion is excluded from existing climate pledges (Peters and 
Hertwich, 2008b).  
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3. The text of the UNFCCC agrees on the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capacities to deal with climate change. However, formal 
definitions on a fair emissions burden-sharing scheme, beyond inclusion in Annex I or 
not, is lacking.  
4. There is still a tendency to discuss end point targets instead of cumulative budgets 
(Anderson and Bows, 2011) even though the science of climate change is clear on the 
cumulative impact of emissions (Meinshausen et al., 2009). This is not dependent on the 
accounting principle employed; however a move to a carbon budget approach would 
require the remaining carbon space to be divided between countries following 
attributional principles agreeable by all.  
Early signs pre-COP21 indicated the new pledges (INDCs), which are intended to add up to 
emissions reductions for two degrees, are still not enough to realise necessary emissions 
reductions to prevent serious climate impacts (UNFCCC, 2015b). Furthermore, many nation 
states argued for a 1.5 degree target which strengthens the argument for the need for greater 
policy options (UNFCCC, 2015a). The results of this thesis demonstrate the integration of 
embodied emissions into climate policy can address some of the barriers to achieving a two 
degree or lower future. 
Using the IEA scenarios which were based on trajectories of national-level production emissions 
I did a similar analysis from a consumption perspective in the first analysis chapter (Chapter 2) 
to investigate the divergence between UK production and consumption emissions. Measured 
against a territorial baseline, a change to UK consumption is likely to underestimate the 
emissions reduction potential, as on average 50% of UK consumption emissions are generated 
abroad (this varies by product) (Barrett et al., 2013) and therefore would not count towards the 
UK’s saving. However, in effect, the emissions saving potential would be on average double the 
territorial emission reduction. In Chapter 2 I estimate that in 2050 as much as 60% of emissions 
embodied in UK consumption could be from imports and would therefore be influenced by 
changes to UK consumption.  
As shown in the third analysis chapter (Chapter 4) emissions from EU final consumption are 
currently 40% higher than those produced by EU sectors. If the EU and its Member States 
included net-imported emissions in their mitigation targets, collectively they would have 
influenced an additional 2,043 Mt in one year. This becomes a higher priority as international 
governance remains weak. It can also provide a lever to negotiate between Annex I and non-
Annex countries in terms of attributing responsibility for emissions reductions. Edenhofer et al. 
(2015b) suggest that Annex I countries taking on greater mitigation efforts would go some way 
to bringing non-Annex I countries on board. 
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This thesis identifies, from a supply chain perspective, that the current focus of policy on energy 
decarbonisation compartmentalises the problem too much. When calculating the emissions 
embodied in a country’s consumption, different sectors become more emissions dominant. 
Figure 12 in Chapter 4 showed that manufactured goods and services have the highest 
embodied emissions compared to the power sector which dominates production emissions. This 
is a result of the carbon intensity of resource inputs further up the supply chain in the provision 
of these products. Decarbonisation reduces the impact of direct energy consumption of these 
sectors, however as alluded to by Ayres and Warr (2005) this does not address the use of carbon 
intensive inputs such as primary materials.  
The UK energy system cannot be viewed in isolation of its links to other productive sectors and 
regions. Changes in demand, by both intermediate (industry and services) and final consumers 
(households, governments and large infrastructure items) have the ability to substantially 
reduce emissions. Some suggest this can be achieved by material efficiency measures (Allwood 
et al., 2011), whilst others suggest an absolute reduction in consumption is needed (Anderson 
et al., 2014). Even if climate policy remains based on production however, measuring embodied 
alongside territorial emissions can reveal underexploited policy options (presented in the 
following sections) that can be less costly and technically easier to implement. Given the slow 
pace of planned decarbonisation, the uncertainty of negative emissions technologies and the 
increasing impact of consumption on trade, it increases the levers available to climate policy 
makers. 
5.3.2 Designing policies 
In its original form (i.e. excluding embodied emissions) the energy system optimisation model 
UKTM, which we extended in Daly et al. (2015) to include embodied emissions, is used as 
evidence to inform the UK’s Carbon Plan and energy policy. The intention of Chapter 3 of this 
thesis was to show how the energy supply pathways from the model results would change when 
including emissions embodied in energy infrastructure in the UK’s territorial target. The model 
outcomes suggest that, based on technical, investment, innovation and deployment limitations, 
the UK can increase the share of low carbon technologies, particularly nuclear, to meet an 80% 
reduction at an additional 5% of the cost3. However, when validating the model outcomes 
(section 5.2.1.2.) the robustness of the results were brought into question, raising concerns 
around the feasibility of the capacity of nuclear deployment suggested from now until 2050. In 
addition, when considering uncertainty in low carbon technology deployment rates, policy 
uncertainty, and a strong public opposition to nuclear, often first-best outcomes are deemed 
infeasible and second-best measures need to be considered. 
                                                          
3 Undiscounted, see section 3.3.2 
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Whilst not mainstream in climate policy, governments have tools and policies available to 
address emissions embodied in consumption that do not always rely on technology solutions 
(illustrated in Figure 15). However, they often require user behaviours to adapt which is not 
necessarily easier to achieve. These tools address industry and business practices, consumer 
lifestyles and trade partnerships and can target traded emissions directly through trade 
mechanisms or indirectly through international transfers and changing domestic consumption, 
as initially presented in the discussion in Chapter 2 and expanded in Chapter 3 and 4’s discussion. 
Figure 15: Framework for designing policies addressing emissions embodied in consumption 
(green = actions by Annex I countries) 
 
Market-based mechanisms targeting internationally traded products directly through a 
regulation or tax such as carbon border adjustments could threaten the welfare of net exporting 
economies by increasing their costs and providing an additional administrative burden to collect, 
comply and monitor all traded commodities. Evidence has suggested that to reduce an 
equivalent volume of emissions, strengthening and extending the coverage of domestic efforts 
in net importing countries could yield greater global welfare improvements than applying border 
taxes by equalising the marginal abatement cost and associated benefits of carbon trading 
compared to encouraging production in regulated regions (Springmann, 2012). 
Effort-sharing agreements, like the Clean Development Mechanism, could become more 
important if traded emissions are to be addressed and international climate policy remains 
fragmented. Their effectiveness will change depending on the level of global ambition and the 
allocation of mitigation responsibilities. Mitigating for 1.5 degrees will require reductions in all 
areas and therefore countries cannot offset their emissions through mitigation efforts in 
another country, however there will need to be a flow of capital from developed to developing 
countries to finance the low carbon transition. Whilst mechanisms such as the CDM are intended 
to provide less developed and industrialising countries with the means to both reduce the 
carbon intensity of production and remain competitive as emissions controls tighten, such 
actions could increase the future mitigation costs of developing countries if developed countries 
take out the least cost measures and claim the credits for them. Additionally an increase in one 
unit of renewable energy deployed has shown to only offset a quarter of a unit of fossil fuels 
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even when controlled for demand (York, 2012), questioning the effectiveness of technology 
transfers in practice.  
Governments have been reluctant to implement policies addressing domestic consumption, 
however, in a previous paper, Barrett and Scott (2012), identified case study evidence for 
changing consumer behaviours of producers and final consumers. We estimated that, excluding 
energy and transport measures, altering consumption patterns of goods and services could 
contribute up to 10% of UK 2050 targets (equating to 30% of emissions in non-energy and 
transport sectors). Other studies have also demonstrated emissions savings from a range of 
consumption strategies applied to industries (e.g. Allwood et al. (2010a)), infrastructures (e.g. 
Müller et al. (2013), Roelich et al. (2014) and Knoeri et al. (2015)), the circular economy (Stahel, 
2016) and consumer lifestyles (e.g. Barrett and Scott (2012), (Girod et al., 2014) (Table 10). 
Table 10: Examples of consumption strategies for industry, infrastructure and final consumer 
purchasing 
Business to business Infrastructure Lifestyles 
 Reducing material yield losses 
in the energy-intensive 
primary processing stages 
 Increasing the use of recycled 
materials which are less 
energy intensive than primary 
production 
 Using products for longer and 
more intensely through repair 
and maintenance and modular 
design allowing component 
upgrading 
 Product re-use e.g. through 
second-hand markets 
 Lightweight product design 
 Apply the material efficiency 
principles in the first column 
 Integrating infrastructure into 
urban planning to reduce 
infrastructure needs e.g. shared 
infrastructure and coordinated 
public transport systems 
 Shift in consumption 
pattern without changes in 
consumption level e.g. 
changing diets and travel 
modes 
 Purchasing the same but 
lower impact products e.g. 
solar panels and electric 
cars 
 Changing the way existing 
products are used e.g. 
driving practices and 
lowering household 
heating 
 Buying less 
 
A crucial step of realising these strategies will be the ability of governments to set the right policy 
framework to incentivise shifts in practice. Governments could lead by example and specify low 
material, remanufactured and or locally sourced (if lower carbon) requirements in tenders, 
which involves millions of pounds spent annually on infrastructure (ERP, 2014). Reducing 
material and product consumption could be more effective if business models shifted from 
profit-driven to performance-driven sales (Steinberger et al., 2009). Using the example of a car 
club, under this model business would provide a fleet of cars to customers for a (monthly) fee 
instead of selling each a car. The incentive would transfer from increasing sales to maintaining 
a stock of cars as efficiently as possible to keep costs down. Hence it would reduce material 
throughput. This is not a new but a niche business model, for example it is practiced across a 
range of intermediate and end-user products including sports equipment, electronics, IT 
equipment, cars and aircraft, and Li and Xu (2015) suggest it can present an economically viable 
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business model. Moving forward, the main challenge will be in understanding how to move 
niche consumption strategies into the mainstream for a range of products and stakeholders. 
5.3.3 Policy scope 
The rationale behind most climate policy instruments is rooted in conventional economic 
theory, which presumes that the optimal quantity of a pollutant is equivalent to the associated 
pollution control costs and the benefits of the control (Spash, 2010). Mayrhofer and Gupta 
(2016) found the scope for co-benefits is ‘enormous’, covering economic, environmental, social 
and institutional co-benefits including enhanced energy security, reduced air pollution, health 
improvements and the promotion of political stability. Practitioners try to quantify these in 
monetary terms, and compare them to the cost of the mitigation control. Pollution control 
optimisation happens when the costs of mitigation outweighs the reduced costs of the benefits 
to society. However, many of the benefits are impossible to quantify economically (Mayrhofer 
and Gupta, 2016) and therefore estimates rarely reflect the true cost to society. In addition, if 
the immediate (carbon) costs become too high for the implementing industry/ sector, sectors 
are anticipated to have the knowledge and ability to innovate to reduce them. Such simplified 
assumptions ignore complex realities, and the drivers and motivations besides cost-based 
decisions. Exclusion of the realities in designing policies will have implications for their 
effectiveness. I now consider whether there is the political, technical, economic and social scope 
to implement consumption strategies referred to in the previous section (Table 10), and the 
interactions and overlap between policies: 
1. Political scope - deployment of low carbon technologies has been weak and there is a 
lack of integration of consumer behaviour in climate policies.  
2. Technical scope - future technologies are assumed in low carbon pathways to achieve 
a two degree future, yet their technical potential is uncertain.  
3. Economic scope – while offering some low cost opportunities, reducing consumption 
is at odds with government objectives on economic growth. 
4. Societal scope - strategies are susceptible to behavioural responses, for example 
public and political lobbying. 
5. Interactions – sectors are interlinked through global supply chains and cannot be 
considered in isolation. 
5.3.3.1 Political 
Despite the UK being one of the first countries to set 2050 climate targets, policy 
implementation has been weak. Although the EU met the first round of Kyoto targets, the 
evidence suggests this has been possible due to the exclusion of international aviation and 
shipping (Gilbert and Bows, 2012), the economic recession (Peters et al., 2012b), generous 
carbon allowances under the EU ETS (Spash, 2010), and outsourcing (Kanemoto et al., 2014). 
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Recent reductions in the UK’s territorial emissions, which reached 8% in 2014 despite strong 
economic growth, have not necessarily been the result of planned climate policy. Many of the 
reductions from building, industry and power emissions reflect one off changes and uncertain 
factors rather than replicable ongoing trends (CCC, 2015b). Had it not been for a mild winter in 
2014, the 15% reduction in building emissions would have been 2%. While coal combustion in 
power generation has reduced, leading to an 18% reduction in emissions, it has been replaced 
with imports, and low carbon sources accounted for only 4% of the reduction in 2014 emissions 
from power generation. Despite good progress in for example the deployment of renewable 
electricity generating capacity, installation of efficient boilers and increased insulation rates, 
there has been limited progress in low carbon heating, uptake of efficient appliances, and 
reduced travel demand. The UK Committee on Climate Change (2015b), tasked with monitoring 
UK climate policy and progress independently of the UK government4, have also perceived a gap 
between existing and foreseeable climate policies and meeting future UK carbon budgets. 
Therefore, there is a need to focus on how climate policy will deliver targets, and the additional 
measures needed to bridge the emissions gap. 
Whilst the UK is one of a few countries to publish national consumption emissions accounts, 
responsibility for them was assigned to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra) and not the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC). Defra is largely 
responsible for sustainable consumption and production, which was separated from climate 
mitigation. Also, since the economic recession, Defra’s budget has diminished and work on 
consumption has been cut. Whilst there was an enquiry in 2012 by the UK government to 
investigate the implications that consumption-based accounting could have for UK carbon 
targets and devising climate change mitigation policies, which concluded that DECC measure 
and monitor UK consumption emissions, this has yet to be implemented. Due to the 
environmental potential of consumption-related policies, consumption policies should be an 
integral part of climate mitigation portfolios. 
5.3.3.2 Technical 
Currently cumulative emissions largely depend on how effectively policy can enable the 
deployment of low carbon technologies. There is technical uncertainty in the development and 
deployment of low carbon technologies, particularly negative emissions technologies such as 
carbon capture and storage (Smith et al., 2016), which is a risk given many two degree scenario 
pathways rely on their deployment (e.g. included in the IPCC’s Representative Concentration 
Pathways for two degrees). Delaying action to be able to maintain current lifestyles at the ‘least 
cost’ with the expectation that such technologies will work in the future is a high risk strategy 
that could be disastrous as the temperature-rising emissions will already be in the atmosphere, 
                                                          
4 Although some would argue they are not independent 
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and will be much more costly (if not impossible) to abate (Edenhofer et al., 2015a). Given that 
technical scope can be limiting and many demand-side measures do not rely on technologies, 
consumption strategies present an attractive policy option to those serious about mitigation. 
Barriers to reducing resource consumption are not often technological ones. Skelton and 
Allwood (2013) suggest the cheap costs of materials (they focus on steel) compared to other 
inputs, particularly labour, mean that there is little incentive for companies to implement 
material efficiency measures such as lightweight design. The low cost of new products in 
comparison to repair and maintenance disincentivises product longevity and the economics for 
second-hand markets are poor (Allwood et al., 2011). People replace products early as their 
tastes change and technologies develop with new and improved functions (van Nes and Cramer, 
2006). Information on product lifetimes are not well understood; people often place little value 
or attachment to products;  and labour costs to repair are higher than the cheap cost of 
outsourcing manufacturing to low cost countries (Cooper, 2005). Therefore areas like product 
design, marketing and fashion can make a difference to people’s perception of products and 
how they value them; and market conditions can incentivise good quality durable product design 
and product longevity for example through performance-driven sales and extended product 
warrantees.    
5.3.3.3 Economic 
Consumption spending is a component part of generating economic growth. Reducing 
consumption is therefore at odds with government objectives around economic growth. 
However, to recognise the limits of economic growth to continually improve people’s quality of 
life there have been movements on redefining progress from an overwhelming emphasis on 
economic growth to more social and environmental factors that determine, for example, levels 
of happiness, with the intended outcome that prosperity can be achieved without necessarily 
the need for economic growth. van den Bergh (2011) for example suggests that we should not 
worry whether economic growth goes up or down, but instead just measure what ultimately 
matters for improving welfare.  
Indicators are a useful tool for designing and assessing policies, and generally what gets 
measured gets managed. Despite rising criticism, for example failing to account for unequal 
distribution of wealth across a population, GDP remains the key indicator for assessing a 
country’s material standard of living (O'Neill, 2012). If measurements are flawed, decisions can 
be distorted. A traffic jam for example would increase GDP generated from petrol yet would 
increase pollution and reduce people’s well-being (both health and enjoyment) (Stiglitz. et al., 
2009). Some research suggests that reducing consumption could have other co-benefits relating 
to quality of life (Pullinger, 2014, van den Bergh, 2011). Understanding these opportunities is 
important however this was outside the scope of this thesis. Policies should be evaluated against 
a range of sustainable development indicators and not a cost-benefit analysis in the 
conventional sense. 
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5.3.3.4 Societal 
Whilst this thesis has demonstrated the environmental potential of consumption-side 
strategies, even if a policy is deemed to be environmentally effective, strategies ‘are not devoid 
of behavioural requirements, self-control and social norms, in order to be effective, and the 
appropriate response must be embedded within an institutional and social frame’ (Spash, 2010). 
Demski et al. (2015) suggest that public acceptability is of critical importance to the success of 
energy policy, as they can have strong preferences for some technologies (e.g. renewables) over 
others (e.g. CCS) and specific preferences or responses might play out depending on public 
attitudes and values. This is a large source of uncertainty of resource policies (Butler et al., 2015) 
and can be a help or a hindrance.  
The public and industry both actively lobby government proposals for example, with the balance 
swayed in favour of large corporations. Publicised examples include public opposition for 
nuclear power and fracking, largely over safety and some environmental concerns. From an 
industry perspective many energy intensive industries have arguably been cushioned from 
climate policies e.g. EU ETS, by exercising their substantial lobbying power on governments, 
concerned first and foremost about their own market share and economic growth. Besides 
having shown to have had little effect on the competitiveness of EU industries, the EU is likely 
to remain locked into carbon-intensive energy forms if governments continue to protect the 
vested interests of energy suppliers (Moe, 2010). The success of consumption policies will 
depend on the ability of the government to shift incentives from profit-driven sales to 
performance-based operations, and encourage firms who see themselves as losers of the 
process to adapt and/ or diversify their activities. Policies must encourage climate friendly 
behaviours and enable those negatively affected to adapt to low carbon activities. 
Policies addressing consumption need to be socially acceptable to be effective. Consumers need 
to be both able and willing to adapt to desirable patterns of consumption. For example, car 
ownership has become the norm, with 75% of UK households owning one or more cars, up 5% 
in 15 years (Department for Transport, 2013). Some people prefer the convenience of owning a 
car, whilst others perceive owning the latest model as a status symbol, and the ‘value’ of the 
product often varies across different socio-demographic segments of the population. 
Deciphering the factors that have led to this social norm will help government shift the incentive 
system towards public transport or low carbon business options such as car clubs that are more 
likely to be adopted. Models are available to describe consumer behaviour, see Jackson (2005) 
for an overview. They vary in their importance given to characteristics that are internal to the 
individual such as attitudes, values, habits and personal norms compared to behaviour as a 
function of processes and characteristics that are external to the individual such as physical and 
regulatory incentives, institutional constrains, and social norms.  
However, putting an emphasis on the role of consumers as agents in mitigating climate change, 
framed as ‘citizen-consumers’ that are both agents of change and consumers with buying power 
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in the capitalist system (Barr et al., 2011), is not so straightforward. Despite the majority of 
people in developed countries being aware of climate change, this does not necessarily translate 
into climate action (Tobler et al., 2012). Tobler et al. (2012) make reference to studies that 
indicate consumers with pro-environmental attitudes are more willing to support political 
changes that encourage sustainable behaviors, but are less willing to make lifestyle changes 
independently.  The former is influenced predominantly by environmental concerns, the latter 
more by personal norms, yet this can differ when looking at specific policies. For example, 
people seem more likely to recycle and insulate their homes than replace car ownership for 
public transport. Consumers have also shown to be more willing to accept technical changes 
than shifts in consumption. In essence Tobler et al. (2012) found that consumers are more willing 
to adopt behaviours with a lower cost or effort involved (i.e. more convenient) and pro-
environmental concerns are not enough to overcome higher costs and less convenient 
behaviours.  
Social practice theory has been used to understand how everyday activities (i.e. social practices) 
shape people’s consumption and use of energy, products and carbon. People do not necessarily 
question recycling of household waste as these are now somewhat ingrained in everyday 
practices, yet this does not lead to harder, bigger scale changes. Barr et al. (2011) found a 
general unwillingness to assume responsibility for climate change among interviewed 
participants, and a tendency to shift the blame to others. This was rationalized due to the global 
scale of climate change and feelings of powerlessness as an individual to make a difference. 
People often highlighted the unsustainable behaviours of others, or those setting the 
consumption environment (i.e. government and businesses), compared to themselves to defend 
their own behaviour. The scale of climate change seems to be very removed from everyday 
practice, and there is still a tension between consumption aspirations, like going on holiday, and 
knowing it can have a detrimental environmental impact.  
Governments and industries often refer to consumer sovereignty, and the individual right of 
consumers, against sufficient consumption (Sanne, 2002). However, Sanne (2002) argues that 
consumers have become locked into structures and habits (understood for example through 
social practice theory), created mainly through producer and business interests, that are 
conducive to high consuming lifestyles, instead of them being necessarily unwilling actors of 
change. For example, persuasive marketing attracts people towards certain products and this 
has grown as communication technologies have developed, becoming sometimes intrusive. 
Marketing has become a considerable force worth billions of pounds on the basis of selling 
consumption, and hence will be influential in resisting change. Another example are 
employment laws regarding full time work which has tied people into certain working patterns 
despite surveys suggesting that people would prefer shorter working hours at less pay. More 
money, both individually and in aggregate, increases consumption. Sanne (2002) suggests the 
relationship between buyers (consumers) and sellers (producers) is uneven, with consumers 
- 112 - 
being subject to persuasive marketing by producers, but with limited power themselves against 
certain products or processes. The balance comes down to the construction and achievement 
of political influence and power. Businesses tends to have a certain amount of power in 
government due to its economic capacity. Whilst media is intended to represent the interests 
of the public, it itself is funded, and therefore dependent on, advertising. Changing 
consumption, as suggested to by Sanne (2002), is rarely discussed due to its central role in 
maintaining economic growth, which is at odds with government and industry principles.    
The above findings are supported by Gössling and Cohen (2014) discussion of transport ‘taboos’ 
in devising EU low carbon transport policies for cars and aviation. These sectors have no defined 
climate targets; people seem unwilling to drive or fly less, however environmentally motivated 
they are; the industries have, and have exercised, their power to lobby government policies 
framed as the human right to travel; aviation is still largely subsidized (probably as a result of 
substantial lobbying); and mobility is ingrained in social practices. They conclude that these 
inter-related transport taboos constitute a risk to decision makers who ‘would be viewed as 
violators of norms and values’. Governments are reluctant to talk about the level of transport 
demand and are under pressure from the aviation and car industries lobbying for and pursuing 
technological innovations without subduing demand.  
5.3.3.5 Economy-wide interactions 
Finally, consumption-accounting reveals the interdependencies between economic sectors 
across countries. The impact of globalisation has resulted in increasingly complex and global 
supply chains, with different countries specialising in different products. Increasing consumption 
of a product in one country increases production in all sectors and countries which inputs to its 
supply chain. Chapter four identified two areas where policy effectiveness is weakened due to 
these interactions. Firstly, policies aimed at energy/ resource efficiency can lead to cost savings, 
which are spent on more of the same, or another consumption activity which embodies 
emissions, known as rebound effects. Secondly, a reduction in energy/ material demand from 
sectors in the EU ETS through efficiency measures reduces the carbon allowances those sectors 
require, which increases the number available for other activities. Having an allowance surplus 
lowers the carbon price, making it cheaper to pollute. Therefore, policies cannot be considered 
in isolation, and need to be designed as part of a policy package so as to offset any potential 
adverse consequences. However, the number and diffuse nature of actors involved in 
production-consumption linkages from a supply chain perspective makes supply chains complex 
to govern. Whilst polycentric systems of governance have shown to solve collective-action 
problems, this tends to be at a more localised level.  
5.3.3.6 Summary 
To summarise, whilst consumption policies in addition to technology installations and efficiency 
improvements are less technically limited, they require businesses and final consumers to adjust 
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their seller and user practices. Reducing aggregate consumption is also at odds with economic 
growth objectives and will affect the income generation of some intermediate consumers more 
than others. However, there will always be ‘losers’ from any proposed policies which has shown 
in the case of the EU ETS to be prevented by strong lobbying and weak governance. Evidence on 
the costs and co-benefits of consumption policies need to be improved, and can be aided with 
the inclusion of broader sustainable development indicators in policy appraisals, to be attractive 
to energy and climate policy makers.   
5.4 A pragmatic proposal 
Currently international emissions accounting and mitigation policies are regulated and 
evaluated on a fully production-based approach, with a minority of voluntary reporting 
performed using consumption-based accounting. It is well understood that the current policies 
in place are not enough to reach the globally agreed two degree target, and some literature 
advocates the need to reduce consumption to meet the remaining emissions gap and reduce 
the risk of pathways dependant on technology-related uncertainties. Much of the more recent 
literature on global responsibility for emissions reductions suggests countries, particularly those 
with legally binding carbon targets, should not be allowed to meet those targets by shifting the 
emissions burden abroad. These two points are strong indications of the need to put policies in 
place to address emissions embodied in consumption, using consumption-based accounting to 
prioritise high emissions flows and assess the environmental potential of alternative trade and 
demand-related policies. Consumption accounting would provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of emissions progress and provide an evidence base to ensure the impact of 
consumption is not just transferred from one country to another. However, there is likely to be 
more political traction when referring to policies and practices that do not radically reframe the 
existing emissions monitoring, reporting and evaluation framework. Therefore, moving forward, 
I propose a middle ground option where national consumption accounting is mandatory yet 
does not replace the existing production inventory approach. National departments tasked with 
climate change should use these when devising and appraising policies to ensure consumption-
related policies are considered alongside technology ones and that policies cannot reduce 
territorial emissions whilst transferring emissions abroad.  
Consumption-related polices are not dependant on consumption accounting, and likewise the 
implementation of consumption accounting does not necessarily mean consumption policies 
will follow. However, making consumption-based emissions accounting mandatory would 
increase the incentive to reduce them and to implement consumption policies that offer new 
reduction opportunities which extend to imported emissions. This transition would require 
standardised accounting guidelines, open access to international production and trade data, 
appropriate models to enable policy assessments, and the compilation of evidence on different 
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consumption-related policies; some of which are at least partly in place in many developed 
countries:  
 In terms of data requirements the System of national Accounts (United Nations Statistics 
Division, 2016), the internationally agreed standard set of recommendations on how to 
compile measures of economic activity, is already a standard which measures how 
income originating in production, modified by taxes and transfers, flows to consumers, 
businesses, government and foreign nations and how they allocate income to 
consumption, saving and investment. This is the basis of data needed to measure 
consumption. Reported trade data between countries is not currently matched with 
reported national accounts. For example all imports reported by the UK are not matched 
exactly to all reported exports destined for the UK. International trade data would need 
to be reconciled with national accounts, and standardised in order for countries to 
report ‘like-for-like’ on their consumption. This would require a central data source such 
as an international monitoring agency (e.g. the OECD) to oversee data provision, which 
is already in place for a subset of countries (OECD, 2015). It would also be beneficial to 
maintain existing global input-output models that perform consumption accounting to 
be able to validate the data that all countries would be expected to agree upon. 
 In terms of modelling, there would need to be a shift from cost-optimal engineering 
models to at least give similar weight to consumer and behaviour-related policy 
evidence. The UK Carbon Plan (HM Government, 2011) references evidence from three 
models (The DECC calculator; ESME; and UK MARKAL, the predecessor to UKTM) all with 
a foundation in engineering and based on future energy system costs. None consider 
embodied emissions or the different motivations behind changing consumer practices. 
For example, in UKTMs the level of final energy demand is determined exogenously and 
the profile of energy supply technologies is adjusted based on least cost to meet the 
pre-defined level of demand within an emissions constraint. Demand is therefore not 
seen as a means of reduction but it is assumed energy supply can adapt to meet the 
specified demand. Neither does UKTMs consider changing end-user technologies such 
as mode of transport (from private car to public transport or car-sharing) or buildings 
designed with less material inputs. Relying on such energy models means that resource 
consumption measures that target the use of materials and products, offering effective 
and complementary policies to address the remaining emissions gap, are currently 
underrepresented in the policy evidence base. 
 With the data in place, more policy assessments of consumption-side measures over 
and above direct energy use from heating, travel and use of appliances, will be needed, 
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which consider emissions embodied in resources used along product supply chains and 
their disposal. There is also potentially more scope to target traded products indirectly 
through changing domestic consumption than to directly target traded products. In the 
introduction (section 1.1.3.4) I referenced a range of policies influencing consumption, 
some that exist in practice and others only in theory, from economic and regulatory 
trading schemes and product standards to information provision, voluntary agreements 
and non-climate related resource policies. The latter has some promise as resource 
efficiency is already a central EU agenda, within its Resource Efficiency Roadmap (EC, 
2011) and Circular Economy Package (EC, 2015), which have strategies and policies 
addressing resource consumption in place, albeit these continue to focus on end-of-life 
strategies and not a reduction in resource use. Therefore, I would suggest that resource 
efficiency makes up a central pillar of climate change policies, taking advantage of the 
contribution resource efficiency can make to meeting climate targets.  
A potential starting point to get consumption policies on the agenda is to do a cost benefit 
analysis of consumption-based measures which policy makers are familiar with. Whilst I have 
raised some drawbacks to relying purely on an economic case to select effective policies, in this 
case policy makers could at least have a like for like comparison of the different measures to 
compare with existing production-side ones. This would be interesting to see how consumption 
policies fair against production ones, and would be easier to attract the attention of policy 
makers.  
However in addition, to be a cost-effective option research needs to frame what a reduction in 
consumption would look like for the economy and society. It is not yet clear how economic 
transactions in a more service-driven and less sales-driven economy would be priced. Reducing 
(UK) demand has been highlighted as being at odds with government objectives on economic 
growth, yet could have some co-benefits that are aligned with alternative economic, social and 
environmental indicators measuring progress. Reducing consumption does not automatically 
mean a reduction in spending as expenditure can be switched from buying products to leasing 
services, such as switching from private car ownership to car clubs. When there is an aggregate 
price reduction, literature on the rebound effect says that there needs to be a price adjustment 
so that the money saved is not used form other emissions-intensive purposes. Therefore prices 
will need to adjust in line with consumption policies without an alternative no-price option such 
as a cap on emissions actually aligned with a high probability of not exceeding 1.5 degrees.      
Consumption policies tend to require a behavioural response. It will be important to get 
industry, businesses, governments and the public adopting different business practices and 
consumption behaviours. Policy mechanisms should be assessed for their social feasibility. For 
example, product lifetime extensions can be implemented via a number of policy mechanisms 
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such as extended and transferable warrantees, product regulations specifying maximum 
resource weights or minimum usage, or changes in business practice to leasing products instead 
of selling final goods. Whilst all three could achieve the same outcome, one may be more 
acceptable to stakeholders, thereby increasing its implementation scope. Some policies will be 
easier to extend, for example standards which are part of the current policy landscape, whilst 
others warrant further attention, for example incentivising a change in business practice. 
Research needs to move beyond listing the potential barriers to uptake to resolving issues of 
implementation and aligning policies with a two degree or lower carbon budget. They also need 
to be evaluated in terms of their interactions and overlap with other policies to ensure they 
don’t undermine existing policies, and to understand the most effective policy package to deliver 
reduction targets. Energy efficiency and consumer policies have the potential to both undermine 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (and probably other existing policies), and also be undermined 
by rebound effects. Therefore, policies must be complementary alongside decarbonisation and 
energy efficiency policies.  
Input-output analyses identify actors at a very aggregated and coarse level, without identifying 
their role in the supply chain. Due to the supply chain nature of potential consumer 
interventions, methods need to advance the understanding of producer to consumer linkages 
in commodity supply chains. Enhancing the spatial resolution of supply chains would allow 
consideration of heterogeneous management practices, actors and governance systems, which 
will increase understanding of how to govern a diverse set of actors in a more coordinated way. 
Methods such as agent-based modelling can simulate the role of agents within a system, and 
how behaviours, and hence uptake, would change under different forms of governance. Co-
evolutionary frameworks better understand the interactions of different actors, technologies 
and ecosystems to enable systematic analysis of influences on the development of consumer 
policies and changing consumer practices, including the conditions needed for change. 
Transitions frameworks help understand the conditions for transitioning from niche products 
and practices to the mainstream, and eventually becoming embedded in the meta-landscape. 
In particular, I would like to use a form of agent-based modelling as a next step to look at 
delivering resource consumption policies.     
To summarise, the most important next stages of research to realise consumption-based policies 
in climate mitigation policy include a systemic detailed appraisal of their environmental, political 
and social feasibility, understood to be ingrained within a system characterised by certain social 
norms and governance architectures. The social and economic impacts of new user practices 
need to be more thoroughly investigated. Particularly within the UK there is some, albeit 
diminishing, political scope to support consumption-accounting as a middle ground mandatory 
option. Research needs to explore the potential of consumption-based measures beyond 
theory, to delivering change. This needs to be framed in light of post-Paris and IPCC budgets for 
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a 1.5 degree future. Researchers must take some responsibility for its application, and work with 
governments to encourage its implementation.      
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6 Appendix 
Analysis 1: An integration of net imported emissions into climate change 
targets 
6.1 Detailed scenario and projections 
The scenarios were undertaken as part of a project funded in 2013 by the UK Committee on 
Climate Change who were investigating emissions associated with future UK consumption 
patterns, documented in the CCC’s report Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing 
competitiveness risks (CCC, 2013). 
Using input-output analysis, consumption emissions (F) are given by 𝐹 = 𝑓𝑥𝐿𝑦, where fx is the 
direct carbon intensity of production sectors, L is the effect of trade transactions (known as the 
Leontief Inverse), and y is the volume and composition of final consumption. Each variable is 
projected from 2010 (the latest year of data available at the time of study) to 2050 using the 
following data sources and assumptions:  
6.2 UK production emissions trajectory (fUK) 
In line with UK legislated climate targets, UK production emissions are reduced 80% from 1990 
levels by 2050 following the “Barriers in industry” scenario defined by the UK Committee on 
Climate Change (CCC) (pg. 46: CCC (2012)), which acknowledges there are some barriers to 
maximum deployment of abatement technologies. The CCC investigated the deployment of a 
range of technology abatement options for UK production sectors which are or are likely to 
become technologically feasible and cost-effective, with some smaller changes in consumer 
behaviour, to meet the 80% target. Core strategies include efficiency improvements, 
decarbonisation of power generation, extensive electrification of heat and surface transport and 
the use of bioenergy. Emissions remain relatively high in industry as there is limited application 
of CCS and no electrification (Figure 16). Greater success is achieved in other sectors, with 
transport, heat and power largely decarbonised (notwithstanding some residual gas use in 
power and heat), and all but the most challenging abatement options deployed to reduce non-
CO2 emissions. Aviation and shipping emissions are included in the end-point target. The dotted 
black horizontal line indicates net emissions of 160 Mt CO2e. Net emissions for UK production 
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(includes exports) reduce to 160 Mt CO2e by 2050 from 805 Mt CO2e1 in 1990. These sector 
projections are disaggregated to 110 sectors as this is the level of detail in the input-output 
model.  
Figure 16: UK production emissions by sector in 2050 
 
The input-output model defines 110 economic sectors on the basis of Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. The ‘Barriers in industry’ scenario for meeting the 2050 target in the 
Climate Change Act examines emissions reductions pathways in the key emitting sectors of the 
UK’s economy: power generation, buildings and industry, surface transport, international 
aviation and shipping emissions, agriculture and waste. Emissions from this scenario are first 
attributed to the equivalent high level SIC sectors based on energy use statistics, which enabled 
us to separate surface transport emissions between services, transport and households (see 
Table 11).  
                                                          
1 Production emissions include emissions from international aviation and shipping. Whilst these 
are not reported in the official UK territorial accounts they are included in the scenario to 
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Table 11: Mapping of high level UK production emissions classifications 
High level SIC sectors CCC production emission sectors 
Agriculture & forestry Agriculture & forestry emissions 
Industry Industry emissions 
Power Power emissions  
Services 20% Surface transport emissions 
  All non-residential buildings emissions 
Transport 20% Surface transport emissions 
  All International aviation & shipping emissions 
Direct household transport 60% of Surface transport emissions 
Direct household heat Residential buildings emissions 
 
Proportional analysis was used to disaggregate emissions by sector in Table 11 to the more 
detailed 110 SIC sectors in the input-output model (Table 12). This means that the proportion of 
emissions within high level sectors remain the same out to 2050. For example, if coal and lignite 
made up 5% of industry emissions in 2010, they make up the same proportion of industry 
emissions in 2050. This mapping was completed by the Committee on Climate Change. 
Table 12: Mapping high level UK production emissions to disaggregated SIC sectors 
SIC Description High level CCC sector 
allocation  
  1  Products of agriculture, hunting and related services           Agriculture & forestry 
  2  Products of forestry, logging and related services           Agriculture & forestry 
  3  Fish and other fishing products; aquaculture products; 
support services to fishing       
Agriculture & forestry 
  4  Coal and lignite               Industry 
  5  Crude petroleum and natural gas   & metal ores          Industry 
  6  Other mining and quarrying products             Industry 
  7  Mining support services               Industry 
  8  Preserved meat and meat products             Industry 
  9  Processed and preserved fish, crustaceans, molluscs, fruit 
and vegetables         
Industry 
10 Vegetable and animal oils and fats  Industry 
11  Dairy products                Industry 
12  Grain mill products, starches and starch products           Industry 
13  Bakery and farinaceous products              Industry 
14  Other food products               Industry 
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15  Prepared animal feeds               Industry 
16  Alcoholic beverages                Industry 
17  Soft drinks                Industry 
18  Tobacco products                Industry 
19  Textiles                 Industry 
20  Wearing apparel                Industry 
21  Leather and related products              Industry 
22  Wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
articles of straw and plaiting materials  
Industry 
23  Paper and paper products              Industry 
24  Printing and recording services              Industry 
25  Coke and refined petroleum products             Industry 
26  Paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and 
mastics         
Industry 
27  Soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, 
perfumes and toilet preparations       
Industry 
28  Other chemical products               Industry 
29  Industrial gases, inorganics and fertilisers (all inorganic 
chemicals) - 20.11/13/15        
Industry 
30  Petrochemicals - 20.14/16/17/60               Industry 
31  Dyestuffs, agro-chemicals - 20.12/20              Industry 
32  Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations            
Industry 
33  Rubber and plastic products              Industry 
34  Manufacture of cement, lime, plaster and articles of 
concrete, cement and plaster   
Industry 
35  Glass, refractory, clay, other porcelain and ceramic, stone 
and abrasive products - 23.1-4/7-9  
Industry 
36  Basic iron and steel              Industry 
37  Other basic metals and casting             Industry 
38  Weapons and ammunition               Industry 
39  Fabricated metal products, excl. machinery and equipment 
and weapons & ammunition - 25.1-3/25.5-9     
Industry 
40  Computer, electronic and optical products             Industry 
41  Electrical equipment                Industry 
42  Machinery and equipment n.e.c.              Industry 
43  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers             Industry 
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44  Ships and boats               Industry 
45  Air and spacecraft and related machinery            Industry 
46  Other transport equipment - 30.2/4/9             Industry 
47  Furniture                 Industry 
48  Other manufactured goods               Industry 
49  Repair and maintenance of ships and boats           Industry 
50  Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft           Industry 
51  Rest of repair; Installation - 33.11-14/17/19/20            Industry 
52  Electricity, transmission and distribution  Power 
53  Gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains; steam 
and air conditioning supply      
Power 
54  Natural water; water treatment and supply services           Industry 
55  Sewerage services; sewage sludge              Industry 
56  Waste collection, treatment and disposal services; 
materials recovery services         
Industry 
57  Remediation services and other waste management 
services           
Industry 
58  Buildings and building construction works             Industry 
59  Constructions and construction works for civil engineering           Industry 
60  Specialised construction works               Industry 
61  Wholesale and retail trade and repair services of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles      
Services 
62  Wholesale trade services, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles         
Services 
63  Retail trade services, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles         
Services 
64  Rail transport services               Transport 
65  Land transport services and transport services via 
pipelines, excluding rail transport       
Transport 
66  Water transport services               Transport 
67  Air transport services               Transport 
68  Warehousing and support services for transportation            Services 
69  Postal and courier services              Services 
70  Accommodation services                Services 
71  Food and beverage serving services             Services 
72  Publishing services                Services 
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73  Motion picture, video and TV programme production 
services, sound recording & music publishing     
Services 
74  Programming and broadcasting services              Services 
75  Telecommunications services                Services 
76  Computer programming, consultancy and related services            Services 
77  Information services                Services 
78  Financial services, except insurance and pension funding           Services 
79  Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding services, 
except compulsory social security &  Pension funding 
services    
Services 
80  Services auxiliary to financial services and insurance 
services          
Services 
81  Real estate services, excluding on a fee or contract basis 
and imputed rent     
Services 
82  Imputed rent services               Services 
83  Real estate activities on a fee or contract basis         Services 
84  Legal services                Services 
85  Accounting, bookkeeping and auditing services; tax 
consulting services          
Services 
86  Services of head offices; management consulting services           Services 
87  Architectural and engineering services; technical testing 
and analysis services         
Services 
88  Scientific research and development services             Services 
89  Advertising and market research services             Services 
90  Other professional, scientific and technical services            Services 
91  Veterinary services                Services 
92  Rental and leasing services              Services 
93  Employment services                Services 
94  Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation services 
and related services       
Services 
95  Security and investigation services              Services 
96  Services to buildings and landscape             Services 
97  Office administrative, office support and other business 
support services         
Services 
98  Public administration and defence services; compulsory 
social security services         
Services 
99  Education services                Services 
100  Human health services               Services 
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101  Residential care services               Services 
102  Social work services without accommodation             Services 
103  Creative, arts and entertainment services             Services 
104  Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural services           Services 
105  Gambling and betting services              Services 
106  Sports services and amusement and recreation services           Services 
107  Services furnished by membership organisations             Services 
108  Repair services of computers and personal and household 
goods         
Services 
109  Other personal services               Services 
110  Services of households as employers of domestic personnel          Services 
 
6.3 International production emissions trajectories (foverseas) 
This is where the two and four degree scenarios are distinguished. The IPCC Fifth assessment 
Report calculates that from 2011 global cumulative emissions cannot exceed around 1,000 Gt 
CO2 by 2100 to remain within two degrees of warming (Stocker et al., 2013). If achieved, global 
emissions would reduce by 60% from 2010 to 2050 to 16 Gt CO2. This requires carbon intensity 
improvements of 5 to 6% annually, achieved largely through energy efficiency, decarbonisation 
and electrification, and carbon capture and storage. Whilst there is international agreement 
under the UNFCCC to reduce emissions aligned with this objective, current emissions reductions 
pledged in the Cancun Agreements are so far only consistent with four degrees of temperature 
rise. Under this case global energy-related emissions will be 40 Gt CO2 in 2050, similar to the 
level of global emissions in 2010. The International Energy Agency (International Energy Agency, 
2012) has calculated how much emissions are released by which sectors in each country that is 
compatible with these two futures. UK emissions have been deducted so as not to double count 
them. As with the UK, the IEA projects emissions by high-level sectors and these have been 
disaggregated to 26 sectors to align with the sector detail in the input-output model. Not all 
greenhouse gases are given in the IEA analysis therefore emissions embodied in UK imports are 
measured as CO2 only.  
The input-output model defines 26 economic sectors for regions outside the UK. The IEA-ETP 
model explores pathways for reducing emissions in the following high-level sectors: Power 
generation, Industry (and other transformation), Transport, Residential and commercial 
buildings and Energy-related emissions from agriculture, fisheries, and other activities. The IEA 
provided emissions trajectories for the seven trading regions included in this analysis.  
To map IEA emissions by sector to 2050 aligned with the Eora input-output classification 
residential emissions were excluded as these are not part of intermediate production industries 
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that become embodied in products. Transport emissions associated with industry were 
calculated from transport emissions, which include private household transport that is not an 
intermediate production activity. Residential emissions from the IEA were subtracted from total 
household emissions in Eora which includes both housing and transport. This establishes the 
ratio of emissions for intermediate transport. Proportional analysis was used to disaggregate 
emissions trajectories for power, industry and a combined sector of agriculture, transport, and 
services to the more detailed 26 sectors in the input-output model (Table 13). This means that 
the proportion of emissions within high level sectors remain the same out to 2050. For example, 
if mining and quarrying made up 5% of industry emissions in 2010, they make up the same 
proportion of industry emissions in 2050. This mapping was completed by the Committee on 
Climate Change. 
Table 13: Mapping high level global production emissions to disaggregated SIC sectors 
No Eora sector description High level IEA sector allocation  
  1  Agriculture  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
  2  Fishing  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
  3  Mining and Quarrying  Industry 
  4  Food & Beverages  Industry 
  5  Textiles and Wearing Apparel  Industry 
  6  Wood and Paper  Industry 
  7  Petroleum, Chemical and Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products  
Industry 
  8  Metal Products  Industry 
  9  Electrical and Machinery  Industry 
  10  Transport Equipment  Industry 
  11  Other Manufacturing  Industry 
  12  Recycling  Industry 
  13  Electricity, Gas and Water  Power 
  14  Construction  Industry 
  15  Maintenance and Repair  Industry 
  16  Wholesale Trade  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
  17  Retail Trade  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
  18  Hotels and Restaurants  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
  19  Transport  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
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  20  Post and Telecommunications  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
  21  Financial Intermediation and Business Activities  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
  22  Public Administration  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
  23  Education, Health and Other Services  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
  24  Private Households  Agriculture, non-private transport, non-res. 
buildings, services 
  25  Others  N/A 
  26  Re-export & Re-import  N/A 
6.4 Direct carbon intensities of production sectors (fX) 
Production emissions by sector are divided by its projected economic output. This describes the 
carbon intensity generated per unit (£1) of output of each sector. The Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR) projections were used to project UK annual economic growth rates and IMF 
and other sources were used to project economic output in the seven trading regions. China and 
India for example are anticipated to have strong annual growth nearing 10% by 2020, reducing 
gradually thereafter. The UK and OECD Europe are anticipated to experience more steady 
growth, reaching their yearly highest (2.7% and 2.8%) between 2021 and 2025. The proportion 
of a given sector to total economic output is assumed to remain the same to 2050 (i.e. a 
manufacturing-intensive economy is anticipated to remain a manufacturing-intensive 
economy).    
6.5 Global trade transactions (L) 
The Eora database developed at the University of Sydney has the world’s largest and most 
detailed map of the structure of the global economy in the form of annual multi-region input-
out (MRIO) tables from 1990 to 20112 (Lenzen et al., 2012, Lenzen et al., 2013). The economic 
structure is represented by monetary transactions between a homogenous 26 industry sector 
classification for 187 countries, which has been aggregated to the UK and 7 trade regions: OECD 
Europe (excluding UK), non-European OECD, Russia, China, India, Rest of Asia and Rest of World. 
Both domestic transactions between sectors within countries and their imports and exports 
sales with sectors in other regions capture the complexity of global supply chains. Domestic, 
import and export transactions for the UK in Eora have been reconciled with the more detailed 
                                                          
2 In Lenzen et al. (2012) tables were available to 2009, and 1 further year have been developed 
at the time of research  
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110 sector classification from supply and use tables in UK National Accounts. This is consistent 
with the sector breakdown of the UK consumption-based emissions accounts published by the 
UK Department for Food and Rural Affairs (Defra, 2015).  
The transactions matrix representing trade between 292 sectors3 is kept constant (i.e. the 
manufacture of goods in 2050 will require the same mix of inputs as 2010; however the carbon 
efficiency of production and demand for goods will change). We recognise that there will be 
changes in the production structure, however modelling approaches to 2050 would fail to 
predict the complexity of 292 sectors interacting. Keeping the detail at this level provides further 
insights into the potential breakdown of future emissions, and production structure changes in 
the last 20 years have shown to contribute only marginal changes in the UK’s carbon footprint 
compared to changes driven by increased final demand and carbon intensity improvements 
(Baiocchi and Minx, 2010b).     
6.6 UK final demand (y) 
Final demand is recorded as final consumer spending on product groups determined as the 
finished goods and services produced by each production sector. Final demand categories are 
those that do not sell goods:  households, government and Not for Profit Institutions Serving 
Households (NPISH). UK final consumers purchase products both domestically and directly from 
overseas. It is assumed that the level of final demand grows in line with trends over the past 20 
years and that this growth is met increasingly by imports. Demand for imported products 
increase at the average annual growth rate of the past 20 years (2.75%) informed by the 20 year 
time series in Eora (MRIO), and growth in domestic demand for domestic consumption equates 
to an average 1.9% growth per annum. The import share of GDP would increase to around 40% 
by 2050. 50% of this share is from emerging economies, compared to 29% in 2010. Additionally 
expenditure on fossil fuels is reduced and redistributed proportionally to all other product 
groups.   
Analysis 2: National climate policy implications of mitigating embodied 
energy system emissions 
6.7 Method summary  
This section provides a summary of the method to derive indirect emissions factors. Refer to 
(Daly et al., 2015) for full details of the method, data sources and modelling assumptions.   
                                                          
3 UK 110 sectors and 7 trading regions represented by 26 sectors each 
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Indirect emissions factors (IEFs) are generated, which measure the physical output of CO2 
emissions on the basis of activity of different economic sectors (CO2/£). This is done similar to 
Nansai (2012) using environmentally-extended multi-regional input-output (EE-MRIO) analysis 
(Miller and Blair, 2009), which is a peer reviewed method for calculating consumption-based 
emissions for the purpose of global sustainability analysis (Wiedmann, 2009). The MRIO model 
was selected for its system completeness and ability to account for traded emissions i.e. it 
captures the full supply-chain emissions of products depending on the emission intensity of 
generation in the country of production. System completeness does come at the expense of 
detail as sectors are highly aggregated, however the specific model selected has a disaggregated 
energy sector (Wiedmann et al., 2011). In the EE-MRIO model, emissions directly emitted by 
industry sectors are reallocated through complex supply chains to the finished products in which 
they become embodied. National consumption-based emissions are the sum of embodied 
carbon along these complex supply chains to meet absolute demand for finished products. 
IEFs are generated for each technology and fuel in the energy supply sectors of UKTM by 
allocating each element of UKTM to a sector in EE-MRIO. The EE-MRIO model generates 
emission factors for the whole lifecycle of economic activity, and since UKTM describes several 
stages of fuel production, double-counting is identified and removed. We convert this for UKTM 
using the capital cost of technologies in £M per unit of capacity (MW for power generation; PJ_a 
for other technologies and infrastructure) divided by the technology lifetime, to generate IEFs 
in terms of PJ_a and gCO2/MW for installed capacity, and gCO2/PJ for fuel imports and 
extraction.   
Because EE-MRIO describes two regions (UK and the rest of the world), the IEFs distinguish 
between emissions produced domestically and those generated abroad. Assumptions regarding 
the future emissions intensities for domestic and rest of world economic activity and the import 
dependency of the UK economy are developed.  
Indirect emissions, from both UK and overseas industry, were added to each stage of the energy 
system up to the point of use (i.e. demand technologies). The model integration captures the 
embodied emissions coming into the UK as well as those going out. If emissions embodied in 
imports are more than those embodied in exports there is a net positive indirect emissions 
budget. 
Analysis 3: Addressing globally traded emissions through domestic 
consumption policies 
6.8 Emissions accounting principles 
Under the UNFCCC, countries submit annual greenhouse gas emissions inventories from a 
territorial perspective, with a two year time lag before publication. If the territorial emissions 
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from the 28 countries that make up the European Union (EU) are summed, this equals the 
emissions released directly by sources within EU territory. In 2012 these were reported as 4,544 
Mt CO2e, with aviation and shipping recorded as a memorandum, at 281 Mt CO2e (European 
Environment Agency, 2014a). A production accounting approach is similar, however instead of 
summing emissions  occurring within national territories, it sums emissions the emissions 
produced by all institutional units resident in the economy that contribute to the country/ 
regions’ GDP (Peters, 2008). For example, aviation emissions are attributed to the country 
registered as operating the flights. Consumption-based emissions are equal to production 
emissions plus emissions embodied in imports minus emissions embodied in exports (Peters and 
Hertwich, 2008a). Exported emissions are attributed to the destination country. Using input-
output analysis we calculate EU consumption emissions as 7,222 Mt CO2e in 2007, the latest 
year available using the EXIOIBASE v2.2.0 MRIO database. For comparison, production emissions 
were 5,187 Mt in 2007.  
Kander et al. (2015) suggest that a technology-adjusted consumption-based emissions account 
is most adequate to measure climate mitigation progress. They argue that production-based 
accounting enables countries to reduce emissions within their territories whilst compensating 
by shifting carbon-intensive production abroad and taking a consumption approach does not 
credit countries for cleaning up their export production. A reduction in the carbon intensity of 
exports would be attributed to the country for which the exports are destined. Kander et al. 
propose a technology adjustment is applied to exports. Instead of subtracting exported 
emissions based on the carbon intensity of the exporting region, export-related emissions are 
subtracted based on the average carbon intensity for the relevant sector on the world market. 
In other words, if EU exports are less carbon intensive than the world average, the emissions 
subtracted from the technology-adjusted account would be greater than the pure consumption-
based one, attributing less total emissions to the EU. However, we argue that this ignores the 
historic processes of industrialisation that by-and-large enabled developed countries to 
specialise in low carbon activities, which is balanced by material and carbon intensive production 
in industrialising countries. Therefore, in line with attempts to present a fairness-based climate 
regime (Raupach et al., 2014, Grasso and Roberts, 2014, Steininger et al., 2014) we do not adjust 
for the carbon intensity of EU exports. 
6.9 Emissions-extended multi-region input-output analysis (EE-MRIOA) 
At the macro level EE-MRIOA is a well-established method to re-allocate emissions associated 
with production activities to the final demand of products i.e. consumption-based emissions 
(Wiedmann, 2009). In the 1930s Wassily Leontief developed a series of linear equations that 
describe how producing a single unit of final demand requires inputs from all sectors of the 
economy. The economic framework was later extended to include a vector of ‘externalities’ 
which measured tonnes of pollution per unit of output for each industrial sector (e.g. CO2/ £). 
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The different sectors of an economy not only require natural resources in order to produce 
different goods and services, but they also generate several by-products (e.g. pollution and 
waste) during their production processes. Calculations could then determine how pollution 
originating from producing sectors could be reallocated to the final users of goods and services.  
6.9.1 Input-Output (IO) Calculations 
Consider a transactions matrix Z (Figure 17), showing sales by each sector (rows) and the 
purchases by each sector (columns). Reading across a row reveals which other sectors a single 
industry sells to and reading down a column reveals who a single sector buys from in order to 
make its product output. A single element, 𝐳𝐢𝐣, within 𝐙 represents the contributions from the 
ith supplying sector to the jth producing sector in an economy. The 𝐙 matrix is in monetary units. 
Figure 17: Components used for environmentally-extended input-output analysis 
 
Reading across the table, the total output (𝐱𝐢) of a particular sector can be expressed as: 
 𝐱𝐢=𝐳𝐢𝟏 + 𝐳𝐢𝟐 + ⋯ + 𝐳𝐢𝐧 + 𝐲𝐢 (1) 
 
where 𝐲𝐢 is the final demand for that product produced by the particular sector. The IO 
framework shows that the total output of a sector is the sum of its intermediate and final 
demand. Similarly if a column of the IO table is considered, the total input of a sector is the sum 
of its intermediate demand and value added in profits and wages (𝐡).  
If each element, 𝐳𝐢𝐣, along row i is divided by the output 𝐱𝐣, associated with the corresponding 
column j it is found in, then each element in 𝐙 can be replaced with: 





forming a new matrix 𝐀, known as the direct requirements matrix. Element 𝐚𝐢𝐣 is therefore the 
input as a proportion of all the inputs in the production recipe of that product. 
(2) can be re-written as: 
 𝐳𝐢𝐣 = 𝐚𝐢𝐣𝐱𝐣 (3) 
 
Substituting for (3) in (1) forms: 
 𝐱𝐢=𝐚𝐢𝟏𝐱𝟏 + 𝐚𝐢𝟐𝐱𝟐 + ⋯ + 𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐱𝐧 + 𝐲𝐢 (4) 
 
Which, in matrix notation is  + 𝐲 . Solving for 𝐱 gives: 
 𝐱 = (𝐈 − 𝐀)−𝟏𝐲 (5) 
 
(5) is known as the Leontief equation and describes output 𝐱 as a function of final demand 𝐲. 𝐈  
is the identity matrix, and 𝐀 shows the inter-industry requirements.  (𝐈 − 𝐀)−𝟏 is known as the 
Leontief inverse (denoted hereafter as 𝐋). (5) can be re-written as: 
 𝐱 = 𝐋𝐲 (6) 
 
Consider a row vector 𝐟 of annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions emitted by each production 
sector. It is possible to calculate emissions intensity (𝐞) by dividing the total emissions of each 
sector by total sector output (𝐱). 
 𝐞 = 𝐟?̂?−𝟏 (7) 
 
In other words, 𝐞 is the coefficient vector representing emissions per unit of output.  
Multiplying both sides of (6) by 𝐞 gives: 
 𝐞𝐱 =  𝐞𝐋𝐲 (8) 
and from (7) we simplify (8) to: 
 𝐟 =  𝐞𝐋𝐲 (9) 
 
However, we need the result (𝐟) as a flow matrix (𝐐), showing the source sector and region of 
emissions embodied in all products, and so we use the diagonalised ?̂? and ?̂?: 
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 𝐐 =  ?̂?𝐋?̂? (10) 
 
𝐐 is the consumption based emissions account calculated by pre-multiplying 𝐋 by emissions per 
unit of output and post-multiplying by final demand. Emissions are reallocated from production 
sectors to final products.  
6.9.2 Data sources 
We use the 2007 Symmetric EXIOBASE v2.2.0 database (Tukker et al., 2013) representing 163 
production sectors and product groups, and 7 final consumers, aggregated from 48 countries/ 
regions to 3 regions: the EU, non-EU Annex I countries and non-Annex countries. We distinguish 
between imports from Annex I and non-Annex I countries, as Annex I have existing quantified 
emissions reductions targets and whilst outside the EU ETS, they are being addressed by an 
emissions cap. This is expected to change as countries prepare their intended nationally 
determined contributions (INDCs) to climate actions to be negotiated at the 2015 UNFCCC 
climate summit. Only final demand by EU consumers is considered i.e. we exclude final demand 
outside the EU. We use the greenhouse gas emissions extension. The results matrix shows the 
sector and regional source of emissions embodied in 163 sectors across 3 regions. The 163 
sectors are aggregated into 6 high-level sectors for Figure 12 in chapter 4, listed in Table 14. 
Operational emissions released directly by households for heating and travel sit outside the IO 
database as they do not flow through an intermediate sector. Operational EU emissions are also 
sourced from the EXIOBASE v2.2.0 database (Tukker 2013), and only the embodied emissions 
are calculated using EE-MRIOA.  
Table 14: Results sectors and aggregation 
Sector 
no. 
Sector name Aggregation 
0 Cultivation of paddy rice Agriculture 
1 Cultivation of wheat Agriculture 
2 Cultivation of cereal grains nec Agriculture 
3 Cultivation of vegetables, fruit, nuts Agriculture 
4 Cultivation of oil seeds Agriculture 
5 Cultivation of sugar cane, sugar beet Agriculture 
6 Cultivation of plant-based fibers Agriculture 
7 Cultivation of crops nec Agriculture 
8 Cattle farming Agriculture 
9 Pigs farming Agriculture 
10 Poultry farming Agriculture 
11 Meat animals nec Agriculture 
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12 Animal products nec Agriculture 
13 Raw milk Agriculture 
14 Wool, silk-worm cocoons Agriculture 
15 Manure treatment (conventional), storage and land 
application 
Agriculture 
16 Manure treatment (biogas), storage and land 
application 
Agriculture 
17 Forestry, logging and related service activities Agriculture 
18 Fishing, operating of fish hatcheries and fish farms; 
service activities incidental to fishing 
Agriculture 
19 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat Prim. materials 
20 Extraction of crude petroleum and services related to 
crude oil extraction, excluding surveying 
Prim. materials 
21 Extraction of natural gas and services related to natural 
gas extraction, excluding surveying 
Prim. materials 
22 Extraction, liquefaction, and regasification of other 
petroleum and gaseous materials 
Prim. materials 
23 Mining of uranium and thorium ores Prim. materials 
24 Mining of iron ores Prim. materials 
25 Mining of copper ores and concentrates Prim. materials 
26 Mining of nickel ores and concentrates Prim. materials 
27 Mining of aluminium ores and concentrates Prim. materials 
28 Mining of precious metal ores and concentrates Prim. materials 
29 Mining of lead, zinc and tin ores and concentrates Prim. materials 
30 Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores and 
concentrates 
Prim. materials 
31 Quarrying of stone Prim. materials 
32 Quarrying of sand and clay Prim. materials 
33 Mining of chemical and fertilizer minerals, production 
of salt, other mining and quarrying n.e.c. 
Prim. materials 
34 Processing of meat cattle Agriculture 
35 Processing of meat pigs Agriculture 
36 Processing of meat poultry Agriculture 
37 Production of meat products nec Agriculture 
38 Processing vegetable oils and fats Agriculture 
39 Processing of dairy products Agriculture 
40 Processed rice Agriculture 
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41 Sugar refining Agriculture 
42 Processing of Food products nec Agriculture 
43 Manufacture of beverages Agriculture 
44 Manufacture of fish products Agriculture 
45 Manufacture of tobacco products Agriculture 
46 Manufacture of textiles Prim. materials 
47 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing 
of fur 
Prim. materials 
48 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of 
luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
Prim. materials 
49 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and 
cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw 
and plaiting materials 
Prim. materials 
50 Re-processing of secondary wood material into new 
wood material 
Prim. materials 
51 Pulp Prim. materials 
52 Re-processing of secondary paper into new pulp Prim. materials 
53 Paper Prim. materials 
54 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
Prim. materials 
55 Manufacture of coke oven products Prim. materials 
56 Petroleum Refinery Prim. materials 
57 Processing of nuclear fuel Prim. materials 
58 Plastics, basic Prim. materials 
59 Re-processing of secondary plastic into new plastic Prim. materials 
60 N-fertiliser Prim. materials 
61 P- and other fertiliser Prim. materials 
62 Chemicals nec Prim. materials 
63 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products Prim. materials 
64 Manufacture of glass and glass products Prim. materials 
65 Re-processing of secondary glass into new glass Prim. materials 
66 Manufacture of ceramic goods Prim. materials 
67 Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products, 
in baked clay 
Prim. materials 
68 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster Prim. materials 
69 Re-processing of ash into clinker Prim. materials 
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70 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
n.e.c. 
Prim. materials 
71 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 
and first products thereof 
Prim. materials 
72 Re-processing of secondary steel into new steel Prim. materials 
73 Precious metals production Prim. materials 
74 Re-processing of secondary preciuos metals into new 
preciuos metals 
Prim. materials 
75 Aluminium production Prim. materials 
76 Re-processing of secondary aluminium into new 
aluminium 
Prim. materials 
77 Lead, zinc and tin production Prim. materials 
78 Re-processing of secondary lead into new lead Prim. materials 
79 Copper production Prim. materials 
80 Re-processing of secondary copper into new copper Prim. materials 
81 Other non-ferrous metal production Prim. materials 
82 Re-processing of secondary other non-ferrous metals 
into new other non-ferrous metals 
Prim. materials 
83 Casting of metals Prim. materials 
84 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
Manuf. goods 
85 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. Manuf. goods 
86 Manufacture of office machinery and computers Manuf. goods 
87 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 
n.e.c. 
Manuf. goods 
88 Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
Manuf. goods 
89 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 
Manuf. goods 
90 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
Manuf. goods 
91 Manufacture of other transport equipment Manuf. goods 
92 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. Manuf. goods 
93 Recycling of waste and scrap Manuf. goods 
94 Recycling of bottles by direct reuse Manuf. goods 
95 Production of electricity by coal Power 
96 Production of electricity by gas Power 
97 Production of electricity by nuclear Power 
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98 Production of electricity by hydro Power 
99 Production of electricity by wind Power 
100 Production of electricity by petroleum and other oil 
derivatives 
Power 
101 Production of electricity by biomass and waste Power 
102 Production of electricity by solar photovoltaic Power 
103 Production of electricity by solar thermal Power 
104 Production of electricity by tide, wave, ocean Power 
105 Production of electricity by Geothermal Power 
106 Production of electricity nec Power 
107 Transmission of electricity Power 
108 Distribution and trade of electricity Power 
109 Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels 
through mains 
Prim. materials 
110 Steam and hot water supply Prim. materials 
111 Collection, purification and distribution of water Prim. materials 
112 Construction Manuf. goods 
113 Re-processing of secondary construction material into 
aggregates 
Manuf. goods 
114 Sale, maintenance, repair of motor vehicles, motor 
vehicles parts, motorcycles, motor cycles parts and 
accessories 
Transport 
115 Retail sale of automotive fuel Transport 
116 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 
Services 
117 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
repair of personal and household goods 
Services 
118 Hotels and restaurants Services 
119 Transport via railways Transport 
120 Other land transport Transport 
121 Transport via pipelines Transport 
122 Sea and coastal water transport Transport 
123 Inland water transport Transport 
124 Air transport Transport 
125 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities 
of travel agencies 
Transport 
126 Post and telecommunications Services 
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127 Financial intermediation, except insurance and 
pension funding 
Services 
128 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory 
social security 
Services 
129 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation Services 
130 Real estate activities Services 
131 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator 
and of personal and household goods 
Services 
132 Computer and related activities Services 
133 Research and development Services 
134 Other business activities Services 
135 Public administration and defence; compulsory social 
security 
Services 
136 Education Services 
137 Health and social work Services 
138 Incineration of waste: Food Manuf. goods 
139 Incineration of waste: Paper Manuf. goods 
140 Incineration of waste: Plastic Manuf. goods 
141 Incineration of waste: Metals and Inert materials Manuf. goods 
142 Incineration of waste: Textiles Manuf. goods 
143 Incineration of waste: Wood Manuf. goods 
144 Incineration of waste: Oil/Hazardous waste Manuf. goods 
145 Biogasification of food waste, incl. land application Manuf. goods 
146 Biogasification of paper, incl. land application Manuf. goods 
147 Biogasification of sewage slugde, incl. land application Manuf. goods 
148 Composting of food waste, incl. land application Manuf. goods 
149 Composting of paper and wood, incl. land application Manuf. goods 
150 Waste water treatment, food Manuf. goods 
151 Waste water treatment, other Manuf. goods 
152 Landfill of waste: Food Manuf. goods 
153 Landfill of waste: Paper Manuf. goods 
154 Landfill of waste: Plastic Manuf. goods 
155 Landfill of waste: Inert/metal/hazardous Manuf. goods 
156 Landfill of waste: Textiles Manuf. goods 
157 Landfill of waste: Wood Manuf. goods 
158 Activities of membership organisation n.e.c. Services 
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159 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities Services 
160 Other service activities Services 
161 Private households with employed persons Services 
162 Extra-territorial organizations and bodies Services 
 
6.9.3 Data validation 
The choice of data used has implications for the results. In the last five years, several MRIO 
databases with an emissions extension have been developed described in Table 15. Limitations 
in the availability, consistency and quality of global trade data has meant tables are constructed 
using various approaches (Inomata and Owen, 2014). The MRIO databases differ in their 
geographical, sectoral and temporal coverage. Eora has the longest annual time series from 
1990 to 2012 and the largest geographical scope covering 186 world regions. EXIOBASE uses the 
most detailed sector classification, displaying each region’s economy in 163 production sectors.  
Table 15: EE-MRIO models 







Eora Varies by 
country from 26 
to 515 sectors4 
187 1990 – 
2012 
Annual updates 
with 2 year 
time lag 
(Lenzen et al., 2012, 
Lenzen et al., 2013) 
GTAP 57 129 (yr ‘07); 
113 (yr ‘04); 




3 year intervals 
with a 4 year 
time lag 
(Narayanan et al., 
2012, Peters et al., 
2011) 







(Tukker et al., 2013, 
Wood et al., 2015) 
WIOD 35 industries, 
59 products 










We selected to use the Exiobase (v2.2.0) MRIO model as it has the greatest sector 
disaggregation. This gives us the greatest scope to isolate material and product groups more 
readily, and sectors that are capped within the EU ETS. Table 16 compares the production and 
consumption emissions of different MRIO models. We also compare the original Exiobase results 
with our aggregated 3 region model. Consumption emissions in the aggregated model are within 
1.5% of the original 48 region model. 
                                                          
4 The original database has heterogeneous country sector classification systems, however a 
harmonised 26 sector model is available 
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Table 16: Comparison of greenhouse gas emissions data across MRIO models for 2007, 
unless specified otherwise 
MRIO database/ project Production emissions (Mt CO2e) Consumption emissions (Mt CO2e) 
EXIOBASE v2.2.0 (3 region) 5213 7256 
EXIOBASE v2.2.0 (original) 5213  7369  
Eora 5184  7369  
Eureapa 5093 [2004] 6568 [2004] 
Global carbon atlas 4028 [only CO2] 5120 [only CO2] 
WIOD 5246 6867 
 
Understanding uncertainties in the data gives an indication of the robustness of outcomes 
(Inomata and Owen, 2014) for use in policy making. Environmentally extended-MRIO analysis 
relies on the compilation of secondary economic, environmental and trade data into a MRIO 
framework. As shown by Peters et al. (2012a) different results across different models and 
studies can be attributed to the use of different production emissions data sources, different 
definitions of consumption and different economic and trade structures (supported by (Lenzen 
et al., 2010, Wiedmann et al., 2008, Wilting, 2012)).There are many ways in which the data can 
be assembled and adjusted (Inomata and Owen, 2014) and each alteration to the original source 
data introduces a layer of uncertainty. National economic data needs to be converted into a 
common currency and monetary transactions converted into basic prices. This requires price 
conversion statistics and taxes and subsidies to be re-distributed from a product to a value 
added sector. Where national data is missing, estimations are required such as the use of a 
representative average. MRIO tables must also adhere to a number of properties such as inputs 
must equal outputs and the sum of value added must equal the sum of the final demand. If these 
conditions are not met in the raw data, then the table is subjected to a number of balancing 
iterations until a table is produced that satisfies these constraints. Balancing methods vary and 
there are numerous techniques for table construction which leads to uncertainty in the final 
result.  
In addition, the aggregation of economic sectors introduces uncertainty. Firms are grouped into 
broader economic sectors, each representing a weighted average of the characteristics of the 
firms within them (Steen-Olsen et al., 2014). Steen-Olsen et al. (2014) show that this is more of 
a problem for environmental analyses, as industries within a sector can exhibit different 
emissions profiles with an order of magnitude difference. For example, a carbon intensity is 
often applied to the agricultural sector when calculating consumption emissions. This 
aggregated sector includes a wide range of crops, animals, practices and so forth. However, 
cattle farming are considerably more carbon intensive than other types of agriculture. The 
choice of aggregation can therefore lead to different impact results. Grouping data together that 
exhibit very different emission intensities will lead to calculations containing more uncertainty.  
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In a comparison of the main databases, Owen et al. (2014) find that differences in national 
consumption emissions accounts across the models are largely explained by differences in total 
global emissions from different data sources, differences in the trade structures, and differences 
in total final demand. (Peters et al., 2012a) found that consumption-based emissions are broadly 
consistent across studies and MRIO databases, despite some differences in the model 
compilation, and that the difference didn’t necessarily translate into uncertainty but were a 
result of several data sources and definitions of consumption. Variation in the territorial 
emissions accounts, and the attribution of these emissions to countries and sectors, was found 
to be much larger than the variation in economic and trade input data. Transport and energy 
intensive sectors exhibited the most variation in results along with small trade dependant 
countries and countries with poor data quality.  
6.9.4 Isolating the emissions associated with energy-using products 
We calculate the total emissions embodied in products regulated by existing EU directives, 
which currently focus on energy, and not resource, efficiency. This measures the maximum 
reach of emissions of adopting resource efficiency standards that address the fully supply chain 
inputs of products. At EU level, the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Ecodesign Directive, and the 
Energy Performance of Buildings Directive are the main elements of energy efficiency policy, 
and we include obligatory vehicle emissions standards. The general energy efficiency targets do 
not relate to a specific product(s) and therefore we investigate the following: 
 The Ecodesign Directive - sets design requirements for energy-related products e.g. 
televisions, washing machines and electric motors. 
 Energy Performance of Buildings Directive - aims at improving energy efficiency in the 
building sector, both for the existing building stock as well as for the newly-constructed 
buildings.  
 Obligatory vehicle emissions standards - EU Regulation No 443/2009 sets an average 
CO2 emissions target for new passenger cars and light commercial vehicles, getting 
tighter with time. 
Each energy-using product group captured by the three EU directives are assigned a 
representative sector(s) in Exiobase, shown in Table 17. The embodied greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with both intermediate and final demand are calculated. This section 
explains how to use input-output analysis to identify the sum of the emissions flows that are 
associated with products using the example of vehicles. The same logic applies for buildings and 
appliances.  
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Table 17: Product mapping 
Energy-using products captured by 
EU directives 
Exiobase production sector(s) 
Vehicles Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Buildings Construction 
Appliances Manufacture of office machinery and computers;  
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.;  
Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
  
The supply chain emissions associated with vehicles can take one of four forms (see Figure 18). 
Case 1 is the emissions associated with any industry that ends up embodied in a vehicle 
purchased by an EU final consumer, e.g. emissions from the steel industry that make a car 
bought by a household. Case 2 is the emissions associated with the vehicle industry that ends 
up in a final demand product, e.g. the on-site emissions from a car making factory and the car is 
then bought by a delivery service which is used by a household. Case 3 is the emissions 
associated with any supply chain that involves the vehicle sector, e.g. the emissions associated 
with the steel industry that go into a car used for delivery services bought by a household. Case 
4 are emissions associated with an industry that makes a product that goes directly to final 
demand without being part of any intermediate stages. E.g. emissions associated with a vehicle 
factory making cars bought by households. It is argued that EU resource efficiency policy on 
vehicles will reduce the emissions in each of the four cases. 
Figure 18: Supply chain emissions associated with vehicles (purple represents vehicles and 
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Let 𝐙 be the MRIO table containing three regions (European Union (EU) and Annex I and non-
Annex I countries) and 163 industrial sectors and 𝐀 is the corresponding direct requirements 
matrix. To calculate the emissions that are associated with any supply chain involving vehicles 
that are a result of EU final demand we first calculate 𝐐𝐄𝐔 = 𝐞𝐋𝐲𝐄𝐔, the EU consumption-based 
account. We next calculate 𝐐𝐄𝐔
𝟎 , the EU consumption-based account if there were no flows 
involving vehicles. The emissions associated with any supply chain involving vehicles that result 
from EU final demand is 𝐐𝐄𝐔
𝐯 , which is the difference between 𝐐𝐄𝐔 and 𝐐𝐄𝐔
𝟎 . However, this only 
captures emissions that are involved in a flow between one industry and another—i.e. cases 1 
to 3 from Figure 18. Those emissions that go directly from the vehicle sector to final demand of 
vehicles (case 4) need to also be included in 𝐐𝐄𝐔
𝐯 . These ‘direct path’ emissions are denoted 𝐟𝐯. 
Thus 
 𝐐𝐄𝐔
𝐯 =  𝐐𝐄𝐔 − 𝐐𝐄𝐔
𝟎 + 𝐟𝐯 (11) 
 
We next discuss how to isolate the individual parts of equation 11, starting with 𝐟𝐯, the ‘direct 
paths’. 
Let 𝑀 be the set of 163 industrial sectors denoted 1 to 𝑚 and including sector 𝑣, which is the 
vehicles sector. 
 {𝑀 |𝑀 ∈ ℕ1, 𝑀 = 1,2, … 𝑣, … , 𝑚} (12) 
 
Let 𝑁 be the set of regions drawn from numbers 1 to 𝑛 and including region 𝑘 representing the 
EU. 
 {𝑁 |𝑁 ∈ ℕ1, 𝑁 = 1,2, … , 𝑘, … , 𝑛} (13) 
 
The dimensions of 𝐙 are 𝑚𝑛 × 𝑚𝑛, where 𝑖 represents the set of row numbers from 1 to 𝑚𝑛 
and 𝑗 represents the set of column numbers from 1 to 𝑚𝑛. The dimensions of 𝐲 are 𝑚𝑛 ×  𝑛. In 
this example, there is only a single demand category per country. The final demand has been 
aggregated. 
 {𝑖 |𝑖 ∈ ℕ1, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑚𝑛} (14) 
 {𝑗 |𝑗 ∈ ℕ1, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑚𝑛} (15) 
 
Let 𝑖0 be a subset of 𝑖 such that it contains those row elements that represent the vehicle sector 
from the EU. 
 {𝑖0  ⊂ 𝑖| 𝑖0 = 𝑣 + (𝑘 − 1)𝑚} (16) 
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Let 𝑗0 be a subset of 𝑗 such that it only contains those column elements that represent the EU 
vehicle sectors. 
 {𝑗0  ⊂ 𝑗| 𝑗0 = 𝑣 + (𝑘 − 1)𝑚} (17) 
 
To calculate the sum of the ‘direct paths’, 𝐟𝐯, we first find the direct EU emissions emitted to 
satisfy total EU final demand for vehicle products. To do this we multiply only those elements in 
𝐲 that represent EU final demand for vehicles with the corresponding EU vehicle emissions 
intensity element from 𝐞. The simplest way of achieive this is to generate a new final demand 
matrix 𝐲𝟎 containing zeros in all cells except the EU final demand for EU vehicles. The non-zero 
element will be in the cell in position (𝑣 + (𝑘 − 1)𝑚, 𝑘).  
Element 𝑦𝑖𝑛
0  from the matrix 𝐲𝟎 is zero when 𝑖 is not in the set of 𝑖0 and 𝑛 is not equal to 𝑘. 
Otherwise, 𝑦𝑖𝑛
0  is the same as 𝑦𝑖𝑛. 
 {
𝑦𝑖𝑗
0 = 𝑦𝑖𝑗  ↔ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑖
0 ∩ 𝑛 = 𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑛




 𝐟𝐯 = 𝐞𝐲𝟎 (19) 
 
Next we need to calculate the EU consumption-based account if there were no flows involving 
vehicles. This is 𝐐𝐄𝐔
𝟎 = 𝐞𝐋𝟎𝐲𝐄𝐔 where 𝐋
𝟎 =  (𝐈 − 𝐀𝟎)
−𝟏
. 𝐀𝟎 is the same as 𝐀 but contains zeros 
in the rows and columns that represent EU vehicle industries. Thus: 
 {
𝑎𝑖𝑗
0 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗  ↔ 𝑖 ∉ 𝑖
0 ∩ 𝑗 ∉ 𝑗0
𝑎𝑖𝑗
0 = 0 ↔ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑖0 ∪ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑗0
} (20) 
 
Once 𝐀𝟎has been calculated, we can then calculate 𝐋𝟎 and 𝐐𝐄𝐔
𝟎  . Finally, now 𝐐𝐄𝐔, 𝐐𝐄𝐔
𝟎  and 𝐟𝐯 
are known,  the final calculation of 𝐐𝐄𝐔
𝐯  can be made following equation 11. 
To calculate the total potential across all manufactured groups you cannot sum the emissions 
as calculated above for each product as there will be some overlap. For example, the emissions 
reach of EU vehicles includes all sectors that purchase vehicles from the EU at some point along 
their supply chain. Both the construction and appliances sectors will have purchased from the 
vehicles sector e.g. for product distribution and staff travel. These emissions are therefore 
calculated to be within the scope of all three’s influence. To estimate the emissions within the 
reach of all manufactured goods with any double counting removed, we also calculated a ‘total 
scope’ where all sectors defined as material-intensive manufacturing were included in the one 
calculation, and hence double counting between products was removed.  
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6.9.5 Emissions capped within the EU ETS 
We evaluate how many of the embodied emissions in the products analysed are produced in 
sectors capped under the EU ETS, and therefore are within the scope of existing EU climate 
policy. From the emissions results matrix we can identify the source of emissions (region and 
sector) embodied in the products analysed. For each product we measure the emissions 
produced in economic sectors which we identify as being included in the EU ETS (Table 18).  
Table 18: Mapping EU ETS sectors with Exiobase sectors 
EU Pulp Pulp 
EU Paper Paper 
EU Manufacture of coke oven products Coke ovens 
EU Petroleum Refinery Oil refineries 
EU Plastics, basic Petrochemicals 
EU N-fertiliser Petrochemicals 
EU P- and other fertiliser Petrochemicals 
EU Chemicals nec Petrochemicals 
EU Manufacture of rubber and plastic products Petrochemicals 
EU Manufacture of glass and glass products Glass 
EU Manufacture of ceramic goods Ceramics 
EU Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay Bricks 
EU Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster Cement and lime 
EU Re-processing of ash into clinker Clinker 
EU Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys and first products 
thereof 
Iron and steel 
plants 
EU Aluminium production Aluminium 
EU Production of electricity by coal Power stations 
EU Production of electricity by gas Power stations 
EU Production of electricity by nuclear Power stations 
EU Production of electricity by petroleum and other oil derivatives Power stations 
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